


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THE POLITICAL HISTORY

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JOHN BULL;

OR,

THE TRUE ENGLISHMAN,

NEITHER A REPUBLICAN NOR AN ARISTOCRAT.

I know their political juggling, Things which ftartie Reafon, and make me deem Not this, nor that, but every Conflitution falfc.

ADDRESSED BY JOHN BULL

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM PITT.

ALSO,

REMARKS

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ELECTIVE

POWER OF THE PEOPLE,

AND

THE CONSTITUTION OF PARLIAMENT,

WITH PROPOSITIONS FOR ACCOMPLISHING AN EQUAL AND ADE-QUATE REPRESENTATION OF

> THE COMMONS OF GREAT-BRITAIN IN PARLIAMENT,

> > AND

A CONSTITUTIONAL MODE OF REFORM.


BY THOMAS BROUGHTON.

Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find Talk and Difcourfe, but to weigh and confider. BACON.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR AND SOLD BY J. OWEN, NO. 168, PICCADILLY, AND J. BEW IN PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1792.



ADVERTISEMENT.

UBL 12/2/38 S the observations contained in the following Papers were made prior to the Frecent debate in the House of Commons on Ethe neceffity of a Parliamentary Reform, and before a number of independent Gentlemen affociated to effect that grand purpose, it is but a just tribute to the patriotism and respectability of those real friends of the people to obferve, that they answer the description, both in principles and worth, of those truly inde-2 6 1938 pendent characters, who are here reprefented as the only proper perfons to effect this effen- $\stackrel{\sim}{\prec}$ tial meafure. And as they wifely proceed on conftitutional grounds, they merit the unanimous fupport of the whole nation; that these are my humble, unbiassed sentiments, will, I truft, be proved from the freedom of the following cafual remarks ; in which it will appear that JOHN BULL is neither a Ministerialist nor Anti-ministerialist, nor Whig nor Tory.

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[vi]

Tory. He cannot reconcile the idea of a division of the common interest: he is convinced the very name of Party augurs a hoftile intention against his liberties; and after much conversation we had together on this subject, it was with infinite concern on his part he concluded, that he could not look up with confidence to either fide for the fupport of his real intereft: he was afraid that those who avowedly oppofed Ministers in every measure were in pursuit of the Hesperian Garden; and if they could flay the dragon, they would take possession of the golden fruit. and notwithstanding all their fair promifes, still leave him in the lurch. He had no hopes left; fecret and corrupt influence had thrown a contempt on patriotifm, and eftablifhed a paradoxical fyftem, wherein integrity and abilities were confidered as hoftile, and cunning and treachery alone found favour; and he had now no other alternative than to encourage the union of independent country gentlemen and citizens to obtain a free

free and equal reprefentation, that practical Government might combine with the admirable theory of his Conftitution. He was a plain Englishman, unhacknied in the arts of managing a Parliament or a Party; but inflexibly determined to maintain the free operation of his Conflitution with his life and fortune. This he wished might be understood to be a principle he drew in with his breath; it lived with him, and could only be annihihilated with his perfon. As for myfelf, who am but the humble vehicle of his fentiments, I beg leave to obferve, if in the generous ardor of liberty, and the fincere reverence for a Conftitution effablished by the wildom of fuccesfive ages, fome propositions and terms should escape me of too politive a nature, every true friend to conflitutional liberty will put a liberal conftruction on every attempt to defend those principles, which, for this last century, have attracted the admiration, as well as excited the envy of all Europe; and every fuch friend to our Conftitution will overlook the animated

(viii)

animated manner a free discussion of its abuses demands, as an unavoidable effect of the true fpirit of liberty. It is therefore with deference and refpect I appeal to the understanding of every reader, that if my expressions on the abufe in the National Reprefentation, which is the leading fubject of investigation, should appear to be conveyed with too much fervor, I hope to find an apology in their own feelings. At the fame time I am confcious, that neither fatire can influence the candid and impartial, nor warmth of expression convince the better informed. My object will be accomplished, if my endeavours shall induce one from the many better qualified to refume a fubject the most important to every Briton.

THOMAS BROUGHTON.

August 8th, 1792.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM PITT.

SIR,

THE language of flattery is grateful to the ear; and though it conveys an infult to the fenfe, the understanding applauds the facrifice, and deals to it both favour and friendship. But the voice of fincerity frequently conveys a fting which wounds the pride of felf-love; and notwithstanding the difpleafure it excites, is palliated by the inward conviction of its truth ; a real friend is too often confidered in the light of an enemy. These prefatory remarks disclose to you my intention; which, as a man loyal to his King, and zealous in the fupport of the civil and religious liberties confirmed at the Revolution, duty rather imposes than choice dictates, the detailing of vices which are growing on the Conftitution.

I lament

τo

I lament that you, Sir, formed by nature and education for eminence, adorned with the beft private virtues, and graced with abilities early matured by your immortal father, fhould become a facrifice to *Borough traffic*. But I more than lament, that a Conftitution in its component parts fo well conftructed, in its effect fo aptly defigned for public profperity and private happinefs, fhould in its Democratic part, by that traffic, labour under an Ariftocratic gangrene.

In your integrity your friends may place a confidence; but individual rectitude, cannot flem the contagion of former Administrations. Abuses are too fresh in the public mind to induce it to repose implicitly in a fallible man. The wisdom of past ages has given to posterity the independence of Parliament as the facred palladium of British liberty. But this bulwark of freedom is held by so precarious a tenure, that for many years past the absolute necessfity of a Reform in the National RepreReprefentation has refounded from every quarter of the kingdom. The rights of the people demand an equal and free reprefentation. On this point the collected wildom of the nation centers. The great majority of people are impreffed with one fentiment, " That the Conftitution is a glorious fabric." But the chief pillar of its fupport has been for years decaying; the ftamina is contaminated; the freedom of election is perverted, and by that perversion the Constitution of Parliament is violated. It is this corrupted part of the Conftitution that affords to republicanism a triumph. It is this which gives to faction a form and figure.

Painful as the conviction of thefe facts are in the breaft of every true Englishman, yet the facred maxim of his Constitution, which gives a remedy when a right is invaded, exalts his mind to its true dignity, that with an equanimity which equality and justice only produces, he can look up to power with a refolution

(xii)

folution which will triumph over oppreffion, and maintain his rights. No one act, therefore, can you atchieve that will enhance your name fo much with pofterity, as to meet the times with a temperate reform. This is the great crifis of your public career; your patriotifm and your reputation are at iffue; embrace the tide now flowing to immortal honour; the wifhes, the endeavours, and the interests of the fober, independent part of the nation are with you; face the enemy in the first instance, and the levelling hydra will fink into oblivion; it gains ftrength from your fears; it merely exifts by the delay of a measure which will conciliate all disaffection, preferve the texture and genius of our happy conftitution, and redound to the honour of the first free kingdom in the world.

These, Sir, are the sentiments of a loyal people; men impressed with the love of their country; men whose ardent wisses are to draw from the wholesome statutes of the land their

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their priftine vigour, whole efforts will be to maintain the energy of their representation.

In reply to this it will be alledged, and I am ready to meet the hacknied affertions, that it is much easier to complain than to remedy; that materials are eafily found, but defects are not fo readily fupplied. Innovations are hurtful, operating on particulars, they excite prejudice. Let us not touch the basis, left the breath of anarchy should diffipate the fabric. Such ignoble fentiments on a constitutional necessary measure, if not interested, are unworthy of an enlightened people, and degrade a free nation; all ranks of people reverence royalty; every true Englifhman will fupport the Crown; but there is not a man but knows the Crown has no longer any analogy to liberty than as the reprefentatives of the people are independent. and the Parliament free.

If my refpect furmounted my duty, I might have forborn to have reminded you of your illustrious

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illustrious father. May the filial remembrance of him stimulate you to this glorious pursuit. The establishing of constitutional liberty on its true foundation is worthy of honour; it will acquire you immortal fame. Permit me to fay, it is your duty to set at defiance the Aristocratic party in the House of Commons. Your first engagement was to promote and effect a reform in Parliament.

The olive branch now courts the laurel; remove therefore the maſk from the Genius of the Conflitution, and the nation will entwine your brow with the emblems of liberty. Recorded honours will hover round your name. The difappointed levellers may cavil at your fucceſs; but future ages will engrave your virtues on marble. Animated with a true zeal for the real interefts of the kingdom,

I am,

Right Honourable SIR,

Your Friend,

JOHN BULL.

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THE

POLITICAL HISTORY

OF

JOHN BULL.

SECTION I.

A brief Sketch of the Character of JOHN BULL, with a prefatory Dialogue, containing Remarks on the Republican and Ariflocratic Doctrines of the Day.

A S a man cannot in all cafes fpeak of himfelf without the imputation of vanity, it may be neceffary first to premise the character of JOHN BULL. A favourable preposse field in the character of a favourable circumstance, which, though not always within our reach, merits our utmoss endeavours to attain. If this attempt should fail, it must be attributed to a deficiency of talents in the author justly to delineate his worthy appellant. For if generous principles display the dignity of man, John Bull by Nature posses the best gifts of Heaven; philanthropy ennobles his heart, and inspires his mind with the most liberal fentiments;

in

in which courage and charity contending for eminence, honour interfered, and united them. Dignified as he is in difpolition, yet he is too credulous, which arifes from those principles of fecurity he had early imbibed from his excellent Conftitution; and all his views and defigns are marked with that open franknefs, that manly affurance and dignity of conduct, which fo particularly diftinguish him from the natives of arbitrary States. combination of fuch noble qualities naturally produces a temper which is fuperior to faction; with contemptuous difdain he looks on, while Envy is biting her lips, and Ambition is treading the air. But when Injustice unites her iron hand, and tramples on his rights, he exerts himfelf with that energy and effect which have ever diftinguished his patriotic meafures, and will always preferve his freedom. Such being the general traits of his character, it cannot be expected his plain language will accord with the fophiftry of interested politicians. On the contrary, perceiving a regular progreffion of immorality, which threatens his Conftitution, keeping pace with fashion, folly, and luxury, John Bull will have his rights afferted in a true English style; in which if a dash of eccentricity fo congenial with his nature should appear, his found principles and good intentions must apologize. Agreeable to his engagement, he now visited me; and after the usual congratulations, we entered on bufinefs.

John

John Bull. If you are, Sir, a plain lettered man, and free from the bias of party, I shall not be difappointed having engaged you to affert my rights.

The Author. Really, Sir, I had no reafon to expect that honour from a man of your importance, having no claim on the world for poffeffing that humble talent; neither fhould I venture to affume fuch a claim, but on fo plain fubject as your rights. By trade I know you to be a dealer in facts; I fhall be proud, therefore, to transcribe your ledger, and draw out your bills on your debtors. To party I am unknown, and by the Conftitution, free; under your protection, I may then venture with confidence; at least my best endeavours will be to defend the Conftitution, and merit your approbation.

John Ball. The privilege of fpeaking truth being denied, her facred value is loft; and the tongue tortured by reftraint, or intereft, feeks the colours of fophiftry to fhade the dictates of the heart. Hence the variety of opinions on the fimple theme of liberty keeps pace with the growth of politicians, to which the French Revolution has afforded a fruitful feafon. For here I find a Republican levelling his predatory principles againft me; and there an Ariftocrat endeavouring to ftrangle me. And for this long time paft, I have been put in fear of my life; and without a transfusion of new blood into my veins, I fhall not be able to withftand B-2 their attacks; for I find my Conftitution much impaired by infractions made on it in my youth; and my infirmities have much increased fince the paralytic ftroke, which deprived me of my voice in St. Stephen's Chapel, where for many years paft I have fat as an inanimate idol in the Oracle of Delphi, to fanction the previous refolutions of the Priefts of a Council. But perceiving there are now two partries, both enemies to the health of my Conftitution, the one pulling the cords or ftamina of my existence at one end, and the other pulling at the other, I am determined to make good my hold, to prevent their breaking; for my anceftors left me this facred axiom-" That we fhould all pull toge-" ther, and form three feparate pillars for the fupport " of one grand fabric," which I am bound facredly to maintain. But the regaining of my public voice being abfolutely neceffary to affure my right to collateral aid and equal benefit, I shall depute you to affert my privileges, and respectfully suggest to the Higher Powers a mode of Reform in my Representation. Be candid and impartial; we have but one intereft; we can have but one wifh. It is the birth-right of Englishmen to keep the British Oak of Liberty free from corrosions. Let it be our pride, as it is our duty, that posterity may find it flourishing in the greatest splendour.

The Author. Indeed, Sir, you utter your complaints with fo much emphasis, I find you have already already made fome advance on my feelings. I shall beg to propose, that we make our joint remarks on popular topics in this Section; during the course of which I shall have an opportunity of catching your style; and also that your complaints, your interests, and your rights, may make such an impression on me, that when I write the dictates of your heart, I may find them equally accord with the section of my own mind. This is actually necessary before I can make remarks on your political history.

John Bull. What flows from the dictates of the heart men in general admire, which can only be attributed to fympathy; for, on fixed principles, you will find theory and practice at continual variance. But the heart, though involved in every intricate evolution of the mind, ftill retains the human bias.

The Author. Philosophy and liberty, it is faid, are infeparable; and certainly it would reflect a censurable flupidity in me not to admire and congratulate you on their progress. And shall it now be faid the prefent age must still wear the garment of Liberty with that tattered appendage of Norman rigour, the Borough Representation, because we have not a Justinian to refcind it? Let the ignoble thought be banished, and the British Constitution be purified. John Bull. A great political character fays, we cherifh our prejudices becaufe they are prejudices. Under this idea, I imagine, he termed the people a fwinifh multitude. This pillar of hereditary rights and arbitrary claims will eventually find a free State the wrong market for his principles; it being my will to roufe from patriotic apathy, and examine if indolence and fupinenefs have not occafioned a breach in the bulwark of our freedom; and probably in the fting of difaffection may be found a truth, which being embraced may preferve the fpirit of the Conftitution.

The Author. However we may differ from the principles of difaffected writers, we are not to difregard fome truths which they convey. But it is become a fashion among men to despife truth, because it affects their pride; and a man is equally a depredator, whether he attacks another's purse or his pride; so the law construes truth, which Nature ordained the fountain of virtue; but now it is become the libellous pander of Justice.

John Bull. Let the lawyers torture words, and diffect Acts of Parliament, keep to the letter of my conftitutional right, and deal freely with the Republican and Ariftocratic doctrines of the day; and if it fhould appear to have a tendency rather to amufe the mind than to convince the judgment, let it be remembered, if fatire be ever in the leaft allowable, allowable, it is when it has for its object Vice, and for its end Truth.

The Author. A man may certainly venture to hold up the mirror of Truth under your patronage, particularly when the chief object is his country's benefit; and if from the refult of our investigation abuses should appear, it becomes the duty of Government to apply immediate and effectual remedies.

John Bull. Abufes exist which require neither fcience nor ingenuity to explore.

The Author. And from those abuses have arisen our enormous national debt, which hangs a dead weight from the neck of Britannia. Yet her sons make a figure, as if she were mounted in a golden car. These are glittering days!

John Bull. Public credit keeps them floating on the tide, where, if they would attend to my voice, they fhould continue to be wafted, but not till an ebb takes place will they liften to me.

The Author. And by a new philosophy *, this enormous debt is declared to be a great national

* See the Effays of the Marquis de Cafaux and George Crawford, which proceed upon the idea that it is abfurd and injurious to attempt to diminifh the national debt.

bleffing;

bleffing; for as neceffity is the parent of invention, fpeculation has now arrived to the very fummit of perfection. The tax-gatherers give a fpur to induftry; they quicken the genius, and mature the invention of a whole family; they give energy to trade, life to commerce, and fpirit to the whole nation. One novelty fucceeds another, till curiofity is loft in a maze. Medical men, for inftance, have added fome hundred drugs to the *Materia Medica*, hitherto unknown, whofe virtues are grand fpecifics. Indeed, the knowledge of Galen and Hippocrates is wholly exploded by the deep refearches of modern advertifing empirics of health —Paint, Patch, and Perfume.

John Bull. I will venture to impart a fecret to you. These grand specifics possible two virtues; the first enables them to set up a chariot and make a figure, and the second enables them to pay the taxes which support the national debt.

The Author. Which fully prove Neceffity to be the parent of Invention. The tax-gatherers, again, have in an amazing degree fharpened the wits of the lawyers, who are now become fupremely fpeculative. They can foon convince a man that a light pair of heels is better than a fafe confcience. For if he brings in a *fat* caufe into court, notwithftanding he may have reafon and truth on his fide, yet they immediately throw it into the fcale of felfintereft: interest; and to incline the balance in their favour, they torture, flice, and trim the letter of the law, till he is fixed with enormous costs, and then he must either run or pay.

John Bull. Taxes must be paid; the national debt must be supported.

The Author. The tax-gatherers have alfo thrown a new light on trade. First, the bankers, to support needy tradefinen, oppreffed with taxes, and the confequent advance of the articles of life, difcount the manufactured paper of those who are of fair fame. Secondly, the wholefale traders encourage young men to fet up retailers, without capitals, who have the repute of having been fober and fteady affiftants to eminent traders. These are neceffary connexions to fupport fictitious paper, and create large returns. Hence the numerous accomodations, from the loweft mechanic to the higheft merchant; hence the increase of country banks; hence the increase of attornies; hence the increase of brokers; and, finally, hence the increase of bankrupts.

John Bull. Taxes must be paid; the national debt must be supported.

The Author. The tax-gatherers rout out the lower clafs of people from their peaceful habitations, and the

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the advance of common neceffaries induce them to forfake honeft avocations. Hence the increase of fwindlers, mail-robbers, highwaymen, pickpockets, &c. hence the aggrandizement of the colony of Botany Bay to our antient kingdom, and the rapid increase of its population.

John Bull. Taxes must be paid; the national debt must be supported.

The Author. Your replies being fo uniform, you are certainly of opinion the morality of the people is the leaft confideration, when the public good is to be confulted. I may reckon you a difciple of Mandeville, who affirms, that private vices are public benefits. The taxes must be paid undoubtedly; but by what means can public credit be fecured?

John Bull. By the brokers keeping up the price of flocks*, notwithflanding it gives the advantage to foreigners to buy and fell to our wrong.

* The fpirit of flock-jobbing is to the fpirit of trade what the fpirit of faction is to the fpirit of liberty. The tendency of both is to advance the intereft of a few worthlefs individuals, at the expence of the whole community. The confequence of both, if ever they prevail to the ruin of trade and liberty, muft be, that the harpies will flarve in imaginary wealth, and that the children of faction, like the iron race of Cadmus, will deftroy one another.

Bolingbroke's Remarks, Hift. Eng. p. 169. But [11]

But this was an unneceffary remark ; for if we are reduced to the last guinea, we have an ample supply of Bank and other paper.

The Author. A fortunate resource to support public credit.

John Bull. As the national debt increased, public credit advanced. It may therefore be very dangerous to remain long at peace; for the increase of commerce and wealth might reduce the national debt, and consequently lower our credit.

The Author. The national debt then is a great bleffing; it is the basis of public credit, and must not be reduced.

John Bull. Again, another weighty confideration. Why, it may be very dangerous to remain long at peace. Inglorious wars and armaments have happily created a number of public offices, and provided for a hoft of excifemen, commiffaries, contractors, agents, &c. befides placemen and penfioners, and a ftanding army. If the increase of commerce and wealth is not checked by a war, the national debt will be reduced, and we may unfortunately have all these men thrown on the public, and our credit lowered. [12]

The Author. That would be a great national evil, indeed.

John Bull. We have dared Spain; we have ftrained at Ruffia; and for the maintenance and promotion of the officers of the Crown, the army and navy, and the fupport of public credit, it does not appear that we can fairly exift another twelvemonth without an actual war.

The Author. Reduction is a more formidable word than war; it conveys a greater trepidation than to be drafted on a hazardous fiege. A long peace will bring us into this dilemma. The national debt is a great bleffing; it is the bafis of public credit, and muft not be reduced.

John Bull. Very fortunately, the prefent war in India keeps up the fpirit of the nation, affords to fpeculation her vital matter, and fupports the new philofophy you fpeak of, which declares, that as our burthens increase, and the national debt is augmented, we grow in wealth and prosperity, and enjoy every bleffing.

The Author. A most fortunate circumstance to fupport public credit.

John Bull. After an indulgence of other people's opinions, I may be permitted to give my own private one.

The Author. That will afford me pleafure, as I am fure it will be ingenuous.

John Bull. First, I confider public credit naturally draws with it and promotes private credit. As the nation, therefore, has gone to extraordinary lengths, by mortgaging to support inglorious and expensive wars, the age has become gay, showy, false, and flattering. Fictitious and other paper money creates a deceptive appearance, and gives a false colour to property, which promotes luxury, and luxury increases the growth of effeminacy and vice, which induce men to treat religion as a chimera; and this is the first step to corrupt the morals, and ruin the State.

Secondly, Public credit being wholly dependant, and combined with the executive power, and every year becoming aggrandized *, we are, by luxury, immorality, and neglect of patriotifm, gra-

* The inftruments of power are not perhaps fo open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the lefs liable to jealous and invidious reflections, but they are not the weaker upon that account. In fhort, our national debt and taxes, befides the inconveniences before mentioned, have alfo in their natural confequences thrown fuch a weight of power into the executive fcale of Government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot anceftors, who glorioufly ftruggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of forefight, eftablifhed this fyftem in their ftead. Blackft. Comment. vol. I. p. 387.

dually

dually fliding into that arbitrary flate from which France has recently wrefted herfelf. She once before was free, and enjoyed her three independent Eftates. But from the baneful practice of corruptly influencing the reprefentatives of the people, they became, by the aggrandizement of the Crown, confolidated into an abfolute power *.

The Author. Your arguments fully convince me of the neceffity of reclaiming your elective power. The national debt having created fo many new offices and new places of every defcription, which, being entirely at the pleafure of the Crown, has given to the Executive Power a proportion of weight fo far fuperior to the other conftituent parts, that it may fairly be faid to hold the fcales of the Conftitution in its hand; or, in other words, the legiflative body at its devotion, of which collution Montefquieu foretells the lofs of our freedom. "As all human things," he obferves, "muft

* Mem. Philip de Comines—Duplex Mezray—By exerting all his powers and addrefs in influencing the elections of reprefentatives, by bribing and over-awing the members, and by various changes which he artfully made in the form of her deliberations. Lewis the Eleventh acquired fuch entire direction of the national affemblies, that from being the vigilant guardians of the privileges and property of the people, he rendered them tamely fubfervient in protecting the odious measures of his reign. *Phil. de Comines, vol. I.* He first taught other modern Princes the fatal art of becoming arbitrary, by corrupting the fountain of public liberty.

" have

" have an end, the State we are fpeaking of will " lofe its liberty. It will perifh when the legifla-" tive power fhall become more corrupt than the " executive *."

John Bull. It is too evident the national debt, by thus ftrengthening the Crown, has deftroyed that equilibrium, which, by the Conftitution is placed in the reprefentatives of the people, by influencing a majority, independent of the elective power of their conftituents. If I wanted a proof to fubftantiate this fact, I need but recur to the late Ruffian armament. When it was notorious that this equilibrium was loft, the general fentiment was made known through the medium of the prefs. It was this cenforian privilege which wrested liberty from the hands of power. It is this palladium of our rights which explores the fecrets of the Cabinet, and keeps magistrates and ministers within the line of duty, which penetrates the vibrations of the heart, and holds up to publie view its evolutions.

The Author. Indeed, John Bull, you grow on me. Every fentence convinces me of the neceffity of a Parliamentary Reform.

John Bull. When I fpeak of a ftanding majority, it may be neceffary to difcriminate between those

* Montesquieu.

acts which may be termed partial and perfonal, fuch as the Slave Trade and the Impeachment, and those public measures which gall the nation, and involve the whole body of people, fuch as armaments and wars. In thefe I have no voice. Dragged to battle like a flave against my will, and in return have my property taxed to maintain the dignity of the nation, or, in other words, the pampered pride of Treasurers, Paymasters, Agents, Commissiaries, Commissioners, Contractors, Placemen and Penfioners, and other neceffary evils, in a right caufe, although right or wrong they uniformly fupport the Executive Power, and their yearly increase becomes a subject of just apprehenfion to the people. If there be any public virtue to be found in the nation, or a real and fincere regard for the permanency of an excellent Conftitution, free elections and frequent new Parliaments will be obtained, to counteract that fystem of immoral policy, which was brought to maturity by a Minister *, who styled himself, No Saint, No Spartan, No Reformer, who treated public virtue as a bubble, and love of the country as a farce; and whole fystem of packed majorities, fo pernicious to the liberties of the people, was practifed throughout the Américan war. The venal and flagitious collutions of men in office under Government at various times, fhew how notorioufly I have been

* Sir Robert Walpole.

duped.

duped. One packed majority to grant millions drawn from my pockets, and another packed majority to drown my voice when I demand an explanation how those millions have been applied, millions to this day remaining unaccounted for to the public *. 'Redrefs and Reform were the two grand objects which poffeffed Mr. Pitt's mind when he entered into office; two fubjects worthy of his fuperior merits. He made fome advances which reflect a degree of honour, but having been long filent in these meritorious pursuits, I am induced to draw conclusions that eclipfe those abilities which fo confpicuoufly shone forth for patriotic fplendour. His integrity to the public is bound by his early promifes to effect a Parliamentary Reform. May his public virtues become as confpicuous as his private, by reiterating his endeavours for this effential measure.

The Author. If the obftacles to a Reform are remote from him, it is a duty he owes to the people and to himfelf to undeceive their confidence—He will be left to no choice between his duty and reputation, for it is no new axiom in politics, That a people may be abridged of their-Liberties, and the conflituent parts of Government be violated, confiftently with the extension of commerce and

* See the petition of the Freeholders of Middlefex, 1769repeated in an Addrefs to his Majefty by Mr. Pitt, 1783.

the

the increase of wealth. The ancient Grecian and Roman States prove, that, in all free Governments as luxury increases the spirit of liberty decreases. The truths afferted in your last arguments are irrefiftible; and I must confess I now feel myfelf properly influenced to affert your right to a free representation. But, first, it may be useful to make fome remarks on the contending enemies of the Constitution, whose erroneous principles cannot be rendered too general, as the more univerfally they are known, it acquires the greater fecurity. The republican champion has indulged an intemperate and mifplaced ridicule, by attacking kings in their leaft defensible part, as individuals and men divefted of magistracy, and by delineating a fpecious form of Government, and infinuating its purity, in order to conceal the republican poifon which he in vain endeavours to inftill into the minds of the people.

John Bull. Let us take care how we are carried away with founds. The republican doctrine is an inflammatory theme, which militates againft our Conflicution. Its purpofes are too evident; it is to fet afide our Supreme Magiftrate, in whofe perfect fafety the very exiftence of our Conflicution depends. And further, it is for levelling all diftinctions in fociety, and deftroying all those barriers which preferve peace and order in a ftate. The Author. When he declaims against monarchy, he artfully makes no diffinction between a tyrannical Government, wherein the Monarch's will is the fupreme law, and a limited Monarchy fuch as ours, wherein the fupremacy is lodged in the legislative authority created by the community. His arguments in no instance apply to our monarchical form of Government, it being a maxim of the Constitution, That the King can do no verong.

"He is ours

" But not to warp or change it."

For by the Conftitution he has appointed a Privy Council, which has the guidance of the executive power; and Ministers of the Crown are amenable to the representatives of the people, who can impeach and punish evil counfellors. Hence the equilibrium of the Constitution is so happily poized, that the will of the One Supreme must coalesce with the wills of the many who obey.

John Bull. If there be fuch a mutual check of one confituent part on the other, why is unlimited confidence fo much debated for? It appears to cover a myftery which I conjecture to be an impofition on our Conftitution.

The Author. Unlimited confidence as naturally arifes from the abufe of your reprefentation, as honour among men who live by depredation. C_2 The

[&]quot; T' administer, to guard, to adorn the State,

The pride of office bravely dares the conftitutional few, confcious that the venal tribe have deposited their integrity for their places and their views of patronage. This or that Minister is no more cenfurable on the general effablished practice than the Grand Viziers. It is the perversion of your elective power grown upon your excellent Conftitution fince the Revolution, and which requires only refolution and integrity in the national body to remedy.

John Bull. The truth of which is too palpable; neverthelefs, to define the limits of confidence is a matter of no fmall difficulty.

The Author. They are truly afcertained in the complex structure of your constitution, whose powers acting reciprocally one upon the other, produce a political machine, the most beautiful and correct that ever was devifed by the wifdom of man. The theory of it has for its basis the laws of God and Nature, general liberty, and univerfal justice. The independent opposition of its conftituent parts, judicioufly applying to each other forits free administration to the people, is its vital principle; and this proves it to be a monument of human perfection, participating of the immutable laws of matter, which act by opposition to produce a certain good. A thunder ftorm may menace destruction like the American war; yet Aurora from

from the Eaft once more ushers in the gladdened day, and all Nature again rejoices.

[21]

John Bull. Thus we have revived, which fhews there is a folid principle in the machine which works its own deliverance.

The Author. In the theory of the Conftitution that principle is to be found; but in the inftance alluded to, the theory of the Conftitution was wholly loft fight of by the abufe in your reprefentation; and we owe much of our deliverance to a fortunate and fingularly happy, becaufe it will ever be found a permanent circumstance-the infular and local fituation of this kingdom. But to return to our strictures on this republican. His principles applied to this country are an exception to common fenfe. The people of England will ever look back to the commonwealth of the laft century; and reflecting on the anarchy and deftruction of civil liberty at that period, will finally reject principles which tend to the fame iffue, principles which, renouncing fubordination, create diffenfions; and as they fow jealoufies, they nurfe vicious ambition, an intemperate spirit of dominion fucceeds, power demurs against equity, and the once liberal Cosmopolite, the free Republican, becomes the haughty, arbitrary Ariftocrat.

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Tohn

John Bull. By his last publication, he feems to posses all the novelty of a prophet, without a miffion; the theory of his heart is vanity, the practice of it prefumption. Mark his own words. 66 T " have not only contributed to raife a New Empire " in the world, founded on a new fystem of Go-" vernment; but I have arrived at an eminence in " political literature, the most difficult of all lines " to fucceed and excel in."-" I neither read " books, nor fludied other people's opinions."-" I thought for myfelf. Independence is my hap-" pinefs; and I view things as they are, without regard to place or perfon."-" My country is 66 the world ; my religion to do good."--- " Speak-" " ing for myfelf, my parents were not able to give " me a shilling, except towards my education, yet " I poffefs more of what is called confequence in " the world, than any one in Mr. Burke's cata-" logue of Ariftocrats *."

The Author. The man who vainly puffs himfelf off, I am convinced is the laft to obtain your confidence. Though he may be actuated by a laudable motive, the liberty of mankind, yet his principles are fo predatory, his fpeculations fo vague, that moderate men, who compose the fober and folid part of the nation, are shocked, and men who exist by the means of Government laugh in

* Egotifms in the Second Part of The Rights of Man.

their fleeve to find him but the mere offspring of faction, darting a poifon which waftes itfelf in the air before it reaches them.

John Bull. I have read, and formed a judgmert not very eafily to be fhaken: I am in confequence fully convinced there is no nation in the world whofe laws breathe more of the true fpirit of freedom, and whofe various civil inftitutions are more effectually calculated to promote the happines and profperity of mankind than those of Old England; but that they have been perverted by the abuse in my representation, is a fact too notorious to be denied.

The Author. Your observation is very just. The conftituent parts of our Constitution, and the spirit of our laws, have received the encomiums of the greatest states and writers of most nations. His wanton abuse of those institutions and laws has foiled him with his own weapons, by attacking principles which are good, and not confining himfelf to the practice which has been bad.

John Bull. Yet he has the prefumption to fay, Mr. Burke would refute him if he could.

The Author. I should entertain a mean opinion of Mr. Burke, if he descended to refute principles which in this country confute themselves. What

man

man of fortune but would rifk his life, rather than be robbed of half his annual income by a metaphyfical mob. Such an equalizing of property is not in the nature of things. There will always be a Lazarus as well as a Dives. His levelling principles may profper a century hence in Botany Bay, as they were the best calculated for America. The Americans had no Princes to cut up, no Nobility to trim, nor any Bishops to feast on; they were all in a state of equality. Under such circumstances, a republic feems to promife to every man the higheft enjoyment of liberty. But experience proves, that men deviate from first principles. The mind of man is reftlefs and afpiring. The aggrandizement of wealth breaks the bond of equality, and creates power; power creates influence, and influence generates corruption. Hence all the republics in the civilized world, Holland, Venice, Berne, &c. &c. being founded on a levelling fyftem, have degenerated into flavish aristocracies, which are compleat and politive refutations of his republican principles. Different gradations of rank, from the peafant to the Prince, and fubordination among mankind, are founded in Nature, confirmed by Scripture hiftory; and no newfangled reprefentative levelling fystem can alter that which forms a part of the Constitution of the world. It may derange, like a ftorm, the order of things for a time, but principles will ever return to the channel Nature has decreed them to courfe

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in. America is in her infancy, and the boafted perfection * of her polity already at variance with its principle; and France, to the infinite mortification of this flaming Republican, has widely differed from his pure reprefentative fyftem, by eftablifting an hereditary Monarchy. She found without that key-ftone to bind the whole, her Government would be enfeebled, and her Conftitution, doubtful as it may be, would be rendered more precarious. His comparative ftatements of the expences of Government in England and America, is of all his attempts the most futile. If the income allowed to the Supreme Chief in America amounts to no more than the income of the Mayor of one of our cities, is it not idle to fuppofe his Majefty should be reduced to near the fame eftablifhment? It is the honeft pride of the citizens of London to fupport their municipal establishment in its prefent dignity; and it is the noble emulation of Britons, and their peculiar boaft, that the energy of their Executive Power can command other nations to compliment the flag of the Crown of England. Its dignity is theirs; its fplendour animates them, becaufe it is their own. And shall they fuffer an Anglo-American adventurer to depreciate their own glory?

* See proposals of Reform in her Representation, Second. Part of Rights of Man.

Juba

John Bull. There will be no end to his vanity while he can write; but his reputation must cease with every true Englishman who can read.

The Author. Clearly fo, by the following citations from his book, which being written by a man who, taking him at his own words, has arrived to an eminence in political literature, the man of fenfe will blufh at his vague conjectures, and the politician defpife his ftrained definitions of Government. I fhall felect a few from the many which occur in his laft work *, and arrange them under the following heads:

METAPHYSICAL ABSURDITIES.

"Were even ourfelves to come again into exiftence, inftead of being fucceeded by pofterity, we have not now the right of taking from ourfelves, the right which would *then* be ours.

" The wretched flate to which man is reduced by wars, under eftablished Governments, is certainly not the condition Heaven intended for man.

" Could it be made a decree in Nature, and " man could know it, &c. &c.

* Second Part Rights of Man.

" The ridiculous infignificance into which literature and the fciences would fink could they be made hereditary.

"The myfterious word Government robs induftry of its honours by *pedanticly* making itfelf the caufe of its effects, and purloins from the general character of man the merits that appertain to him as a focial being.

" The prefent generation will appear to the future as the Adam of a new world."

POLITICAL ABSURDITIES.

"The inhabitants of every country under the civilization of laws eafily civilize together. But Governments being yet in an uncivilized flate, and almost continually at war, they pervert the abundance which civilized life produces, to carry on the uncivilized part to a greater extent.

"The keeping the wild beafts in the Tower can be no other than to fhew the origin of Government; they are in place of a Conflictution. O, John Bull, what honours thou haft loft by not being a wild beaft!

" Government

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"Government has two diftinct characters. One civil, difpenfing laws at home; the other of the court, operating abroad on the rude plan of uncivilized life; the one attended with little charge, the other with boundlefs extravagance; and fo diftinct are the two, that if one was to fink as it were by a fudden opening of the earth, and totally difappear, the former would not be deranged.

" When the ability in any nation to buy is deftroyed, it equally involves the feller.

" Could the Government of England deftroy " the commerce of all other nations, fhe would " most effectually ruin her own.

" The more perfect civilization is, the lefs occafion it has for Government, becaufe the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itfelf.

" Civil Government does not confift in execu-" tions.

"Were a Government fo conftructed, that it could not go on unlefs a goofe or a gander were prefent in the Senate, the difficulties would be just as great and as real on the flight or ficknefs of the goofe or the gander, as if it were called a King."

John

John Bull. If his reputation depends on his wit, his lame attempts will deprive him of the laft remaining remnant.

The Author. His attempts, in general, facrifice his principles. For inftance, "levelling all di-" ftinctions, equalizing property, one form of " Government in Europe *, and univerfal peace," can never be accomplished, Governments being fubject to all the various affections of men. Till he can eradicate felf-love, the parent of felf-intereft from the heart, his theories will prove fallacious. If we believe him, we might imagine, that by regeneration * he can produce a new creation, divefted of all politive vices; and this new species of mortals are to kifs and be friends in every quarter of the globe. Adam's transgreffion is atoned for in the American Elysium, and all the world is becoming an uniform paradife. Happy they who live to fee that golden age. Pale Poverty no more shall distrefs the eye of Humanity. Imperious Princes no more to wars of plunder shall command the affectionate hufband, breathing an heroic figh over the dewy cheeks of a fond wife; no aged parent, with filver hairs, shall be brought to filent forrow for the loss of a dutiful fon, his prop and pillow,

* See his anticipation of all Europe becoming one Republic, Second Part Rights of Man.

† Remark the frequent use of this word in Rights of Man. Inatched fnatched by vultures to the altar of a mad ambitious war. No more fhall polluted ftreams of vice offend the blufhing moon; all Nature fhall revel in one long Summer's day; Heaven fhall fhower down manna to all; wailing and gnafhing of teeth fhall no more prevail; but an univerfal love fhall reign, and every one fhall have an equal fhare of manna *.

John Bull. As he is in poffeffion of the philofopher's ftone, and in his dedication to Fayette he promifes to join him on the borders of Germany, I fhall recommend him to lofe no time in imparting his fecret to the French.

The Author. Your recommendation receives my hearty concurrence. My beft wifnes attend the rights of man in every defpotic State. Next we proceed to notice the Ariftocratic party, at the head of whom I find a brilliant champion. In contemplating the genius and talents of this great political character, admiration, furprize, and regret, play on the flattered fenfes, which are alternately animated with retrofpect and damped by dereliction. Who fo eminently diftinguifhed himfelf the patriot hero? Who fo induftrioufly probed every

* See his chimerical fpeculations in Second Part of Rights of Man, for equalizing property, and his philanthropic plan of granting annuities to the poor.

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canker which affailed the Conftitution? Who fo indefatigable for public Reform? Even from the Eaftern Empire down to the Royal kitchen experienced the effects of his improving genius. Who fo glorioufly laboured to reduce the overgrown influence of the Crown? Who declaimed with more applaufe and patriotifm during the American war? The very Minifter himfelf trembled at his oratory, more than Felix did when reproved by Paul.

John Bull. Alas! the age of patriot chivalry is no more! The Genius of Liberty is transplanted to a more propitious foil, and the Norman feeds are vegetating. It is possible, and I should rather conclude his patriotism became a facrifice to the Higher Powers. The smiles of a Court are very tempting in the decline of a Parliamentary career.

The Author. We have fo many inftances of defection in the *finale* of great political characters, as amount to a clear proof that the Conflicution has long fince been invaded by undue influence, which prevents men of the greateft patriotic virtues from meeting the reward due to their public fervices, without fubjecting their inward fincerity to the mafk of a corrupt fyftem. I fhall briefly notice the chief Ariftocratic dogmas, or Tory principles, which eclipfe the brilliant thoughts, the glowing imagination, and deep erudition of this great politician, and that gave the alarm, and excited a fpirit fpirit of political inveftigation, which tends to difhonour and depreciate those hereditary rights and claims, which he takes an unqualified occasion to affert. He has created a jealoufy among those whom it would perhaps have been a merit in him rather to have applauded than to have cenfured; and notwithstanding his inimical views, he has fanned the flame for religious toleration, and effentially inspired the cause of liberty.

John Bull. It is an ill wind which blows no one good. The prefcriptions of power oft betray the want of wifdom. He fhould have known John Bull never gulps a pill but by his own choice.

The Author. It is ftrange a man who has been your advocate fo many years fhould forget your disposition. It is impossible your native independent fpirit could affent to his arbitrary principles, which in his bitter invectives against the Diffenters he has laid down. He is an inftance of that frailty of human nature which all men deplore, when they perceive a great man difplaying his abilities at the expence of his wildom and philosophy. Religious difcords in a free State have the peculiar faculty, above all other evils, to render the arm of Government despotic. The attack on Dr. Price is for that reason the more inexcusable from a man of learning and a philosopher. A few strictures on the particular paffage in that celebrated divine's fermon I fhall

fhall fubmit to your confideration. He observes *, for That on the three following principles, and for more especially on the last, was the Revolution founded.

" The right to liberty of confcience in religious " matters.

" Secondly, The right to refift power when " abused. And,

"Thirdly, The right to chufe our own Gover-"nors, to calhier them for milconduct, and to "frame a Government for ourfelves.

"Were it not true that liberty of confcience is a facred right, that power abufed juftifies refiftance, and that civil authority is a delegation from the people. Were not, I fay, all this true, the Revolution would have been not an affertion, but an invafion of rights; not a Revolution, but a rebellion."

It cannot be inferred from the above premifes, that Dr. Price confiders the Crown elective. His inferences undoubtedly are, that there exifts a right unalienable in the body of the people to maintain their liberties. But on this important period I

> * P. 34. D

fhall

fhall referve a more full difcuffion for your political hiftory, and briefly obferve, that as the Conftitution was recovered at the Reftoration, the people acquired no new rights at the Revolution, which Mr. Burke affirms Dr. Price affumes. When the contract between the King and people is broken on the part of the King, the people may withdraw their allegiance, and a Parliament may peaceably fupply the defect, but it has no right to frame a new form of Government. It is the intereft of every individual in the nation to have the Conftitution confidered inviolable.

The principles of Dr. Price are laid down on the true basis of liberty; but as they have called forth fo much virulence, let me enquire of what ferious import are these dogmas to you, whether afferted by an Archbishop of Canterbury, a Pope of Rome, a Doctor Sacheverel, or a Doctor Price? What ground is there to excite your prejudice, if they be consonant to the spirit of your free Constitution?

John Bull. That they are the immortal principles of freedom admits of no doubt. And as the fons of Freedom, with life and fortune we will maintain them, and with a noble pride deeming ourfelves an enlightened people, we will fupport the eftablished Church in its utmost purity; but we difclaim all invidious rancour with sectaries; we esteem ourfelves felves as brethren in reference to the main principles of the Gofpel. The flavish dogmas of the Roman church, and every fuperstitious formality, vanish as Reason recovers her fovereign stary; and all the ridiculous embargoes, and unneceffary imposs on the road to Heaven, are clearly discovered to be the invention of priest, who, as a worthy fecretary observed, "appeared to him like fo many " pilots, who tell of a thousand fand-banks, ob-" ftructing the road into port, in order to be paid " the pilotage. Scarce any thing to me is so fasse, " fo easy, and so pleasant, as the way which con-" ducts to Heaven—Love God, love your neigh-" bours, and be just. This is our law and our " prophets."

The Author. But it must be confessed the intemperate zeal of many divines has carried them fo far, as to mix politics with divinity in the pulpit, and its fatal effects have been experienced in every age. The express duty of the Clergy is to promote the happiness of mankind. True happiness can only be derived from a rigid adherence to the religious and moral duties of life, and it is their particular unwearied duty to enforce them. On political topics it may be a question, whether it be confistent to write as citizens, at leaft let them preach as divines. Our Saviour never made one parable on politics; this should be a powerful example with the ministry. The union of Hierarchy and Court D 2 intrigue

intrigue has been a bane to mankind. It is pampered pride and domineering ambition, feafted by the labour and toil of poverty and ignorance. Had our Great Politician been content to explode this heterogeneous mixture, we fhould have applauded the wielding of his glittering falchion; but we must wholly condemn the confequences, when we find it sheathed in the vitals of our very freedom.

Fahn Bull. To preach infallibility in Church or State, is a groß reflection on the good fense of the age. That breaches in the Constitution will be made, and abuses infinuate themselves, are as certain as the fallibility of man.

The Author. Most affuredly; notwithstanding the chief statutes are founded on equity and reason, and the practical use of them for ages has rendered them venerable, as was remarked by the Commons at the conference with the Lords of Charles the First's reign, in the noble struggle between Patriotism and Despotism, "That the laws of Eng-" land were grounded on reason more ancient than " books, consisting much in unwritten customs, " and so full of justice and true equity, that their " most honourable predecessors and ancestors " many times propugned them with a nolumus mu-" tari; and so ancient, that from the Saxon times " they had continued for the most part the fame, as " appeared " appeared in the old remaining manufcripts of " the laws of Ethelbert, King of Kent, and of " Alfred, after the union of the Heptarchy."

John Bull. But have not the civil laws been twifted, shaped, and turned, like the Sybilline leaves, according as chance has formed the pericraniums of the grand interpreters, who have refined upon refinement with the fluctuations of interest, that in many inftances the pandect has been tortured into another fenfe. Is not the police as defective as that of any State in Europe, wherein magistrates make a trade of justice, and a fwarm of pettifoggers pick a man's pocket in open Court. And, in like manner, the political flatutes, have they not been perverted by the flagitious collusions in office, and abufe of public money? Has not the liberty of the fubject been abufed by extra-judicial conftructions on libels, and abridging the rights of juries? And has not the political part of the Conftitution been rendered null and void by the violation of the freedom of election.

The Author. Your farcasms set Envy at defiance. Malice, indeed, may direct her shafts at the shield of Truth, but in vain; they will recoil, to her own destruction.

John Bull. These facts being admitted, will any reasonable and independent man affirm this is an D₃ improper 300987 improper period to reform the reprefentation? When will the Meffiah come? Will he not rather fay, let us embrace a peaceful opportunity to repeal the obnoxious and oppreffive refinements of the law. Let us correct abufes in time, and render efficient the ftatute laws of the land, which are founded on true equity and reafon. Is not this the end of Government, the relative duty of Governors to the governed.

The Author. Beyond a doubt, it is the fine qua non of liberty. But your enemies will fay your zeal for reform difcovers a general principle, which proving too much, renders a perverse practice the common effect. Better mitigate error than facrifice precedents.

John Bull. The law of precedents is ufeful, fo far as to afcertain the two fundamental principles, right and wrong. Sovereign regal power converts a bad precedent into a worfe practice, by appealing to precedents eftablished in an illiterate age. Sovereign reason, the illuminating deity of Man for this century past, verging into light and perception, rejects the ignorance of military ages, and, shocked with the bloody shield of revenge, seeks the enlightened rays of the sciences and the arts; and the wisdom of the prefent age laughs to scorn those interested few, who pretend to be panic struck with the idea of reforming abuses.

The

The Author. No precedent can be maintained against the conviction of reason and truth. In the hiftory of this country, I find through every century, Prerogative, Ariftocracy, and Priefthood, have been alternately vigilant depredators on the rights of the great majority of people; and at different periods it became abfolutely neceffary for the Democratic part to oppose equality of right to the inequality of men, to remedy the abufes of the Constitution; and it is evident that the defect and abuse of the representation of the people has been the fole caufe of all the grievances and innovations which have occurred fince the Revolution. What opinion then can you entertain of a man who lays down the following unconftitutional and dangerous dogmas.

* 1st. That the King holds his Crown wholly independent, and in contempt of the nation.

2d. That the people of England have in no cafe whatever any more right to alter or interrupt the hereditary fucceffion once established, than they have wholly to abolish the monarchy.

⁴ 3d. That the Aristocratic and Democratic parts of the Constitution originate with, and derive all their legal power from the King.

* Reflections.		† Appeal, p. 4	.6.
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Hence

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Hence Kings do not derive their right to the Crown from the people, and are not responsible to them, which is a most arbitrary dogma, denying in its confequences the very principles of our free Conftitution, which has fo wifely provided against the fucceffion of a tyrant, by placing the fupreme power in the Legislature, and rendering a King fubordinate to the law. We do not at first view fee the remote confequences to which this libel on the Conftitution applies. It is a renunciation of the rights and powers of the people to legislate for themfelves, and fets the will of the King above the law. In fact, thefe principles being equally as unconftitutional as the Republicans, and prior in publication, whatever faction or anarchy have or may arife in confequence, this great politician * " is deeply responsible, and an enemy to the free " Conftitution of this kingdom."

When principles fuch as the foregoing proceed from a man who has left the veffel of patriotifm, and clung to the throne, who has forfaken the true principles of conflictutional liberty, men will regard with a jealous eye the progreffive fteps of arbitrary power by the growing increase of fecret and corrupt influence +.

* Sir Brooke Boothby's Observations, p. 73.

† What I confess was uppermost with me, what I bent the whole force of my mind to, was the reduction of that corrupt influence which is itself the perennial fpring of all prodigality and

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John Bull. I with fome learned Aristocrat would teach me the dead languages, that I may be convinced I have a living Conftitution, for this fecret and corrupt influence is Latin and Greek to me. In fact, the dead languages conceal many mysteries; for the other day, reflecting that too many tythe pigs found their way to the Rectors, when poor Dactyle, the Curate, looked as if he had not tasted a flice fince he put on the toga; 1 took the liberty to remonstrate with the jolly ecclesiastic, who dogmatically afferted his claim in Greek; and when I enquired of Dactyle into the matter of right, the pedagogue, anticipating the parfonage, Supported his Reverend Master's argument in Latin. Thank God, I replied, I am not the first man who has been talked out of his reafon by Latin and Greek; neither are we the first nation. Oh, the glorious liberty of the prefs, I have nothing but that bulwark left to fhame men into virtue, to extract from their vices, and maintain my interest in the State.

The Author. John Bull, forbear your illustrations. Let your zeal be weighed in the scale of your understanding, and then your friends will not charge

of all diforder, which loads us more than millions of debt, which takes away vigour from our arms, wifdom from our Councils, and every fluadow of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our Constitution.

> Mr. Burke's Speech, Feb. 11, 1780. you

you with a heated imagination. But as your hints apply to the necessity of a Reform in the mode of fupporting the Established Church, I cannot without deep concern remark its expedience, from the apparent decay of its discipline and fanctity, which is occasioned by continuing the laws of an intolerant age, at a period when time has entirely changed the face of things. In the days of fuperflition, the people, by the facrifice of a temporal property, overlooked the mercenary views of the church in the profpect of an eternal felicity. But in this enlightened age the Clergy can hope nothing from the fanctity of their order, when the very means of their fupport are efteemed by their parishioners as not founded in reason or equity. But this, John Bull, is a fubject we shall leave to the wisdom of the Legislature.

John Bull. Affuredly; but you muft permit me to reply to the imputation of a heated imagination, and on the leading fubject leave you to decide, when I affirm, and will maintain, that the nation of which I compose claims an inherent and unalienable right to preferve the conftituent parts of the Conftitution independent and entire; and I utterly difclaim any right a Parliament might claim to alter the Conftitution, contrary to this the collective fense of the community. The King, Lords, and Commons, are in truft for themfelves and myfelf, John Bull; and whenever they feparate rate the joint intereft, by the Conftitution I am authorized to remonstrate; it impowers me eventually to interfere. If the Executive Power influences a majority in the Legislature, our Constitution is violated. That the venality of borough traffic, and the effects of the Septennial Act, have repeatedly reduced us to this dilemma, is too palpable. Bv the ftern virtue of my anceftors was the path laid down for posterity to walk in. Let the prefent age remember, that it ever was the difpolition of arbitrary power to deface it; let us therefore, with the fame native spirit of our ancestors, unanimously refolve to reclaim an equal and free delegation of our elective power, that we may ftand upon fure ground.

The Author. With infinite pleafure, John Bull, I congratulate you on difcovering true English fpirit. I must confess you have borne away the palm; and I am proud to fay, in your dignity 1 perceive justice; in your firmness, truth; in your judgment, reason; and in your resolution, the trio combined.

John Bull. Reafon, truth, and justice are the facts we are at iffue on. Let not any man think that with impunity he can violate those laws which God has rendered facred, and equally to be enjoyed by every individual; which are the foundation of liberty, the rich confolation to the human mind, the the balmy fuccour to virtuous affliction, and the ftern reproof to vicious principles.

The Author. After fome private conversation, John Bull left me, first engaging to renew his vifits every day till I had fully afferted his rights.

SECTION.

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SECTION II.

Remarks on the Rights of Man, Society and Government.

A T this next vifit from John Bull, he very politely declined any further dialogue for the prefent, and left me to purfue thefe topics agreeable to my own inclination. Before I proceed, I may be permitted to observe, that having differed on political points with writers of both parties, and in the courfe of my obfervations may have occafion to differ with others of not fo modern a date. I should incur the imputation of prefumption, if my difference of opinion went merely with a view to criticife; my chief object is the investigation of true conftitutional principles. And, as Voltaire has well observed, men are fo variously constituted, that fome by nature reafon wrong, others are incapable of reasoning, and others again are ever inclined to oppofe and cenfure those who do reason: confeffing myfelf free, therefore, from every confideration of party prejudice or interested motive, I shall deliver my fentiments on political points, as reason prefents them to my mind, and, with the greatest deference, I beg to fubmit them to the candid reader.

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In difcuffing the fubjects of this fection, I fhall endeavour to avoid prolixity, as from an intimate acquaintance with my friend John Bull, I find, though he be poffeffed of patience to fift the few grains of corn from the chaff, he is better pleafed when he is faved the trouble.

The first subject which comes under our notice is the rights of man, which appears to be treated of by fome in too general a manner. When men, speaking of government, talk of natural rights, it pre-fuppofes a state of nature pre-existing before fociety was formed. But as I do not find any author who has been able to prove a real existence of this primitive ftate, the rights, powers and properties of this natural flate can be only hypothetical. 'To confider man in this abstracted state, is merely speculative and fallacious; for philosophers affume a maxim, where no caufe appears, it is to be confidered as not exifting. If, therefore, we fail in proving this general flate of nature, we lay down wrong principles, by afferting natural rights in a flate of fociety, and treating of them in abstracted terms. Adam, for the very fhort period he was by himfelf, was in a flate of nature ; and the legendary tales of Robinfon Crufoe, Philip Quarles, &c. fhew alfo they were in the fame ftate. But they were no longer in that primive ftate than when they were by themfelves. So foon as companions were added to them they entered into a flate of fociety, wherein

wherein their natural liberty was refigned for reciprocal benefits; an exchange of natural rights for focial liberties took place, for which God, in a fingular manner, had fitted the human mind. Upon further enquiry of these undefined natural rights, Mr. Locke obferves*, " where there is no law there " is no freedom;" and where no law is there can be no transgreffion. Right is therefore reduced to a mere legal term; for admitting these maxims, it is evident laws only can eftablish rights; and laws can only arife from fociety, being rules of conduct emanating from the reafon and confcience of men. under a fense of their weakness, their wants, and their fears. And as the Holy Scripture informs us, all men are equal in the fight of God, Blackftone, Locke, Montesquieu, and other eminent authorities, have truly affirmed all men are equal in focial rights; I fay focial rights in contradiction to natural rights; for, upon examination, we find when they defcend to particulars all their varied definitions of polity bottom on one fundamental principle, focial liberty, a renunciation of metaphyfical natural rights for reciprocal duties and benefits; man, in a focial flate, being entitled to the full enjoyment of every acknowledged benefit of life, he is only restrained from doing wrongs and committing injuries. Hence I conclude there is no fuch primitive state as that of nature, but to folitary fepa-

* On Gov. p. 2-57.

rated individuals, no fuch unlimited power as natural right in a fociety of men; and I am of opinion the anarchy and riots which have arifen among the lower orders of people, have been occasioned by their not having formed certain fixed ideas of focial duties and reftraints; they have mingled natural and focial rights together, have overlooked the reciprocal duties of focial life, and by intemperate notions of natural liberty have confounded the relative obligation to fubmiffion with the undefined power of refiftance, which has occafioned the most violent disorders in the community. To admit a ftate of nature wherein man has natural independent rights, and clash them with focial restraints, is mere fophistry. Under the impression of these indiscriminate rights, a man who plunders or fets fire to another's houfe, is reduced to a level with the brute creation. This ideal flate of nature and natural rights leffens the dignity of the human race, which God has eminently exalted above the whole creation, endowed man with reason, and " put him under strong obliga-" tion of neceffity, convenience, and inclination, " to drive him into fociety, as well as fitted him " with underftanding and language to continue " and enjoy it "." These riots and factions in fociety are the effects of ignorance, and frequently,

* Locke on Gov. p. 2-77.

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are the immediate caufes of neceffary laws which border on tyranny. The beft affurance for the higheft enjoyment of focial liberty is a general dif₁ fufion of knowledge among the lower orders of people. When the reafon of man is directed to true principles, it conquers more than the fword, and is the true fource of liberty, peace, and virtue. It is only by the ignorance of the greateft number in a State that it wears the chains of flavery an hour. Enlightened reafon gives an energy to the human mind which defpots tremble at ; and, like fallen angels, fink before truth, in guilty pufillanimity and defpair.

The next and fecond fubject of remark is Society, for which ftate man is peculiarly fitted by his maker; and for the free enjoyment of liberty in this ftate, men have no other rules to refort to than the laws of Nature and revelation, which are the laws of God. Thefe laws I fhall briefly notice, in order to afcertain the focial duties and rights of man. It is certain that man, by Nature fubject to the eternal and immutable laws of good and evil, wanted not promulgated precepts to direct him in the purfuit of his own true and fubftantial happinefs, "* which is the bafis of the natural law." For God endowing man with reafon, had enabled him by the aid of his conficience to difcover the

* Blackstone's Com. vol. i. p. 41.

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commixed principles of good and evil, and to difcriminate rules of action by which his rights, his interefts, and his happinels might be affured him. Thele first principles of conduct, which fecured those benefits, and which are reciprocal in fociety, were to honour God, to live honestly, to injure nobody, to render to every one his due, and in all things to do unto others as he would be done by. These general precepts constitute the law of Nature.

But the reafon of man being corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance, the exercise of right reafon was perverted by felf-love, that uncultivated, yet indifpenfible fpur, grafted on the mind to quicken it to action, and engage it in the purfuits of its own happinefs. This occasioned the benign interpolition of the Divine Author of Nature, in compassion for the frailties of human reason, to difcover and enforce its laws, by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered are called the Divine Law, and they are only to be found in the Holy Scriptures. These precepts when revealed were, on comparison, not only found to be a part of the original principles of the natural law, but tending eminently to illuminate the mind, and conduce to man's felicity.

From these Laws of Nature, and the Divine Law, spring all human laws. To these general precepts Justinian

Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law *; and it follows that the conftitutional law of every State should be founded on these eternal laws of true equity and reafon. No human laws are binding or valid if contrary to them. To establish these laws, and fecure their observance in fociety, certain restraints and limitations must be imposed. Neverthelefs Mr. Blackstone observes, the rights of man, independent of fociety, leave him under the Divine as well as natural law, to purfue his own liberty agreeable to the dictates of his reafon, independent of any human laws. But fo brutish a ftate is incompatible with human nature, man being incapable of living alone; neither has he refolution to live reclufe from fociety. In fine, man, as before remarked, was peculiarly formed for fociety, in which, for the prefervation of peace the benefits of mutual fecurity, and the quiet poffeffion of property, natural liberty and natural right become fubfervient to civil limitations and to moral and religious reftraints, which is a fubmiffion of the private wills of every member of fociety to the will of one man, or of one or more affemblies of men, chosen by the common confent of the community, and to whom the fupreme authority is intrusted. And this will of that one man, or affemblage of men, constitutes the Law, for which every individual pays the price of his natural

> * Inft. i. p. 3. E 2

liberty,

liberty, by yielding a fubmiffion in return for the benefits of having his life, liberty, and property protected. This exchange of fubmiffion for protection arifing from a fenfe of weaknefs and neceffity, is underftood to mean the original compact of fociety.

Natural liberty would be truly an evil, unreftrained by focial ties; and the allurements to focial liberty are fo great, that a State having fecured by laws the free pofferfion of the one, enjoy in the higheft degree the privileges of the other.

Society being neceffary for the exiftence of the human race, it followed, from the various feparated divisions of the earth, and other natural causes, that mankind must neceffarily be divided into many societies, and form separate States and nations, independent of each other, yet from that universal prevailing disposition to traffic, a mutual and continued intercourse must arise. Hence the regulation of this intercourse constitutes * the law of nations. But as these different States are independent of each other, and are wholly governed by their own laws, none can assume the power of dictating to the other where there is no acknowledged fuperiority. The regulation of this intercourse therefore depends on mutual treaties and compacts,

* Blackstone, vol. i. p. 13.

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constructed on those principles of equity and reafon, which conftitute the Law of Nature.

The affociation of mankind into different focieties being for the enjoyment of mutual liberty and fecurity, these benefits can only extend to every individual by laws framed on the principles of general liberty and equal juffice, the Laws of Nature and of God. On these first principles the civil and religious liberties of mankind are affured them; but that men have miftaken the true principles of Government, or these first principles have been perverted by ambitious men, and mankind, inftead of being happy and free, have fallen into flavery, is too evident from the number of defpotic nations in the world. This circumftance leads to the third fubject of remark, which is Government.

If the Mofaic account be just, it followed that the first families, fo long as the distinct ties of relationship could be ascertained, must have been go. verned by patriarchal authority; but when those ties were obliterated by the increase of mankind, the neceffity of eftablishing a public interest no doubt convened them together, the oppression of the powerful over the weak must necessarily have fuggested the idea of creating a Supreme Power, which should counterpoife the natural inequality of men, by difpenfing equal justice and equal fecurity to all; and this idea could only arife from a pofitive

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tive conviction, that every individual was equally entitled to the benefits of life; and as man from simple rules afcend to the more complex, the fupreme power vested in one or more for the common intereft of the whole community must have been created by choice, it could not have been established but by election, when the enviable diffinctions of wealth and luxurious refinements were unknown. Every man having equal right, the Legislature no doubt was composed of a few leading men, diftinguished and chosen for their abilities and wisdom, and the executive power deputed during pleafure to a chieftain eminent for his qualities, to conduct their enterprizes, to lead them in war, or to prefide in their affemblies in time of peace, forming thus a fimple Republic, in which their rules of conduct were rather certain usages and customs than written laws. Abfolute monarchy could not have been the first form of Government, the affociations of mankind being for the fole purpose of protecting the weak from the powerful, it is impoffible to fuppofe they would reft under the authority of a known oppreffor.

A disquisition into the dark maze of antiquity to establish this *postulate* were to little purpose, the earliest accounts in the history of modern Europe prove that the first known Governments were republics or principalities, possifing a considerable portion of Democracy.

The ancient Britons, the Germans, the Gauls, and other nations, we find were in this primitive state divided into a number of tribes, or fmall States, under their respective Chieftains, Heretogans, Generals, or Princes, who owed their eminence entirely to their military talents, and whofe powers were fo far limited as to confift rather in the power of advising than commanding, for every individual was at liberty to chufe whether he would engage in any warlike enterprize or not. The earlieft accounts therefore prove, that the chief nations in modern Europe enjoyed political liberty in the most unlimited sense. Of this first native principle of Society, I shall have further occasion to treat, in remarks on the English history. It may be fufficient here to observe, that the chief nations in Europe, from the earlieft accounts, poffeffed this first principle, Political Liberty. To affirm it was uncultivated, rude, and barbarous, is an objection of no weight. It is the birth-right of mankind; and though it has affumed different forms and figures through different ages, in the various modes of Government which have fprung from it, fome of which have totally annulled it, yet fuch inftances afford no rational argument against its full and compleat reflitution by any community at any future age, where it has been fo furrendered or loft.

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Upon enquiry into the leading causes of nations furrendering their liberties to the arbitrary will of

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one individual, we find in republics the popular affemblies in general have the public good in view; their intentions are to do that which is right and just, but in the execution of their powers they are weak, and too often divided by the ambition of enterprifing men; and through the inordinate thirst for power, the common interest has been repeatedly facrificed, as different parties have prevailed, which is fully exemplified in Machiavel's history of the Republic of Florence. And though Republics have particularly diftinguished themselves from Aristocracies and Monarchies in public virtue, public fpirit, and patriotifm, yet the divisions and diffensions which they have nurfed and matured, have ever rendered their executive powers feeble and precarious; and in confequence they have finally funk into flavish Aristocracies or Monarchies, which juftifies Mr. Hume's remark *, That all anarchy is the immediate caufe of tyranny. But from the hiftory of modern Europe we approach nearer the truth, when we affirm, that ignorance and fuperflition have been the caufe of the flavery of the European nations, by means of that grand engine of Despotism, Papal Authority. But at this enlightened period, anticipation may indulge a pleafing gratification, when it is confidered that the Church of Rome was the most powerful combination ever formed against the autho-

* Appendix, No. 1, p. 208.

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rity and fecurity of civil Government, the pillar and fupport of Despotifm, and sworn foe to the liberty of mankind. It was a stupendous fabric of fuperstition, maintained by the private interests of fuch a numerous and powerful class of people, that feemed to fet at defiance human reason, wifdom, and virtue. But time producing all those changes which refult from the active spirit of nature, loofened those ties by fortuitous events, which to the efforts of the human mind, appeared impregnable, and has progreffively trenched its immense power, which in another century may be wholly annihilated; and wherever its power has been annulled, Freedom and Toleration have been established, have spread and flourished, as in England after the Reformation, and the entire emancipation from the Papal yoke. Again, in France its power was first weakened by the Pragmatic Sanction, further reduced by the Concordat in the fixteenth century; and now by the Revolution its power is wholly deftroyed! And however we may differ on political points, the immortal rays of liberty have emanated with unexampled fplen-The heavenly influence of this fpirit dour. raifes the human race to a parallel with the higher order of beings. The mind, when unfhackled from the fuperstition of priestcraft and defpotism, opens to the wide expanse of dignified nature, and imagination traverfes the globe, and explores

explores with boundlefs refearch the arcanum of the universe. The Genius of Liberty, wherever fhe prefides, is the parent of the fciences, the arts, and literature; her principles are the pureft in nature, being founded on charity, that first law of Scripture, which includes all the virtues of mutual benefits, and gives to man all the enjoyments which flow from the fountain of all perfection. To fecure these ineftimable bleffings, a form of Government has been conflituted by the French, which Time will meliorate into a permanent fyftem of focial freedom; and being now agitated like a troubled fea, is occafioned by its being founded on an excefs of liberty, a confequence naturally proportionate to the degree of oppression thrown off. It followed, when new and brilliant prospects rushed on the public mind, and every man's breaft glowing with the dignity of his nature, and every tongue freely expatiating on the glorious caufe, that the wifdom of a great and free people fhould be dazzled by the light of fo pure a flame, and in the ardour of one common caufe they fhould facrifice much at the fhrine of Liberty, rendering feeble those conftituted powers which were to compact and confolidate into a permanent system-A FREE CONSTITUTION, THE BEST AND GLORIOUS GIFT OF HEAVEN.

In the Emperor's dominions the fame enlightened work is begun. In the year 1781 the reduction tion of monasteries, and the reform of the ecclefiaftics in general threw the Conclave at Rome into fuch a panic, that the aged Pope himfelf took the unprecedented and dangerous journey to Vienna, in the midft of Winter, to remonstrate in perfonwith Joseph II. but it proved fruitles; the work was begun by a power superior to Sovereign Pontiffs; and the period is not far distant when we may conjecture those extensive dominions will be as free as England and France.

Nations cannot materially err in reforming their modes of Government at a period when the light of reafon, by a general diffusion of knowledge, is confpicuoufly illuminating the civilized world, in a manner as aufpicious to the common focialrights of man, as evidently conducive to an univerfal toleration, agreeable to the pure precepts of the Gofpel, but which Papal authority has with all its industry fo powerfully opposed, by keeping under St. Peter's keys those holy truths, those facred emanations from the Deity, to enlighten mankind, and to fpread the bleffed flame of liberty, that man from ignorance might afpire to a true knowledge of himfelf, and by that knowledge explode the mysteries of priestcraft, and shake off the fetters of flavery. The freedom of nations, and toleration are infeparable; the first expands the mind, and the other enlarges the foul. Defpotifm and priestcraft, the two evil genii which ravage

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ravage the world with war and perfecution, act in mutual contact; the first shackles the perfon with coercive restraints, and the other keeps the soul in constant terror. The conjunction of these two despotic powers in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany, as well as the despotism of Prussia, Russia, Sweden, &c. is supported by an usurped authority over the facred birth-rights of mankind, rejecting the facred principles of Liberty, the Laws of Nature and of God; they always go armed against their subjects, like highwaymen against the public; such is the force of conviction on the human mind, when acting on wrong principles.

Several writers of the prefent day difhonour the name of Englishmen, and difgrace the British prefs, by fixing a reproach on the advocates of Liberty, whom they style illuminating philosophers. But when we reflect on the rapid progress of literature during the last two centuries *, is it furprising a general diffusion of knowledge should discover itself in opinions the most liberal, in fentiments the most humane; and confequently prejudices, superstition, and bigotted principles, yield to the mild and temperate dictates of maturing

* Henry VIII. made a law that all men might read the Scripture, except fervants; but no women, except ladies and gentlewomen who had leifure, and might afk fomebody the meaning. The law was repealed in Edward VIth's days.

> Selden's Table Talk, p. 7. reason?

reason? Had there been a full enjoyment of the liberty of the prefs during the reigns of the Houfe of Tudor, and the fubfequent years, down to the period of the unhappy civil wars, in all probability they would not have taken place. The Star Chamber fhackled the mind, tortured reafon, and men were left in a state of political and religious darkness. But the passions of the multitude were fo inflamed with their native ideas of liberty, that the very measures adopted to keep them in re-Araint and flavery, added fuel to the fmothering pile, which poffibly might have been prevented breaking into a flame by the freedom of the prefs, which carries with it the important privilege of reducing magistrates to the limits of the law; and though it leaves to the higher powers no choice between their duty and their reputation, yet it teaches the fubject no other doctrine, it leaves him no other privilege; it is, in fine, the very life itfelf of every free Government, and the moving principle of whatever is great and glorious in the State. It preferves that harmony in the various inflitutions and conftituted orders of Government which compose the bond of union among the people; and one bleffing peculiarly attends this privilege, that Kings and Princes, as well as Ministers and Officers of the State, can never take measures to fecure to themfelves the fame of posterity, without exalting the interests of the people; and no man, however high his station, is worthy of his place, if a regard for

for fame and reputation is not the chief motive and active principle of his mind. This renders the liberty of the prefs a rod of terror to vicious Governors. But to the truly wife patriot, the man who nobly fupports his integrity amidft furrounding fafcinating temptations, it never ceafes to record his fame; it is a fource to gratify the moft exalted ambition; the truly great mind will have no other emulation than to merit its fair imprefion; and fuch men whofe rule of conduct is regulated by this noble regard for recorded reputation, merit the full confidence of the nation.

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SECTION III.

The Political History of John Bull; or, Remarks on Political Liberty under the Britons.

THE limits which I have prefcribed myfelf, 1 and the leading fubject itfelf under confideration, do neither, admit nor require a narrative hiftory ; I shall therefore confine myfelf to occasional remarks on political liberty, from the earlieft accounts down to the Revolution, and endeavour to form more certain ideas and determinations on those acknowledged first principles of the Constitution, which we hear of in terms generally loofe and undefined. Of these we must remark the following. The Majefty of the People-The Sovereignty of the People-The Supreme Power of the People, I should imagine it to have fallen within the &c. obfervation of most men, that, from the variety of ideas formed of thefe first principles, has arisen the spirit of faction and the name of party; and the violence of different parties, which has at times both agitated and alarmed the State, proves in moft inftances, that particular interests rather than reason have directed their views, and private motives rather than truth have fixed their principles, of which fome militate against the texture and genius of of our Constitution, and others deny to the people the right of political liberty. Hence political truths, though fimple in themfelves, have acquired an elaborate mode of difcuffion; and where it has failed, or even fucceeded in elucidating fome truths, the mind has been left with faint ideas of first principles, and the common terms Majesty of the People, &c. have become rather bombaftic popular founds than certain defined co-active powers. In discussing these first principles, it is neceffary that circumfpection should guide the pen of truth; and that they may be freely discuffed is the particular privilege of every Briton, a privilege he enjoys from poffeffing political liberty, which can never be furrendered or loft, but with the deftruction of that free Conflitution which has fprung from this first native principle.

The Conftitution therefore growing out of political liberty, to treat of the one before we have proved the exiftence of the other is taking the effect before the caufe.—A very material diffinction occurs to my mind between Social Liberty, Political Liberty, and Civil Liberty. This diffinction, if rightly confidered, acquires an importance which I find feldom attended to by many political writers, who in general express Political and Civil Liberty in fynonimous terms, and involve the general principles of the fupreme power of the people with the inftitutions and laws created by a delegated authority. rity. With fubmiffion I make a diffinition of these three descriptions of liberty.

Social Liberty is the politive birth-right of mankind, without diftinction of perfons. This privilege in a State may be diffinguished by two general absolute rights; first, the right of enjoying all those benefits which are supposed to belong to man in the hypothetical state of nature; and which; when he enters into fociety he is permitted to retain, for the reason that the enjoyment of them does not interfere with the interests or happiness of any of his fellow-creatures. By these absolute rights a man enjoys loco motion, or the power of moving his perfon wherever his inclination leads him, without reftraint; he likewife enjoys the privilege of living as he thinks proper, of following his bufinefs, his pleafures, and his purfuits, agreeable to his own will, without being dictated to by any other perfon or power whatever. Hence his vices are not cognizable in Society, unlefs he publifhes them. A man, for inftance, may indulge in liquor without reftraint; but if when intoxicated he interferes with the interests or the peace of others, and commits injuries, he then becomes fubject to those rules or laws by which the fociety hath agreed to be governed; and that power which every State or Society affumes of eftablishing fuch rules and laws, is the fecond abfolute right which every individual is entitled to from Social Liberty. F And

And this right is that of Political Liberty, which is the first operative principle of fociety, and which gives to every member of a State the right of convening, either in perfon or by reprefentative, to eftablish inftitutions and rules of conduct by which justice shall protect the virtuous from the vicious, the weak from the powerful, and liberty, peace, and happinefs, be enjoyed by the great majority of the community, the happiness of the greatest number being the first object of law in fociety. The various institutions hence established form a Constitution, and the rules and regulations laid down compose the law or Civil Liberty, from which a material diffinction arifes between Political and Civil Liberty. Mr. J. Blackstone tells us *, " Ci-" vil Liberty leaves the fubject entire mafter of " his own conduct, except in those points wherein " the public good requires fome directions or re-" ftraints." From the diffinction necessary to difcriminate between fupreme and fubordinate power, it appears evident to me, that the afcertaining those points, and giving directions, or creating reftraints, is the fole province of political liberty. Such restraints, directions, or points, when expressed and published, compose the civil liberties of the fubject, political liberty being the power and fcience of governing; civil liberty the means used for governnient; from which I conclude political liberty

* Vol. I. p. 126.

appertains

appertains invariably to focial liberty, and civil liberty grows out of political liberty. These propofitions induce me to make a further remark on a paflage in the Commentaries, where I find political and civil liberty used fynonimously. It is to the following effect : "* The idea and practice of this " political or civil liberty flourish in their highest " vigour in these kingdoms, where it falls little " fhort of perfection, and can only be loft or de-** ftroyed by its owner, the Legislature." Though with pleafure we admit the premifes, it does not follow that the conclusion be just; for political liberty, or the fupreme focial power, invariably refides in the body of people; and the fupreme created power is fubordinate to that in fact, but not in terms. The people are the owners of the eftate; the Legislators are only the truftees, and poffefs not an arbitrary and diferentionary power. But the usurpation of this power by the conftituted and delegated authority of this country, flands recorded on the face of hiftory as the caufe of all internal commotions and civil wars. That Houfe of Commons which enacted its own existence from three to feven years is an inftance the most violent and arbitrary that has been exercised fince the being of a Parliament. The admission and sufferance of that usurpation on political liberty, has tarnished the glory of every fublequent reign. On this fub-

* Vol. I. p. 126.

ject I shall have much to advance. It is necessary here to form just ideas on political liberty, before any remarks be made on its first existence in this country, and its fubsequent progress. I shall not contract my arguments by narrow notions and prejudices, being convinced, that to liberality of fentiment we owe many bleffings; and though it be the pride of human nature to difdain fervile imitations, it is to the honour of it to diffipate prejudice, and notice with the cool eye of wifdom the virtues of the most malignant enemy. Far be it from me to excite invidious comparisons. Truth can be only established by elucidation; and without offering the French Conftitution by any means as an example to us, I embrace an inftance which fully establishes my positions, and confirms the diftinction fuggefted between political and civil liberty. The French have afferted most explicitly the common right of mankind to political liberty, and have made a very evident diffinction between that power and civil liberty, by limiting the fitting of any future National Affembly to two years, and denying to fuch Affembly the powers of continuing in its delegated capacity beyond that period, without a violent ufurpation of the conflictutional rights of the people, the rights of a nation being abfolute, the rights of an Affembly or Parliament relative. Hence political liberty is an abfolute power, which the body of people at any future age may affume,

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to remedy the abuses of civil liberty, which is a fubordinate, created, and relative privilege.

The origin of Constitutions and the various modes of Government being antecedent to all re,cords, we have no lights to guide us through the dark maze of antiquity, by which we can trace their first principles, but the exercise of our reafon, aided by those accounts of ancient Government which are known, and which antiquity hath rendered venerable. Many eminent writers, diftinguilhed for their learning, incur the fuspicion of narrow minds or biaffed principles, when they affect to pass over the first zera of the British history, as a maze where perfpicuity would be trammelled with defaced pictures, and truth itfelf be loft in the refearch. This difregard to antiquity is attended with effects which fully prove an unwarrantable industry to accommodate facts to principles. It may be useful and entertaining to read the laws, inftitutions, and cuftoms of our anceftors; but when men firain at the precife meaning of an old law, attempt to refute the existence of a particular inftitution, quibble about the word conquest, depreciate the poor Commons, and affirm that the reprefentation of the people arole from the grace and favour of Norman defpots. It is with pain, mingled with indignation, we fee men of fuperior abilities and learning difgracing in this F 3. manner

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manner the annals of liberty, by drowning her genius in the vortex of law.

To engage in the controverfy between popular and monarchical writers would be foreign to my purpole; I fhall endeavour, by unqueftionable authority to confirm the polition, that political liberty invariably refides in the body of people, independent of any refinements of law or religion; and that from the earlieft accounts of antiquity, its coactive powers have been enforced, and may at all times be exercised by the majority of the community, when the injuffice and oppression of its delegated powers demand the common interest to be preferved.

The rude hiftory of ancient Britain affords no flattering topic for an hiftorian, no inftruction for the reader. The higheft gratification which an Englifhman can derive are thofe well authenticated records, which prove, that the Britons enjoyed political liberty. To confult thofe remote æras with an eye prejudiced by modern political refineinent, leads to error and party. The refinement of manners was wholly unknown in thofe early periods of fociety, thofe nice diffinctions between the principles Right and Wrong; and thofe *wire-drawn* decifions in our modern courts of juffice could only be attained by the refinement of many centulies.

ries. The mind therefore ought to be prepared for the diffinction between a military age, when the virtues of valour, the love of liberty and independence, were carried to the higheft pitch, and that of a commercial age, when wealth creates en? viable diffinctions, and a thirft of gain facrifices every noble principle of the mind. Men who make this neceffary diffinction between the two ages, contemn the narrow and dark controverfy, whether the Britons were governed by abfolute Monarchs or enjoyed Republics, whether their Kithifrins commune confilium regni, or Parliaments, were composed of Commoners or Peers, or whether they enjoyed a limited Monarchy. If we can gather from approved authority that they enjoyed the common right of mankind, political liberty, however bold, fierce, or unrefined, the argument will be compleat. And when our anceftors at the Revolution, in their Declaration claim, demand, and infift upon all and fingular the premifes as their undoubted rights and liberties, and 1 Wm. and Mary, f. 2. cap. 2. recognizes all and fingular the rights and liberties afferted in the faid Declaration to be the true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom; and the Act of Settlement, which again confirms these liberties, declares them. to be the birth-right of the people of England, where shall we fix the æra for these inheritances, if we do not establish them from the remotest antiquity. If the Revolutionists ran over the string of periods F4

periods or data, where would they ftop, or where shall we now ftop? The Petition of Right, the thirty-two corroborating statutes of the two Charters, the Magna Charta itfelf, and all the Charters granted, or obtained fword in hand from Norman defpots, without equivocation declare the premifes infifted on to be the ancient rights and liberties of the people of England. What the express verbal liberties of Edward the Confessor were, History does not fully explain *. We find by Mr. Hume fome antiquaries as well as himfelf have narrowed their ideas, and political liberty hath fuffered in the refearch for express laws; but these laws of Edward the Confeffor, we learn, were merely confirmations of those established by Alfred; we may therefore prefume they were nothing lefs than those great outlines of political liberty which that wife

* What thefe laws were of Edward the Confeffor which the Englifh, every reign during a century and a half, defire fo paffionately to have reftored, is much difputed by Antiquaries, and our ignorance of them feems to be one of the greateft defects in ancient Englifh Hiftory. The collection of laws by Wilkins, which pafs under the name of Edward's, are plainly a pofterior and an ignorant compilation. Thofe to be found in Ingulf are genuine, but fo imperfect, and contain fo few claufes favourable to the fubject, that we fee no great reafon for their contending for them fo vehemently. It is probable the Englifh meant the common law as it prevailed during the reign of Edward, which we may conjecture to have been more indulgent to liberty than the Norman infitutions. The moft material articles of it were afterwards comprehended in Magna Charta. Vol. I. p. 479.

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man had digefted from Saxon and British originals, and which were involved in the two charters which partially comprize those ancient rights and liberties, so firmly and so effectually infisted on. The laws and infitutions of the Great Alfred, Historians inform us were improvements on the customs and usages of the Germans and Britains; and the native Britons, it will appear, posses fuch a confiderable portion of Democracy, that they may truly be faid to enjoy political liberty. And here, to use the expression of another, our enquiries find a refting place, our reason finds a home.

From the preceding remarks it appears, political liberty must be taken in its general fense, meaning the operative power of the people collectively, or by delegation affembled, to maintain the common interest and happiness of the great majority of the nation. But in every age civil liberty, which is its effect, will constantly affume the fashion of the reigning day; and laws which were neceffary and beneficial in one age, and to that age appeared to be formed according to ftrict right and justice, by a future age may be deemed unjust and oppreffive; the inference follows, that the particular institutions and laws of remote ages are only uleful to the prefent age, as in the fcale of common right juffice shall incline the balance, fo truly fluctuating are human affairs.

The chief writers among the ancients from whom we learn the best accounts of the ancient Britons are Cæfar and Tacitus; their authority has in general obtained the confidence of all hiftorians. By Cæfar's Commentaries, it appears the Britons were divided into a number of fmall States, in which Democracy had the afcendant. On his invafion, he expressly tells us *-" Among the Britons the " chief command and administration of the war " was, by the Common Council, beftowed on " Caffivelan." And that the Commons were called to this Affembly, Sothilius + fays the commonalty composed a chief part in their public councils. Other corroborating testimonies I shall deduce, to prove that the Britons enjoyed the common right of mankind, political liberty. Milton, the immortal bard, in his Hiftory of Ancient Britain, refers to all the known ancient authors, and from his undoubted veracity two inftances may be felected, which are ftrong evidences of the exiftence, at that epoch, of this true native fpirit of liberty, which is fo much the pride and glory of Englishmen. Britain at the period of the Roman Invation was divided into feparate States, indepen-

* Lib, V. c. 5.

† Mr. Justice Doddridge on the Antiquity of Parliaments, p. 66. who cites Francis Tate—Apud hos papulus magna ex parte grimatum tenet—Alfo Vitus in Hist. Brit. Lib. VIII. p. 11. Beda, Lib. II. c. 2. & 13.

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dent of each other; many of which had furrendered, or were fubdued by the Romans, who were particularly defirous of introducing their laws and customs; for this purpose, " Cogidinus *, a Bri-" tilh King, their fast friend, had certain cities " given him; a haughty craft which the Romans " ufed, to make Kings the fervile agents of en-" flaving others." The Silures, one of the British States, had for feveral years held out against the Roman yoke under their Prince Caractacus, but were at length fubdued in a pitched battle on the weft edge of Shropfhire, before the commencement of which this valourous Prince went up and down, animating his officers and leaders +, " That this " was the day, this was the field, either to defend " their liberties, or to die free; calling to mind " his glorious anceftors, who drove Cæfar, the " Dictator, out of Britain."

This is an inftance which the modern refined fpirit of liberty cannot furpals, and fhews how deeply independence and common right are rooted in the British heart. The second inftance corroborates this idea. After the victory of the Romans over Boadicea, "Suetonius ‡, the Roman " General, gave too much way to his anger against

* Milton's Hift. Brit. Book II. p. 68 & 69. Tacitus Vit. Ágricola.

† Milton's Hift. Brit. B. II. p. 81. ‡ Tacitus Vit. Agricola.

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" the Britons, Claffician therefore fending fuch word to Rome, that thefe fevere proceedings would beget an endlefs war, Polyclitus, no Roman, but a courtier, was fent by Nero to fee how things went. He admonishing Suetonius to use more mildness, awed the army, and to the Britons gave matter of laughter, who fo much even till then were nurfed up in their native liberty, as to wonder that fo great a General, with his whole army, should be at the rebuke and ordering of a Court fervitor."

I fhall conclude the inveftigation of that theorem of ancient Britifh right, *Political Liberty*, by citing a learned modern writer, who obferves *, " No-" thing is worfe founded than an opinion induf-" trioufly propagated by many writers, who ne-" glecting reafon and hiftory, and guided only by " prejudice, have afferted ‡, the firft government of

* Dr. Stuart's Antiquity of the English Constitution. Part I. p. 52.

† See Brady's Anfwer to Petyt, Filmer's Patriarchia, and other writings for prerogative. The writers on this fubject feem to confound the first state of the Britons with that in which they afterwards appeared, when conquered by the Romans. Tacitus fays expressly, Ips Britanni delectum, ac tributa et injuncta imperii numera inpigne' obeunt. Si injuriæ defint, hos ægre tolerant jam domiti ut pareant nondum ut ferviant ægri, c. 13. And Dion on Xiphilin, in the Life of Severus, observes to the fame purpose, Apud Britannos populus magna ex parte primatum tenet. The

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" of the Britons was regal and defpotic, an opi-" nion from which they infer the abfurdeft confe-" quences. When the ambition however, or ava-" rice of Cæfar had brought him to our ifland, " and fucceeding Emperors were fired with the " glory of fubjecting it to their arms, the inhabi-" tants loft their liberty and independence.

The feveral inftances here adduced, from many to the fame purpofe, evidently fhew, that the Britons fully enjoyed political liberty. And it is obfervable from the earlieft accounts of various nations, before the purfuits of commerce and the refining of manners took place, equality of right, liberty, and independence, were as well underflood and maintained as at the prefent day. Military valour was the peculiar excellence of an age when liberty difcovered herfelf in great and magnanimous enterprizes, before commerce had influenced the minds of men to a mean hypocrify, and all the little arts of trade had ftifled every noble effort of

The writers just now referred to, by endeavouring to found the Royal Prerogative fo high, think to prove, that the liberty we enjoy was derived from the conceffion of our Monarchs. But allowing that the ancient Britons were fubject to the arbitrary will of Kings; that this was alfo the cafe with the Anglo-Saxons; that William was a conqueror; and that the power of the people leffened the defpotifm, and detracted from the dignity of our Kings, can it yet be fuppofed that their conceffions would form a Conflictution fo wife and conflictent in all its parts as that of England ?

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the foul. Mankind in the großs were ever the fame. The happiness enjoyed in those remote periods was no doubt equal to that of the prefent. The ancient Britons painting fuch part of their bodies as was exposed, was as elegant, fashionable, and bewitching to them, as the tinfel gaudy trappings of the moderns. The vanity, as Milton observes, is only removed from the skin to the fkirt. And their mode of fighting in chariots drawn by horfes, argues, in my humble opinion, fuch a knowledge of mechanism, as in no wife correfponds with the very barbarous and ignorant flate fome writers represent them. Mr. J. Blackftone tells us *, " of a ftrong affinity and refemblance " between their tenets and discipline and some of " our modern doctrines of English law." No inference can be drawn to the prejudice of political liberty from their rude flate, or our ignorance of their express laws and Government. When we perceive the great outlines of freedom, the love of liberty and independence pervading all ranks of people, and difcovering itfelf on all important occafions, and which the remnant of the Britons, after the Saxons had established themselves in England, carried with them into Wales, we are bound to yield to hiftory and reason, and pronounce the ancient Britons, the aborigines of this ifland, FREEMEN, who fully enjoyed political liberty,

* Vol. IV. p. 408.

that peculiar birth-right of Englishmen, which was fo glorioufly exercised in obtaining Magna Charta in reviving the ancient Conftitution at the reftoration of Charles II. and the further fecuring it at the Revolution. This privilege of convening to maintain the free operation of the Constitution, and the common interest, is the fupreme power of the people; a most facred, invaluable right, growing out of the common equality of original fociety; a right which every Englishman being truly fensible of, will unite in the fentiment of Lord Bolingbroke, when he fays *, " I feel a fecret pride in " that I was born a Briton, when I confider that " the Romans, those masters of the world, main-" tained their liberty little more than feven cen-" turies, and that Britain, which was a free nation " feventeen hundred years ago, is fo at this hour."

* Remarks Hift. England; p. 66,

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SECTION IV.

Remarks on Political Liberty under the Saxons and Normans.

IN the preceding Section, I have endeavoured to imprefs on the mind the force and importance of this general axiom, That the fupreme power of the people, operating by political liberty, which is the right and power of the majority of the nation to convene at all times and feafons for the prefervation of the common interest, is the first principle of Government. With this foundation of all we hold most facred and valuable in our Conflitution, we are well prepared to trace the progrefs of Liberty through the mazes of Superfition, the ufurpations of Despotism, or the crooked paths of Anarchy. With this principle the mind penetrates with the eyes of Argus-The ftern fophiftry of tyrants, the jefuitical impositions of priefts, and the plaufible quibbles of lawyers, their rights, their powers, their privileges, and their precedents, as shoals in a shallow rapid current, make a great noife, but when the deep tide of reafon and common right overflows, they become filent as the grave.

We now enter on those periods of history from which were derived the great outlines of our Confitution. I shall pass over all those events and circumstances which ferve rather to amuse the mind than illustrate the subject we are upon, and confine my remarks to a few important points which are applicable and useful.

The Saxons who came over from Germany, after the dereliction of the Romans from Britain, brought with them their laws and form of Government, which has been acknowledged by all impartial writers to have been a true model of freedom; and though we are apt to conclude, in fuch early periods the purpofes of fociety were little underftood or valued, * it is however among nations whom we difgrace with the appellation of barbarous, that the duties of the citizen are most generally known. - In fine, the very form of our Constitution, its feveral inftitutions and laws, are merely refinements on the laws and cuftoms of the Saxons, among whom political liberty feems to have been fo well underflood, that every man who held a refponfible fituation in the State was elected thereto by the body of people. The inferior civil and military officers were chofen within the feveral counties or diffricts, but their Princes, Heretogans or Generals, were elected in the public council of the nation +; in which

* Dr. Stuart's Ant. Eng. Conft. p. 273. † Ib. p. 243.

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every freeman affembled in perfon, or voted for the reprefentative of his diffrict. In these national affemblies a perfect equality reigned, but those only who were diffinguished for their military valour and eloquence were elected to the most important offices of Government. Here they also deliberated

about war and peace, and concerted the plan of operation for the year, which gave rife to the annual Parliaments established in the reign of Edward III.

From these Saxon originals our present Constitution received its fairest outlines. The Genius of Liberty dictated the act, and the great Alfred impressed on the island of Britain those institutions which are now become congenial with the soil. Of Alfred we are told*, "he was a complete mo-" del of that perfect character, which, under the " denomination of a sage or wise man, the philo-" fophers have been sond of delineating rather as " a siction of their imagination than in hopes of " ever seeing it reduced to practice."

+ "His mighty genius prompted him to un-"dertake a most great and neceffary work, which "he is faid to have executed in as masterly/a "manner, no less than to new model the Consti-"tution, to rebuild it on a plan that should en-

* Hume, Hift Eng. vol. I.p. 90. + Black. Com. vol. IV. p. 410. " dure

" dure for ages, and out of its discordant materials " to form one uniform and connected whole. This " he effected, by reducing the whole kingdom " under one regular and gradual fubordination " of Government, wherein each man was answer-" able to his immediate fuperior for his own con-" duct and that of his nearest neighbour's; for to " him we owe that mafter-piece of judicial polity " the fubdivision of England into tithings and hun-" dreds, if not into counties, all under the influ-" ence and administration of one fupreme magi-" ftrate, the King; in whom, as in a general re-" fervoir, all the executive authority of the law " was lodged, and from whom justice was dif-" perfed to every part of the nation by diffinct, " yet communicating ducts and channels, which " wife inftitutions have been preferved for near a " thousand years unchanged, from Alfred's to the " prefent time."

Of these institutions ordained by Alfred, the trial by a jury of twelve men is represented as "* an institution admirable in itself, and the best "calculated for the preservation of liberty and the administration of justice that ever was devised "by the wit of man."

The first principles of our Constitution, as at this period laid down, operated by election, the

* Hume, vol. I. p. 94.

only true balis of freedom. Every ten householders chofe one from among themfelves to prefide over them, and reprefent them in the fuperior courts; in which magistrates, both civil and military, were elected for their feveral districts, and who alfo reprefented the whole body of people in the General Affembly of the Nation, which General Af-. fembly, Wittena Gemote, or Meeting of Wife Men, conftituted the Saxon Parliament, which Alfred * ordained for a perpetual usage should be held at London twice a year, or oftener if need be, to treat of the Government of God's people, how they fhould keep themfelves from fin, fhould live in quiet, and fhould receive right. The noble fimplicity of these last lines conveys a just idea of this good and wife man.

The executive power of the Saxons being placed in the hands of one man, who was the Sovereign, the Conftitution was partly monarchical. But as the King could not make laws without the confent of the principal men of the nation, it was in fome degree ariflocratical; and as the magiflrates of the town and rural tithings, and the counties were fummoned to the General Affembly of the kingdom, it poffetfed alfo a confiderable fhare of Democracy.

The Conflictution Alfred thus established from British and Saxon materials was a true limited Mo-

* Mirror of Juffices, Chap. I. f. 3. p. 6.

narchy, which having through a feries of fublequent years experienced many and dangerous vicifitudes, the dangers it has met renders it the more venerable, and at this period each feels an equal intereft in the prefervation of its facred parts, as well as an indignant contempt of all its enemies, both Republicans who are overtly attacking it, and Ariftocrats who are fecretly undermining it.

It may be useful here to recur to the distinction between political and civil liberty; for when Mr. J. Blackfton as above tells us, that the inftitutions eftablished under Alfred have been preferved unchanged for near a thousand years, we are apt to conclude, that the nation poffeffed invariably those liberties; but when we find that William the Conqueror, by the aid of priestcraft, rendered the Government despotic, yet those institutions still reremained. The diffinction between civil and political liberty is rendered evident, and illustratesthe maxim of Montesquieu, That the subjectimay be free and not the Conftitution, which I imagine to imply, that the people may have right done them in certain relative matters, as one individual to another; and in this respect the subject may be partially free, and enjoy civil liberty; but having no voice or vote in public measures, nor; share in the motions of Government, which being entirely at the arbitrary will of a King and his Council; the Constitution is not free, and the subject is deprived G 3

prived of political liberty. Similar ideas I should conclude induced Lord Clifford, Prime Minister of Charles II. to fay, That if the King would be firm to himfelf, he might carry the Government to what height he would; for if men were undifturbed of their properties, and were affured of liberty of confcience, and strict justice done them at Westminfter, and the army made firm to the King, there were none that would have either will, opportunity, or power to refift. That Charles had much at heart the grand object of reigning despotic, is a fact too well confirmed. But the old British spirit at that period was too prevalent to induce him to hope for fuccefs by direct overt attempts. Charles fell on the only expedient to deceive the jealous eye of Britons, impose on their credulity, and render the generous bias of their dispositions the only enemy to their real interefts. This Charles completely effected by fecret and corrupt influence.

Without the violent example of the Conqueror, it may be remarked, that Monarchs at a more refined period have made use of two methods to render themselves absolute over a free people; one method, as practifed by the late King of Sweden, by overawing the Diet, and by the stern abuse of his prerogative subjecting it to his will, which was an open, direct, and arbitrary usurpation of political liberty. The second method, as practifed by Charles II. like a man of gallantry, by art and address corruptly influencing

fluencing the reprefentatives of the people, in order to govern by his own will. Both methods, in their effects, tending to one point, arbitrary power, though widely differing in the means adopted. Of the two methods, the first is open, manly, and becoming, a military hero panting with ambition for mistaken glory. The fecond method is indirect, fecret, hypocritical, and treacherous, deluding the people with the faireft intentions, at the fame time undermining their dearest interests.

These reflections furnish sufficient evidence of the inftability of all Governments; the reftlefs aspiring nature of man ever tends to break the great chain of connexion which links the order of fociety, and ever fubverts the best institutions, when operating in the minds of vicious men in power. Hence we find the free Constitution of the Saxons, at various times, tending to anarchy, and at other periods to an actual Aristocracy, to which it feemed inclining when the Conqueror, made his invation, which event overthrew the Saxon free Government, and established on its ruins for a time a fystem of civil and religious slavery. The Saxons, until this combination of William and the Pope, had acknowledged the primacy of the See of Rome, but had hitherto maintained. an independence in their ecclefiaftical administration, and refifted the exorbitant claims which supported the grandeur of the Papacy. These were fufficient GA

fufficient motives to induce the Pope to support William's fucceffion' to the throne of England; and it further aided his plan of church government, which was widely diffusing itself at this æra over Europe; for wherever civil or religious independence was established, the heavenly powers of the Pope were thundered forth with accumulated virulence. His Holinefs espoufed William's caufe, and by a crufade openly announced his tyrannic intentions; and as a fymbol of his Chriftian-like motives, and his charity to mankind, made William a prefent of a confectated standard, with a golden Agnus Dei, and a ring with one of St. Peter's hairs in it; and further to promote his holy purposes, and in order that every man might worfhip the Duke as the champion of the church, pronounced Harold a perjured ufurper, and then iffued his divine mandates, that he would excommunicate every one that opposed William; and thus, as Mr. Hume observes*, were all the ambition and violence of that invation covered over fafely with the broad mantle of religion.

That the Crown of England till this period was elective, is evident by the choice made by the Wittena Gemote of Harold, who by that Affembly of the nation was fettled on the throne prior to the invafion made by William. Had the fucceffion been indifputably eftablished by hereditary defcent,

* Vol. I. p. 186,

Edgar Atheling, the right heir to the Crown, as fon of Edmund the Outlaw, and grandfon of King Edmund Ironfide, would have fucceeded to the throne, and been confirmed in it without doubt by the Wittena Gemote.

A few reflections arife from this circumstance on the advantages and difadvantages of the Chief Magistrate being elected by the nation, or fucceeding by hereditary descent. We find, in whatever State the Crown, or Chief Magistrate, has been elective, that State has proved the theatre of anarchy; the improving wildom of ages has taught men the ideal and dangerous power of the multitude's choosing a. master; and as the science of Government becomes better underftood, a true limited Monarchy approaches nearest to that perfection of civil government which both preferves the focial equality of men and the common interest of all. The executive power being placed in the hands of one by hereditary descent, subject to the law enacted by the delegated authority of the people, the acknowledged right and fuperiority of birth embraces popular opinion, and confidence, prevents invidious distinctions, and renders faction filent. Let any one reflect on the private feelings and conviction of the two characters-a King elect or an usurper, and a King in a limited monarchy by defcent, and judge from the harmony or difcord of their minds, whether in general their fituation be agreeable to thar

that order and tranquillity which is the effence of every community. The first, perhaps, owes his eminence to a majority opposed to a powerful candidate at the head of a faction, or may have usurped the throne. In either cafe their jealoufies and apprehensions will be the fame; their fears are inceffantly fuggesting to their minds the idea of affaffination or poifon, they continually go armed against their fubjects, and feldom go or return the fame road, or fleep often in the fame chamber. Strangers to the blifsful harmony of a finiling family, their ftern brow can never relax to the enjoyments of private life, and they foster two of the greatest enemics to human happinefs, jealoufy and fufpicion; they are never free from those miserable attendants. On the contrary, fee the reverse of all this in a King by hereditary defcent in a limited Monarchy, whole rule of conduct is prefcribed by the legiflative power of the people. If any public grievances, or any oppreffion on the common intereft is made, or any violent abuse of the executive power is exercifed, the reprefentatives of the people have full power to redrefs fuch abufes of the conflitutional rights of the people, by impeaching and punishing the Ministers and evil counfellors of the King; and this ineftimable privilege muft imprefs on the minds of all, the facred importance of the freedom of election. In fine, to all candid inquirers, the independence of a House of Commons must appear the only bulwark of all which the people

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people hold most dear and valuable. The Minifters of the Crown being refponsible for the abuses of the Executive Power, a considence arises bebetween King and people, which discovers itself by a conduct of generous regard and affectionate conduct on the part of the King, and by a grateful submission and stanch loyalty on the part of the people; a hereditary King in a limited Monarchy thus enjoys all the blessings of private life as a man, and all the dignity and power in public life as a King. These enjoyments a King can only assure to himself by making the interests of the people his greatest happines. His incessant duty is to promote that order and tranquillity in a State which is the first and chief object of Government.

To thefe advantages of hereditary fucceffion in a limited Monarchy, I am prepared for the objections which have afforded much fportive ridicule to a Republican, who has wilfully overlooked the great line of connexion which links the mutual dependences of the Conftitution, or he has imbibed falfe notions of its principles. But as political liberty is the fubject of inveftigation, the Conflitution we fhall notice in a future Section, and fhall briefly remark, that a King being a minor or an ideot, the firft of which has not occurred for near two hundred and fifty years, are objections of no weight, when it is confidered an independent Parliament, as prefcribed by the Conftitution, is

ever adequate to all fortuitous events of that nature. If the reprefentatives of the people be faithful, the Constitution can never suffer by such events; limits are prescribed to each constituent part, and a violation of those boundaries is an usurpation on the rights of the people. At the prefent period, as I shall have occasion to obferve, the Conftitution cannot be materially violated; without a general fenfe of the perversion diffusing itfelf through all ranks, one opinion will be formed, and one general fentiment prevail; the people will exercife their birth-right, political liberty, and will reftore that which they founded ; the Conftitution will acquire additional purity, and the proof of its excellence will confift in the harmony and energy of its powers.

From the Invafion down to the Revolution, I fhall endeavour to be as concife as the leading fubject will admit. The treacherous conceffions which William made after the battle of Haftings were merely to pave his way to the Crown by the feeming confent of the Englifh nation; through the influence of the Clergy he obtained this point, but to the infinite mortification of the Englifh, they foon found themfelves proferibed, their eftates confifcated, oppreffive exactions and arbitrary laws enforced, and their native language fupplanted by the impofition of a foreign one. Power and property were thus united in the hands of a few, while the multitude

multitude were deprived of their common rights. To reftore the balance of power and the balance of property was the after-work of ages. The first circumftance that led to this equilibrium, which is the basis of the Constitution, was the exercise of political liberty under King John. The regaining of this facred principle of primeval right will ever command the feelings and infpire the mind with the true principles of liberty. When the Executive Power exceeds the limits of juffice, and usurps a tyranny which reafon renounces and freedom difclaims, a people who once have tafted the bleffings of liberty will dare to oppofe, will rife to refift, and eventually will obtain. It was the exceffive tyranny of the Conqueror and his fucceffors that called forth the latent oppreffed fpirit of Englishmen, the feeds of liberty they had planted-The vegetation may be checked, may to a defpot's flattered eye be eradicated, but the Sun of British freedom has ever difpelled the cloud of defpotifm, re-animated the hereditary feeds, and the vegetation has made arbitrary Monarchs tremble.

The formidable power of the first Norman Princes, who could crush the most powerful Baron at their pleasure, excited a spirit of union to deliberate among the different ranks of people, and close confederacies took place, to concert a resultance against the enormous power of the Crown. Here the Barons, as the chief landholders, associated,

ciated, and freely expatiated on the tyranny of the judicial proceedings, and the flavish injunctions of the forest laws *, the feverity of which was particularly oppressive. In these confederacies a difcuffion of the precife terms and meaning of the new laws imposed by the Conqueror, must have appeared unintelligible to a great majority, the interpretation of them by the Barons could not have been conveyed to the capacities of the lower orders, without a colourable ray of fophiftry, which would naturally excite an enquiry into the focial rights of men. and renew to their minds the free principles of the Saxon inftitutions. The confequence followed, if we judge from effects, of their thorough conviction, that a limited power exceeded is a power forfeited; that equality of privileges is the first principle of fociety; that the union of power and property, in the hands of one or of a few, operates against the common interest of a community and. against focial right, and its oppressive laws or right of action may be opposed by a fimilar right.

* Another violent alteration of the English Conftitution (in confequence of the Invasion) confisted in the depopulation of whole countries for the purpose of the King's royal diversion, and subjecting both them and all the ancient forests of the kingdom to the unreasonable feverities of forest laws imported from the Continent, whereby the flaughter of a beast was made almost as penal as the death of a man. In the Saxon times, though no man was allowed to kill or chace the King's deer, yet he might start any game, pursue and kill it on his own estate. Black. Comm. vol. IV. p. 415.

Hence

Hence by an eafy affimilation of principles, the fubordinate claffes became infpired with the true fpirit of liberty, and we find them in the fubfequent reign of Henry III. ftipulating for the fame conditions as the Barons themfelves; and the Barons by * uniting with, and confirming the people in their rights, in order to oppofe the rapacity of the Roman Church, and the power of the Crown, created that fpirit of dignified human nature in John Bull, which having now afcertained the juft prerogatives of the Crown, will ever check the overbearing fpirit of an Ariftocracy, and preferve the Conflitution from arbitrary power, and the no lefs dangerous State, a convulfed Republic.

Some adventitious circumftances concurred to produce thefe rifing fparks of ancient liberty. After the death of William Rufus, Henry I. fecured his fucceffion to the throne, to the exclusion of his elder brother Robert, by promifing to reftore the laws of Edward the Confeffor, and other confirmations of Saxon liberties, which fecured the people in their perfons and property; for this purpofe he granted a charter, which in the reign of King John the Barons made the foundation of *Magna Charta*. By the irregular fucceffions of Henry I. and Stephen, the people made fome advances for the regaining of political liberty; and

* Hume, Appendix, No. II. p. 113.

the

the conceffions first made by Henry were particularly demanded at the coronation of every fubfequent Monarch; but by them they had been confidered merely as appendages to the Crown, to be put on or off at pleasure. John at his coronation took the usual oaths, but foon after discovered his despotic nature, by the horrid murder of his nephew Arthur. Imbruing his hands in the blood of fo near a relation, shocked the humanity, and roufed the indignation of the whole kingdom. On his arrival in England from the French provinces, he exerted the Royal prerogatives and the foreft laws to that degree of excessive feverity, that the dormant fpirit of confederated liberty now openly manifested itself throughout the nation. The cause of freedom became the caufe of juffice; the caufe of equal privileges the caufe of truth; the union of the people was fober refiftance; the efforts of the Barons were dignified ; the opposition glorious and laudable. Hence were obtained the Great Charter of Liberties, which involves all the chief outlines of a legal Government, and provides for the equal distribution of justice, and free enjoyment of property, which Mr. Hume emphatically terms * the great objects for which political fociety was at first founded by men; which the people have a perpetual and unalienable right to recall, and which no time nor precedent, nor statute, nor positive institution,

* Hift. Eng. Vol. II. p. 88.

ought

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ought to deter them from keeping ever uppermost in their thoughts and attention.

By this famous Charter, the Saxon free principles were incorporated with the feudal fyftem, which laid the foundation of our truly limited Monarchy; and whoever at the prefent period reflects on the incorporation of those two opposite principles, and the prefent connexions and fubordinations of our elaborate Constitution, cannot fufficiently admire the limitations and prerogatives of the Chief Magistrate. With the feudal system introduced by William I. many valuable energies were obtained; and this fystem, however at first fubverfive of the common rights of the people, has through fucceffive ages been open to improvement, and as knowledge became progreffively more general, it has been in a continual habit of acquiring perfection. At the Revolution it was pruned of its chief exceffes, and attempted to be modelled to the interest of all. But practice ever tending to make theory blufh, it remains for the prefent age to temper the energy of the Norman fystem with the lax principles of the old English, by a Parliamentary Reform ; this will produce that neceffary equilibrium, or balance of property and power, which is the basis of a limited Monarchy; and the first principle of our Conftitution.

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SECTION V.

Remarks on Political Liberty, from the Confirmation of Magna Charta, under King John, to the Succeffion of the Houfe of Stuart.

THROUGHOUT the English History, we must carry in our minds the facred truth, that political liberty is the birth-right of Britons; and though the feveral articles in Magna Charta, through the refinements made by the chicanery of modern law, are now confidered as bare of circumstances, and too concife, and the charter itself an useless fcroll, yet it contains, among other articles of universal justice and equal right, an explicit confirmation of the right of political liberty. This important article * is as follows :--- " That if the "King, or his Juffices, or Bailiffs, or any of his "Ministers, offend any person contrary to any of " the faid articles, or tranfgrefs any article of this " peace and fecurity, and that fuch mifcarriage be " made known to four of the faid five and twenty " Barons', those four Barons shall go to the King, " or to his Jufficiary, if the King be out of the " realm, declaring to him that fuch an abufe is " committed, and shall defire him to cause it spee-" dily to be redreffed; and if the King, or (if he be

* 64th.

" out of the realm) his Jufficiary do not redrefs it, "Then the faid four Barons shall report the fame to "the refidue of the faid five and twenty Barons; and then those five and twenty Barons, with the Commonalty of England, may distress us by all the ways "they can; to wit, by feizing on our cafiles, lands, and possessions; and by what other means they can, "till it be amended, as they shall adjudge, saving our own person, the person of our Queen, and the persons of our children; and when it is amended, they shall be subject to us as before."

The language of this Covenant is very harfh, and the condition itfelf appears ill fuited to produce either peace or good order in the State, or to affure the real liberty of the fubject. It was no doubt fuitable to the genius of the times; civil liberty could not thrive in a community altogether military, and in a flate of vaffalage; but with the abolition of this military dependance, the Conftitution became better known; and though the fubftance of this article has been modelled to the exigencies of good government, the people have not, nor cannot relinquish the principle, it being their: indefeasible, unalienable right. By this condition it must have followed, that the power of the King was very materially retrenched, and it must have thrown an immense power into the hands of the Aristocracy; the truth of which appears, with some trifling intermiffion, down to the Revolution. The H_2 whole

whole of this long period feems to have been a fluctuating ftruggle between political liberty and the usurpations of Monarchs, Priests and ambitious Barons. Upon this express flipulation in Magna Charta, on behalf of the commonalty, to refift the higher powers, the memorable oppositions of Tyler, Cade, &c. were lawfully made. Recurrences to political liberty which must render their conduct venerable in the effimation of every impartial and fincere friend to the Conftitution, which appears to owe its excellence to extreme cafes and extreme arguments. The true spirit of liberty boldly faces its enemies; confcious truth gives ardour to common right; and though tyranny prevail, and prieftcraft triumph, we are bound by reason and history to acknowledge that the truest friends to mankind have been those who have nobly facrificed their private interefts for the public good, and glorioufly bled in the common caufe.

As this famous Charter is the first on record of the Leges Scriptæ, or Statute Laws, and lays the foundation of our present form of Parliament, the controversies which have arisen on the origin of the House of Commons, and the rights of the people to an equal representation, are reduced to mere quibbles about words. If we take an enlarged view of those circumstances which attend all revolutions, our prejudices will not then ascribe Magna Charta and the being of Parliament to the grace and and favour of Monarchs; nor can the most enthufiaftic advocate for liberty wholly afcribe them to the forefight and wifdom of their anceftors. It has been found in every material innovation or change of Government, that lefs is due to the fagacity of the laity or the virtues of the clergy, than to those fortuitous events which constitute the laws of the universe; to those immutable laws, which ever operating on matter, produce those feeming irregularities in human fyftems, which render every inftitution mutable, and every Government a type of the human heart. With this remark we shall confider the circumstances of this important period, and we shall find the obtaining Magna Charta, as well as the fubfequent revolutions, was owing to the fluctuating principles of property.

The feudal fystem introduced by the Conqueror threw the balance of property, and with that the balance of power, entirely into the hands of the Crown, which created * a fubordination of vaffalage from the King to the meanest gentleman, and the confequent flavery of the lower people. The King being the fupreme Lord of all the landed property, it followed that - all the lands in England were derived from, and holden, mediately or immediately from the Crown ; and which William

* Hume, vol. II. p. 265. + Black. Comm. vol. IV. p. 418.

had

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had conferred on his chief Barons, subject to the military fervices of 60,000 Knights fees.

But the balance of property, having its foundation in nature, cannot be immutably fixed by either of the two extremes, a Norman feudal tenure, or an Utopian levelling fystem. The usurped power of a few in a large community cannot retain it for any length of time from the many, particularly when the public mind is impreffed with the fpirit of liberty, or the diffusion of knowledge has undermined fuperftition, and difpelled the cloud of ignorance, which two enemies of reason and truth are the main fprings on which despotism and priestcraft move. The Houfe of Commons therefore, and the partial reprefentation of the people, originated from the variable principles of the balance of property, by the accidental divisions of the exorbitant eftates of the Norman Barons, and the confequent abolition of military tenures, * these immense Baronies were divided by provisions to younger children, by partitions to co-heirs, by fale, or by escheating to the King, who gratified a great number of his courtiers by dealing them out in fmaller portions, by which a middle rank was formed, which became very numerous, and at the period of obtaining Magna Charta formed a very respect-

* Hume, Vol. II. p. 268.

able

able order in the State ; and as they were all immediate vaffals of the Crown by military tenure, they were, by the principles of the feudal law, entitled to a feat in the national councils. 'It is unreafonable to fuppofe, that when the various divisions and fub-divisions of property had abolished the military tenures, which entitled the tenants to a feat in the national councils, they fhould have forfeited their right to a future share in the motions of Government, or have entirely difregarded that privilege. On the contrary, it is more reafonable to conclude, they became more anxious for their property, and attentive to their rights. By the abolition of military tenures, perfonal fervices were exchanged for pecuniary fupplies; the minds of men were turned to agriculture and commerce; property acquired an estimation, and became the first moving principle in private life, as well as the great object of the public mind; this great period may therefore be regarded as the dawn of a revolution from a military to a commercial age; the obtaining Magna Charta laid the foundation of that great event; the Reformation gave it fpirit and motion; and under Elizabeth it affumed a body and figure.

The accidental and gradual abolition of military tenures accelerated the attainment of that due balance of property which is the foundation of a free Government, by conftituting a Legislative power, partly composed of the labouring part of the com-. H4 munity,

munity, to counteract the oppression and encreachments of the rich and powerful. This revival of the ancient British free principles arole, as before obferved, by the union of the Barons with the fubordinate ranks, to concert refistance against the And the future right to this co-operation Crown. was confirmed by the 64th article of the Charter, which impowers the commonalty of England to oppose the King if he violated their liberties. The fubfequent civil wars to which this condition gave birth, prove how little civil Government was known in that military age; a rifing of the commonalty in England in arms against the King was productive of infinite evils, and attended with animofities for which death itfelf could only atone. But happily, the immortal Earl of Leicefter laid the foundation of an inftitution, * which in process of time became one of the most useful and powerful members of the national Constitution. This great Baron, under Henry III. glorioufly oppofing the thunders of the Roman Church, and the weaknefs and wickedness of the King, fummoned a Parliament in the year 1265, to which he ordered returns to be made of two Knights from each shire, and Deputies from the cities and boroughs. Upon this first precedent of our present House of Commons, it is impossible to fplit and divide an idea, and render a general covenant a partial one. If

Hume, vol. II. p. 211.

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Commonalty of England were impowered by Magna Charta to oppose the abuse of their liberties by the King, the commonalty of all England are entitled, without a shadow of doubt, to an equal representation in the House of Commons, the origin of which arofe from changing a hoftile refiftance into a legal form. This is the true principle on which the Houfe of Commons is founded. It is general, it is univerfal, it is the birth-right of Britons; that this principle; which extends to all, and is the right of every man, should be reduced to common right in abstract, to partial representation and monopoly, could only arife from the flate of military vaffalage under which the great majority of the people laboured for many years, added to the ignorance and fuperfition which for many fublequent centuries the Roman Church encouraged.

In the fublequent reign of Edward I. this precedent of Leicefter's, which was in fact * a privilege covenanted in Magna Charta, obtained fo much on the public mind, that Edward found his edicts for raifing talliages and aids could not be carried into effect, without fummoning reprefentatives from cities and boroughs to Parliament; and one of the Parliaments of this reign obtained from Edward the most important statute in the whole English code. The statute de tallagio non conce-

* Blackftone Comm. vol. IV. p. 225.

dendo

dendo, which decrees that no tax shall be laid, nor impost levied, without the joint confent of the Lords and the Commons.¹ * This statute was the engine which protected the Charter itself, and by the help of which the people were thenceforth to make a legal conquest over the Crown.

Many arbitrary writers, I conclude, embrace a mistake, merely to accommodate their principles, when they affirm that the reprefentatives of the people returned from cities and borough towns were an order of men who had ever been confidered as too mean to enjoy a place in the national councils. This conclusion would not have been doubted, if we were not informed, that, under the feudal law, military tenants were entitled to a feat in the Norman Parliaments, and that the Houfe of Commons in its prefent form derives its origin from the abolition of military tenures, and from the covenant in Magna Charta impowering the Barons and the commonalty of England to oppose the oppreffion of the Monarch. Hence the term Commons, from the word commonalty, was merely giving a new name to the fame order of men. The military tenants were the Knights and Gentry, who upon this revolution got themfelves elected for their respective counties, cities, and boroughs, in which they refided; and with the progress of com-

* De Lolme, c. 11. p. 40.

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merce and literature, obtained a preponderance in the Conftitution, and a powerful influence in the motions of Government, a confequence which naturally followed, after fhaking off the burden of military vaffalage. The reprefentatives of the people elected in the cities, counties, and boroughs, were from this period legally eftablished as a constituent part of the Constitution; and it was ordained under Edward III.*, that Parliaments shall be held once a year, or oftener if need be, which was a + renewal of the Saxon law of holding Parliaments.

And a Houfe of Commons as thus conftituted, when freely chofen and freely acting, has, in numerous inftances, proved the only affurance for the free operation of the Conftitution, and the ftable fupport of freedom. And notwithftanding it was by variable, yet progreffive acceffions, that it became a permanent and powerful eftablifhment, at that period it was a very important point obtained for the body of people, to convene in a legal manner, armed with liberty, reafon, and truth, inftead of the fhield, the buckler, and battering ram, to demolifh the King's caftle, and feize on his poffeffions for redrefs of grievances.

> * 4 Edw. III. c. 14. and 36 Edw. III. c. 9. † Mirror of Justice, c. 1. f. 3. and c. 5. f. 1.

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In the fublequent reign of Edward II. the Commons * began to annex petitions to the bills by which they granted fubfidies. This was the first dawn of their legiflative authority. Under Edward III. they declared they would not in future acknowledge any law to which they had not exprefsly affented. Soon after this they exerted a privilege, in which confifted, at this time, one of the great bulwarks of the Constitution; they impeached, and procured to be condemned, fome of the Ministers of State. Under the weak and turbulent reign of Richard II. the King endeavoured to poifon the integrity, and oppofe the growing independence of the Commons, by fecret and corrupt influence. One article alledged against him, and to which he confeffed, was in the following words, as they appear on the Rolls-+ 19 Item. " Although by statute, and the custom of his " realm, in the calling of every Parliament, and " to lay open their grievances, and to profecute " for remedies thereupon as they think fit, not-" withstanding the faid King, that in his Parliaments he might obtain his will, which was rafh, <u>،</u> " often directed his mandates to his Sheriffs, that " they fhould return certain perfons, nominated by " the King himfelf, as Knights of the Shires, " which Knights indeed he could make pliable to " him, and as he very often did, fometimes by

* De Lolme, c. iii. p. 41. + Henry IV. m. 20.

" various

" various threats and terrors, and fometimes by " gifts, to confent to those things which were " prejudicial to the realm, and extremely burden-" fome to the people."

From this reign down to that of Henry VII. was a continued scene of infurrections and wars. No part of the English history since the Conquest is so uncertain, and so little authentic, as the wars of the Houses of York and Lancaster; at the conclusion of which the nobility were brought to a humble submission to the stern prerogatives of the Crown. The people were reduced to their former state of vassage, and the improvement of the Constitution wholly neglected—Nam filent leges inter arma—and we are left to deplore a disgraceful period of history, * a scene of horror, bloodshed, tavage manners, arbitrary executions, and treacherous, dishonourable conduct in all parties.

The union of these two contending families by the marriage of Henry. VII. quelled each jarring interest; and the reformation in the next reign, which occasioned a great revolution in manners and property, paved the way for ascertaining the equilibrium necessary in the Three Estates, by imperceptibly weakening the Aristocracy, advancing the Commons, and limiting the Prerogative; and

* Hume, vol. III. p. 33.

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finally concurred to the reftoration of the ancient limited Monarchy, which was confirmed by the Revolution. Yet in the intermediate reigns, the Crown, while this great Revolution was maturing, became progreffively * more arbitrary, by those very means which afterwards reduced its power.

The wars of the two Rofes put an entire ftop to trade for feveral years; and the Commons were reduced to fuch an abject dependance on the King, the Clergy, and the Barons, during the defpotic reign of Henry. VIII. that they feemed to have totally loft that infpiration for their ancient liberties, which pervaded and animated the whole State during the reigns of John, Henry, and Edward I. And no reign in the English history holds out a more ferious truth than this of Henry VIII. For though there be no danger that the nation, while animated with the fpirit of liberty, will again relapfe into fuch a bafe and fervile dependance on a rude tyrannic barbarian, yet the principle teaches the important leffon, That Government, in the hands of an ambitious Prince, may be modelled to the defpotic bias of his heart, though the forms of a free Conftitution remain; and that those barriers which political liberty has provided in the Conftitution to maintain freedom, life, and property, may be made, by direct or indirect means, falvos

* Black. Comm. vol. IV. p. 433.

for

for the groffeft enormities. Henry extorted loans from the people which he never meant to repay, and loaded them with oppreffive taxes; and the first men in the nation were made to tremble at his displeasure, against whom he perpetrated violences the most enormous., But he never attempted to abolish the Parliament, or even to retrench its' doubtful privileges. On the contrary, he made it the prime minister of his tyranny, the passive inftrument of his outrages against liberty life, and law. It fanctioned his defpotic and fanguinary meafures, and authorized his oppreffive taxes; and to the eternal difgrace of the Parliaments of this reign, they enacted that the King's Proclamations fhould have the force of law, and by creating a long lift of chimerical treafons, have rendered the memory of them infamous.

From these facts we may conclude, that the long civil wars of the Roses had so depressed the national spirit, that as the vigour of the national body failed by the division of its parts, the sovereign power of the Crown became by consequence more arbitrary and unlimited; and England at this æra was arrived at an ebb, which was either to flow to flavery or freedom. At the moment when transitory evils had thrown the Constitution into the gulph of Despotiss, the Resormation by a fortuitous event, wasted the bark of Freedom over the quicksfands of Priestcraft and Tyranny, roused the Genius

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Genius of Liberty, which in the fubsequent reigns animated the fpirit of the nation to affert the privileges of a free people; and happily that faceed fpirit of liberty has never fince forfaken the British isle.

In the fubfequent reign of Edward VI. the tyrannical laws and new fangled treafons inftituted by Henry, his father, were happily abolished. This virtuous youth was adorned with the light of reason, with a heart graced with promising dispositions, and a capacity to learn and judge; but to the infinite concern of the friends of liberty and the Protestant cause, his reign was cut short under his people's fmiles; and fo eafy is the transition from human joy to forrow, by the blood-thirst Mary, their finiles were fucceeded by tears. Milton's Satan under Papal colours ravaged the land, revelled in the tortures of reason and truth; and in this monfrous reign, ignorance was no protection, when even brutes were facrificed to the Popish faith. On the acceffion of Elizabeth, England, reviving from the general flupor, began to breathe; and Elizabeth embracing the Protestant religion, bleffed the Isle with a long and brilliant reign. But fuch was the analogy between fovereign power and despotism, that a Princess the most enlightened, and of the most splendid talents, could not separate the long cherished idea of former reigns from that which is a Sovereign's ultimate happinels and final fecurity-the affections of their people. The Star Star Chamber was still continued, and the High Commission Court even instituted to systemize confidence and enforce obedience. The extreme mission of the last reign, and the glory of this lessend the tyranny of these institutions; and the wission of Elizabeth, as it tempered oppression, the people in the admiration of the one, overlooked the other.

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SECTION VI.

Remarks on Political Liberty, from the Succession of the House of Stuart to the Revolution.

THE nation at this period began to find the happy effects of the Reformation. The great alteration in property advanced the power of the Commons; the art of printing began to diffeminate learning throughout the State, and to enlarge the minds of men; trade and navigation were fuddenly carried on to an amazing extent; an inundation of wealth flowed in upon the merchants and middling ranks; the Popifh Clergy had been detected in their frauds and abuses, and ftripped of their lands and revenues, were left trembling for their very existence. " * But there " is no abufe fo great in civil fociety, as not to " be attended with beneficial confequences to " fome: and in the beginning of reformations, " the lofs of these advantages is always felt very " fenfibly, while the benefits refulting from the " change is the flow effect of time." This accounts for the prejudices of the House of Stuart in favour of Popery, that engine of defpotifm, which was

* Hume, vol. III. p. 236.

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the caufe of the civil wars, and the unfortunate cataftrophe of that high prerogative family. That Monarchs should favour every institution which deprives the people of their rights and liberties, is the natural confequence of human ambition. But that there should be found any confiderable difinterested number, or even one individual, possessed of this aftonishing predilection for despotism, is wonderful. The partifans of that unhappy family, and the advocates of the prefent day for arbitrary power, evince how difficult it is to eradicate prejudices when deeply rooted in the human breaft. The partifans of the Stuarts may be compared to · Mary I. who declared *, " She never read Pro-" testant books, and thanked God that as she " never had, fo fhe hoped never to read any of " them." Ignorance in an illiterate age may be admitted as a veil for many enormities, but the enemies to liberty and reform among the moderns can only plead felf-intereft-Individual integrity, the public good, and the national freedom, they confider as meritorious facrifices for their own aggrandizement. Hence ignorance, felf-intereft, and prejudice, eclipfe the hiftory of man. One age decries the ignorance and prejudices of the last; succeeding ages the corruption and vices of the times; and posterity, finally, refts on the frailty of human nature.

* Hume, vol. IV. p. 436.

Of

Of all the frailties in the human eatalogue, prejudice is the leaft defenfible; it deprives the mind of its nobleft faculty, that reafoning principle which diftinguifhes a human being from a brute; and though ignorance be the caufe, yet it fcorns the conviction of the fact by which it is flattered. With this ignoble principle the Stuart family afcended the Britifh Throne. Ignorant of civil government, though learned in the law of defpotic precedents; and prejudiced by the example of their predeceffors, their narrow minds could not perceive the amazing revolution both of property and religious fentiment which had taken place fince the Reformation.

James, the first King of the Stuart race, was lefs a tyrant than an enthusiaft. Enthusiafm delights in chimera; and in the brain of James it alighted on a fruitful foil. The divinity of Kings was his political creed; the absurd doctrine of divine right had feized on his mind, and his tongue chimed with the theme. With the pedantry of a collegian, in his private conversation, his writings, and his public speeches, he was continually afferting *, That the authority of Kings was not to be controlled any more than that of God himfelf; like him they were omnipotent; and that the privileges which the people laid claim to as

* See his speeches made in Parliament in the year 1610-21.

their inheritance and birth-right were no more than the effects of the grace and toleration of his Royal anceftors. Thus James oftentatioufly difplayed those fallacies which his ancestors and the Pope had invented. Paffive obedience, and nonrefistance had been taught by the Clergy; but former Monarchs were content in the enjoyment' of that deception which James had the impru-, dence to publish. The liberty of the prefs, then, in its dawn, contributed, notwithstanding the Star-Chamber, to diffeminate fuch falutary no-, tions among all orders of the people, as detected the fophisms delivered from the throne and the pulpit, and finally concurred in the refutation of the divinity of Kings, by teaching Charles I. his fon, that Kings rule by the grace of the people, and that they never can affume the facred privilege of ruling by the grace of God, but when they. govern according to the laws of the land, according to general liberty, virtue, and justice.

The private character of Charles is reprefented as virtuous, but his public character vicious; Nature had been kind, but his education, as in the words of the Poet, triumphed.

> By education most men are misled, So we believe because we were so bred; The priest continues what the nurse began, And thus the child imposes on the man.

Encircled

Encircled by a few, who in their hearts cherithed the doctrine of the Pope, yet wore the femblance of the Protestant Church, Charles was inceffantly flattered with his father's maxim of Divine right, and the unlimited prerogative of his predeceffors, which he manifested on all occasions. The nation detected the fiction, and in turn freely canvaffed the prerogatives of the Crown. The fcrutiny proved fatal; rather let us fay, when reason and justice prevail over arbitrary power and priestcraft, *a triumpb*. Political liberty was afferted and maintained by the representatives of the people; the Commons alone stood firm, when the power of the Nobles was vanquished.

Among the Commons were men of profeffed abilities, and acknowledged Statefmen—Men who entered warmly into conflicutional measures— Men whole views were as folid as their principles were juft; these opposed to the *jure divino* of Charles the vox populi vox Dei—The Divinity of law—in the law alone was the Divine Power; and every law founded on liberty and juffice had a claim for obedience, Royalty itself not exempt. This was the voice of the people fanctioned by the immutable laws of the Deity. But the King had been taught, that the fupreme power was inherent in the Crown; that the legislative authority must comport with the dictates of his heart, that the executive authority could only originate from the active impulse of his divine mind.

Both powers thus claimed a divine origin; but it requires not the fagacity of a Pope to perceive, that the people's was that of the Gofpel, the King's that of the Alcoran. Charles became a convert, but by his apoftacy met his fate. The ftern brow of Prerogative, supported by the delusion of Divine right, could not brook the fancied ignominy of relaxing its fovereign power, by fubmitting to the future wildom and control of Parliament. Charles repeatedly diffolved his Parliaments for their integrity and patriotifm, and continued to practife every illegal measure. The perversion of the law by corrupt judges, and the imprifonment of the fubject for default of payment of fhipmoney, and other obnoxious and arbitrary taxes, operated in fanning the flame of difcord among all ranks of people, and created those lasting prejujudices, which his concessions in his last Parliament could not allay.

The famous Petition of Right, framed by a Committee of his third Parliament, fets forth, in an explicit manner the violent abuses of the prerogative, and beft explains the pretensions of the Commons, who appear to have affumed no unprecedented privileges, or demanded unufual powers. The Bill of Rights, which was enacted in confequence,

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quence, was declaratory of the known statutes of the land, and a recognition of the Great Charter, and that important statute of Edward I. for raising *taillages*, which is the bulwark of the Constitution.

The firmnels and independence of the Parliaments of this reign afford the higheft example of their fpecific utility. The confequences which followed amply fhew the abfolute neceffity that the reprefentatives of the people fhould be independent of the frowns or fecret influence of the Crown, but that they fhould never be independent of the choice of the people. Free Parliaments and frequent elections are the deputies of political liberty, and the members and fpirit of the Conftitution, and cannot be annulled without annihilating the machine. When Parliaments are free, civil liberty is affured from every act, overt or fecret, that tyranny can invent, or proud ambition ftimulate.

Happy had Charles been, happy indeed would have been the nation, had he as folicitoufly endeavoured to gain the affections of his people as he was induftrious in every chicanery to trample on their facred rights, and violate every principle of juffice. But the King could not reconcile reftraints or limitations of that Divine power with which the Great Author of Nature had vefted him; an authority, which for bafe mortals to difpute, in his his estimation, amounted to blasphemy. His evafions in confirming the Bill of Rights prove his fubmiffion was concealed hypocrify; his conduct and difcourse dicovered the infincerity of his heart. The first opportunity that offered he violated all that he had done, diffolved the Parliament, and in future was determined to govern by himfelf fupreme, which he did for eleven years, when his various defpotic ways and means failing, his urgent necessities induced him to call another Parliament, which poffeffing the fame patriotic fpirit of those which had formerly been the occasion of his displeasure, he abruptly disfolved it, but soon after convoked another, which wifely began its career by impeaching, and procuring to be punished the King's evil counfellors, the fecret enemies of liberty, peace, and concord; and the. mutual agreement of the King and Commons bid fair to reftore once more the calm return of promifed harmony, Charles having in Parliament abolished the Star Chamber and High Commission Courts, and enacted statutes for Triennial Parliaments, for accertaining the forest laws, and renouncing Ship Money and other exactions. But the true caufe of the national difcontent under the Stuart family now manifested itself. The cruelties of Mary had left an indelible stain on the Catholic faith, and created a jealoufy in the British breast, which the leaft breath of fuspicion fanned into a flame. Unfortunately this family indirectly countenanced

tenanced the Roman church : and in the dawn of general literature, it followed, that theological points, discussed by ruftic reason, would beget fanaticifm. Unacquainted with logical refinements and the fubtleties of schoolmen, any learned oppofition to their opinions they confidered as fophiftry; their minds dwelt on enthufiafm as infpiration : and in a common caufe, which under the gofpel dispensation, required the laws to be adminiftered with justice and mercy, and equal right to be done, where each had an equal claim to the enjoyment of liberty, it was a natural confequence that the Puritans should imagine they possessed the Divine favour, and that their caufe was that of the Lord's. The extremes which followed were in proportion to the oppression suffered. Religious diffensions were now rising to a flame. The King had broke with the Scots, and the Irish were in rebellion; and Charles having, by his former conduct, lost the confidence of the nation, his fituation became desperate. The Commons, to fecure their authority, had taken advantage of the King's neceffities, and obtained from him the fatal confent for their unlimited duration, exempt from the control of his prerogative; which rash measure was attended with the most fatal confequences. One tyrant is more tolerable than five hundred; the one has his moments of relaxation, the many are invariably and inflexibly the fame; the gathering florm now raged from every quarter; the most difcordant

discordant passions which harrass the human mind. composed the element of anarchy; and in the thunder form of civil war, the unhappy Charles fell, an awful example of lawlefs majefty; and the Commonwealth which fucceeded is another lawlefs example, and fhews too evidently the wide difference between theoretical models of polity and practical ones. On this overthrow of the Conftitution, Mr. De Lolme judicioufly obferves, the " English made fruitless attempts to substitute a " Republican Government in its ftead, fubjected " at first to the power of the principal leaders in " the Long Parliament; they faw it afterwards " parcelled out among the Chiefs of different bo-" dies of troops, and thus shifting without end " from one kind of fubjection to another; they " were at length convinced, that an attempt to " eftablish liberty in a great nation, by making-" the people interfere in the common business of " Government, is of all attempts the moft chi-" merical; that the authority of ALL, with which " men are amused, is in reality no more than the " authority of a few powerful individuals who di-" vide the Republic. They at last rested in the " bofom of the only Conftitution which is fit for " a great State and a free people. I mean that " in which a chofen number deliberate, and a " fingle hand executes."

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How neceffary is Monarchy when duly limited? How futile and vain are the attempts of a multitude to maintain liberty on a pure foundation, when there is no object to obey, but a code of laws executed by a number of men, equal in perfon, equal in claim, and equal in right? Where they demand allegiance they create jealoufy; where they enforce fubjection, they fow envy and malice; a division of interest takes place; the rich and powerful maintain an ufurped authority; and the people, after a momentary excess of liberty, find, to their forrow, the vain delusion of natural right, the chimerical dream of unreftrained liberty. An arbitrary Government, by reftraining the paffions, and enforcing subjection, is in fact far the more eligible and happy than a convulled Republic.

From this memorable ftruggle for the prerogatives of the Crown and the privileges of Parliament, there arifes two reflections. 1ft. That whether the Executive Power, by coercive meafures can fubdue the Parliament to its will, or by fecretly and corruptly influencing the reprefentatives of the people, can feparate the common intereft, the Government becomes arbitrary and abfolute. 2nd. That when the reprefentatives of the people can render themfelves a permanent body, by an overt act obtained by confent of the King for their unlimited duration, or when a Parliament liament shall abolish the kingly office, or when Members of Parliament, by obtaining boroughs, can make their election independent of their conflituents, the Government likewise becomes arbitrary and absolute.

The conclusion from these facts and reasonings is the confirmation of that known apothegm, That England never can be ruined but by a Parliament. The secret and corrupt influence of the Executive Power over the Parliaments of the prefent century, afford a degrading contrast to the Commons of Charles's reign. Posterity will not again experience overt responsible acts from the Crown. Its very antagonists are now become the instruments of its power, and oppression has shifted fides. This evil can only be remedied by an equal and free representation, and the public mind is preparing for the event.

Charles II. was wholly indebted to the deftruction of civil liberty by the Commonwealth for his reftoration. By a well-timed and judicious exercife of political liberty by a convention of the States, the Conftitution was regained; but it was found that the King had not profited by the example of his father, the fame arbitrary principles mantling in his veins, operated in a converse direction, more plaufible, but not the lefs dangerous. Charles, by the diversity of his fortune, had formed a judgment a judgment of men, which a thorough knowledge of the world confirms, That a principle of felfinterest predominates in general to the exclusion of public virtue, and too often that of moral obligations. He faw the error of his father in contending with a Parliament, and with a people who inherited a Constitution formed by laws breathing a bold and independent spirit of liberty. The last House of Commons that confented to a law for its own unlimited duration, which had abolifhed the elective power of the people for near twenty years, furnished him with a precedent, that the representatives of the people were willing to make a feparate interest from their constituents, and that by a Parliament the outward form and figure of the Conftitution might be preferved, yet he might by indirect means extend his prerogative to any height he chofe; for if he could separate the interest of the Commons from that of the people, by influencing a majority to the interests of the Crown, he could govern the nation at his will, leaving the people deftitute of any power to redrefs their grievances. Upon this principle, after the convention of the States had fettled him on the throne. he iffued his writs for convoking a Parliament; and the people, long harraffed by the anarchy of the Commonwealth, fubmitted the election to his own management, by which means he procured the memorable penfioned Parliament, and afterwards was guilty of every diffipation and tyranny, uniting

uniting with the high prerogative of his father the principles of a debauchee; and the national fpirit, depressed with continued scenes of despotism, tamely fuffered her most virtuous patriots to be inhumanly butchered. But notwithftanding the tyrannical disposition of the King*, the happy concurrence of circumstances was fuch, that from this reign we may date not only the re-establishment of our Church and Monarchy, but also the complete reftitution of English liberty, for the first time fince its total abolition at the Conquest, by abolifhing the flavish tenures of the feudal fystem; which removed those oppressive appendages which incumbered the eflates of the fubject; as alfo providing additional fecurity of his perfon from imprifonment, by that great bulwark of the Conftitution, the Habeas Corpus Act, by conflictuting triennial Parliaments, the Teft and Corporation Acts, and other wholefome flatutes, which added fuch weight to the Commons, as gave them fufficient power and influence effectually to refift the invalions of the Royal prerogative, which the next reign fully exemplified.

James II. inherited the family fpirit of Divine right, and by his Popifh partifans improved on the principles of his brother, by laying the axe at once to the root of freedom. But in attempting

* Black, Comm, vol. IV. p. 438.

to render the Government as abfolute as the Inquifition of their foster parent at Rome, roufed John Bull's ancestors to exert the privileges of a free people, and by the Revolution excluded this Catholic race for ever.

We are now arrived at that grand epoch in which political liberty was exercifed in a moft confpicuous and orderly manner, highly to the interefts of the nation, and honourable to the acting parties. Political liberty ever infpires the moft liberal views; upon this principle I fhall continue my remarks on this important period.

With the progrefs of the Englifh Hiftory, we are told the Conftitution became better underftood and improved. Upon this theorem, the relation between Governors and the governed, and the nature of a limited monarchy, acquires at the prefent day arguments drawn from the experienced effects of the Revolution; and though, perhaps, differing from the fentiments advanced by fome, may, neverthelefs, tend to improve the elucidation of the contract between King and people; at the fame time the meafures adopted at the Revolution correfpond with the fubfequent poftulate of our focial compact.

We have feen that the Norman fystem for a time annihilated the free principles of the Anglo-Saxons,

Saxons, whole inftitutions form the balis of our Conftitution, and that the people, by a variable exertion of their free privileges, under the tyranny and usurpations of subsequent Monarchs, were progreffively recovering and improving the Conftitution. Infpired with the free spirit of the Great Alfred, whole noble foul breathed that immortal fentiment preferved in his will, "* That it was " just the English should for ever remain as " free as their own thoughts." The nation waded through a fea of blood to regain his principles, + which, prior to this memorable Æra, were completely reftored fince their total abolition at the Conquest. This circumstance enables us to judge on what ground the Revolutionists acted. They had recovered their Constitution of a limited Monarchy, and all parties feemed unanimous in that opinion, which is the only one fuperior to the contract between a King and people, which is, That the Constitution is facred and inviolable. I do affirm there cannot be a doctrine more inimical to the interests of the people than to affert, that if the Chief Magistrate 'violates the contract, and forfeits the Throne, the Conftitution is diffolved, confequently all its inftitutions annihilated, and laws repealed. The contract on the part of the King is to administer the Constitution as he finds it. " # He can neither make any alteration or

* Hume, vol. I. p. 96.

† Black, Comm. vol. IV. p. 439-Charles II. 1679.

‡ Fortescue, c. IX.

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" change in the laws of the realm without confent " of the fubject, nor burthen them with ftrange " impofitions." And as the law gives the King his prerogative, and gives jurifdiction to the House of Lords, and limits the jurifdiction of the Houfe of Commons, thefe restraints on the exifting conftituent parts of Government, must originate from the nation, when it had reference to its original capacity of delegating power, by political liberty, the laft recurrence to which was at the Reftoration; and the nation in its original character was at the Revolution, and is at this day, and for ever, legally authorized to reform fuch ferious abufes in the conftituent parts of Government, as amount to a fubversion of those powers to which it had primitively given diftinct privileges, separate forms, yet a joint body, and concentred power, to be exercifed only for the public fecurity, the common good and private happiness of the people.

The first power in the State is Political Liberty, unalienable, always existing.

The fecond power, the Conftitution facred and inviolable.

The third power, the Three Eftates, as one united body, fubordinate and relative, fworn to administer the Conftitution with justice and truth; and and in the legal discharge of their duty, these powers are absolute, and without control.

But in order to prevent abufes of powers fo transcendent and absolute, each power forms a mutual check on the other; and the only fecurity the people have against the Constitution's being invaded is by the Third Estate, their representatives; and that fo important a trust should not be violated, wholesome * laws have been provided, which declare what persons shall be denied this trust; and laws are also provided to fecure the freedom of election. The facts on the face of history, fince the Revolution, prove these laws to be inadequate; and the experience of a century shows, that a reform in the representation is now absolutely necessary.

From the reign of Elizabeth down to the Revolution, the Parliaments in general had acted with fo much patriotifm, and fo conformable to conftitutional liberty, that the public mind never fuggefted the idea of a reform in the reprefentation; added to which, the violence of parties fince the Reftoration had run fo high, that the Revolutionifts were content to facrifice future prospects of advantage by temporizing; and upon confulting the popular fentiment, they found it neceffary to compromife, rather than openly avow

* Black. Comm vol. I. p. 162.

either

either their wilhes or the apparent neceffity of ftipulating for more extensive advantages in favour of Democracy, the factious spirit of which had before overthrown the Constitution.

The great object of public concern was to limit and afcertain the just prerogatives of the Crown, and to continue the fucceffion in a collateral branch of the fame family. And further, what was deeply impreffed on the heart of every true Englishman was to fecure the Protestant religion. In the Prince of Orange were found qualities eminently adapted to the important occasion, and whose principles were perfectly congenial with the Revolutionifts, confequently he became the object of univerfal adoration. The legality of his accession was in strict conformity to the true principles of the Conftitution; to elucidate which I shall affume an hypothefis, and apply the fact to the principle. Pre-fuppofing therefore the Conftitution to have been recovered at the Reftoration, and prefuming the reprefentatives of the people, at the Revolution, to have been independent and true to conftitutional principles, the Conftitution may be termed a machine. composed of a number of wheels, one within the other. The outer one, composed of the body of people, may be called the Wheel of Liberty, which in its evolution communicates its powers to the various internal wheels, till it reaches the centre, which may be termed the Executive, or the

Crown, whole powers confift of a perpetual fpring of action and re-action ; but by deriving its active property from the outer Wheel of Liberty, it is virtually fubordinate to that, as poffeffing the original principle of motion; by which circumstance the centre, or Executive Wheel, can never depart from its fixed laws of motion, without infringing upon the original one of Liberty; and as the primeval active power is inherent in the latter, the remedy is also as well as the fupply of every defect. Hence the death of a Monarch can never deftroy the Executive Wheel without annihilating the machine. The confequence follows, * the King in his political capacity never dies; and on a parity of reasoning, an unprecedented vacancy or abdication of the Throne cannot annihilate the machine: for the perpetuity of the Executive Power keeps the component parts together, till the defect is peaceably fupplied, even when there are no precedents or written laws to guide the popular mind. It is of the higheft importance to the internal peace of the State, to the harmony and order of fociety, that the Conftitution should be confidered, under all contingencies, facred and inviolable.

A Conflitution thus pure in its principles, and equal in its parts, contains a primary intereft,

* Black. Comm. vol. I. p. 249.

which

which every member proportionably fhares. And one common intereft pervading the whole community, the theory of Government is rendered fimple, and eafily underftood. But the practice will ever require wifdom, founded on integrity, in those who direct its motions, which is the most irrefragable argument for frequent elections and frequent Parliaments.

To compare this theoretical diagram to the facts which occurred, we shall find them accord.

James II. had abdicated the Throne, and by that abdication the Throne became vacant and forfeited. By what authority did the Convention affume a legiflative capacity to fupply that defect? By recurring, *ex neceffitate rei*, to political liberty, the original power in the State, which bears analogy to the diagram ftated, wherein I have endeavoured to make it appear, that the perpetuity of the Executive Power keeps the component parts together, by a neceffary relation the whole bears to form one fyftem.

The application therefore to the Prince of Orange, and the Convention which affembled in confequence, and the feveral laws established, were strictly legal and constitutional, as further appears by the following precedents. After the death of William Rufus, Henry I, by flattering promifes promifes made to the people, was, by a Convention, fettled on the Throne, to the exclusion of his elder brother, Robert; and the confirmation of liberties passed by him under the Great Seal was held as conclusive as any laws enacted by a Monarch in direct defcent. And in the fubfequent reign, Stephen was fettled on the Throne by fuch another Convention, to the exclusion of the Empress Matilda. And at the death of Henry III. Prince Edward being then abroad, the nation recurred to political liberty, and without fummons, the Prelates, Nobility, and Commonalty affembled, and fettled the Government till the King returned, and their acts were held legal. And in the 10th year of Richard II. the Parliament fent a folemn meffage to the King, that by an ancient ftatute they had power to depose a King who would not behave himfelf as he ought, and be ruled by the laws of the realm. And the Parliament convened for the reftoration of Charles II. affembled without fummons, or authority from the King, yet the laws which were then enacted were afterwards confirmed; fuch Convention having affembled according to political liberty, the first principle of the Constitution.

The fucceffion to the Crown is limited, and incapacities are attached to the legal poffeffion of it, which render the inheritance a matter of right in the nation, and not a matter of K 4 right

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right in any Prince, unlefs he be free from the incapacities created by the people, and eftablifhed by law. If this be not admitted, * a Prince may claim the Throne, poffeffed of all the incapacities which would render the intervention of the people neceffary, by Convention or Parliament, to exclude him, and elect another from the fame family, whereby we learn a diffinction between a right of inheritance and a right of fucceffion; for there can be no right of inheritance in defiance to the will of the law; and + a Prince claiming the Crown, by being next heir to his father, or other relative, muft fubfcribe to the will of the law, which alone can give him a clear right of fucceffion to the Throne.

The law is the expression of the general will, emanating from the common agreement of fociety, fubduing the passions by enforcing reason, and protecting the rights of men by dispensing justice. Obedience to the law is the solemn pact of the community; and the subscription to its will by a Prince, forms the compact between King and people; and so long as his present Most Excellent Majesty, and his illustrious issue, maintain this union, this facred palladium, free and inviolate,

† Black. Comm. Vol. I. p. 195.

^{*} See the Refolutions of the Commons, 1681, to exclude James Duke of York.

they have an indifputable and unequivocal claim, and an established right to the allegiance and subjection of the people of England at this day, their heirs and posterity, for ever.

A further remark I shall make, which will illustrate in an eminent manner the flability of the Conftitution, which is, that the indivisibility of the Crown, and the perpetuity of the Executive Power, preferve the component parts of the Conftitution in all unprecedented cafualties. If this theorem be not admitted, the Convention affembled on the abdication of James, affuming a legiflative capacity, and exercifing powers as independent of the people as they actually poffefs when elected in a regular Parliamentary manner, might have conftituted themfelves an Ariftocracy, formed an Oligarchy, or. eftablished a Republic; and having in pay the army and navy, and in poffeffion of the Treasury and Public Offices, the refistance of a people intimidated by Popery, and depreffed by the recent civil wars, might have been checked effectually; and a tyranny fubftituted on Protestant faith might have reconciled fects, and fystemized flavery.

But the stability of the Crown, which is the fuperstructure of the Constitution, by that necessary relation it bears to the foundation, which is the law, preferved the system entire, that the breath

of Anarchy, or the voice of Rebellion, could not reach it without annihilating the Conftitution. The indivisibility of the Crown, and the perpetuity of the Executive Power, therefore naturally dictated to the Public mind the fupply of the defect, without any innovation on the Constitution, or diffurbing the harmony of the fystem. For the interest which every man possession in the community, is the best fecurity for the prefervation of this model of Government; for every individual, by its abolition, would be deprived of whatever right he may poffels under the common law, whatever privilege he may enjoy from an Act of Parliament, and whatever franchife he may be partaker of from a charter. Under these confiderations, the Convention of Lords and Commons for the common good, and by the confidence reposed in them by the nation, made the statutes of the land and the principles of the Conftitution the rule of their conduct, equally binding themfelves as the whole community, from which deductions it is evident that the confidence of the people is the bafis of a Convention or Parliament, and a free and independent Parliament the basis of freedom.

To conclude thefe remarks on political liberty, let it be remembered, as it ftands upon record, That the people owe every thing they deem excellent and ineftimable in their Conftitution to the exercise of political liberty; not one law of liberty

liberty in the whole code, from the Invafion down to the Revolution, proceeds from the voluntary effusion of a patriotic heart in the breast of a Monarch. The pride of human nature induces them to look one way, fawning courtiers another; and it is feldom the people can catch a glance. And notwithstanding, by the Constitution *, whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs, is not to be imputed to a King, nor is he answerable for it perfonally to his people; yet when a weak and bad man fucceeds to the Throne, he must be confidered as a neceffary evil; but when a wife and good man afcends the Throne, his reign proves an age of triumph, of freedom, and happy Government. It is not in the power of a nation by election to choose a fucceffion of wife and good men. In all elections it is in general found, that interest supplants merit. The order of Nature must be reversed to command virtue and wifdom in a fingle man, or body of men; and the chance of good men by hereditary descent is equal to that of choice, and never attended with its evils, rivalfhip and anarchy.

To imagine that Government does not confift of the various affections of men, is miftaking the nature of it. In every age it has proved as verfatile as man, operating alternately by paffion, pro-

* Black. Comm. vol. I. p. 246.

fusion, and economy; by fear, folly, and wifdom, arbitrary and free. Let the warmest Republican lay his hand on his breaft, and diveft his heart of predatory views, and chufe what period of the feventeen hundred years of the English history he would wish to return to; and let the strongest advocate for hereditary claims and hereditary rights divest his heart of the thirst of power, traverse the fame period, and fix the data for the perfection of the Conftitution : England was never more fplendid by opulence, or more inexhauftible in refources, than at the prefent day; and the Conftitution, for that very reason, never more liable to be perverted. But to the glory of Britain, the chief excellence of her constitution confists in being open to improvement. It is a folid machine whole greatest beauty is to court furvey; it folicits inveftigation; political liberty gave it fpirit and motion; and that fame native power can ever maintain that which it founded.

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SECTION VII.

The Rights of Englishmen; or, The British Constitution.

O avoid a labyrinth of difcuffion, by adducing codes of law, and citing a multitude of authors, I shall sum up these facred Palladiums under a few heads.

THE ABSOLUTE GENERAL RIGHT OF ENGLISHMEN.

POLITICAL LIBERTY.

Which is the fupreme power of the people, or the right of convening at all times to maintain and preferve the Conftitution and Laws, which guaranty their abfolute perfonal rights.

THE ABSOLUTE PERSONAL RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN.

Ift. The right of perfonal fecurity, or the legal uninterrupted enjoyment of life, limbs, body, health, and reputation.

2d. The

2d. The perfonal liberty of individuals, which confifts in the power of loco-motion, of changing fituation, or moving to whatfoever place a perfon's inclination may direct, without imprifonment or reftraint, unlefs by due courfe of law; as by Magna Charta " no freeman shall be taken or imprifoned " but by the lawful judgment of his equals or the " law of the land."

3d. The abfolute right of property, which confifts in the free ufe, enjoyment, and difpolal of all his acquifitions, without any control or diminution fave only by the law of the land, which was alfo confirmed by Magna Charta, which declares, "That no freeman shall be diffeized or " divefted of his freehold, or of his liberties, or " free cuftoms, but by the judgment of his peers " or by the laws of the land." And by various fublequent statutes, the property of the subject was most firmly fecured. The obtaining these statutes was a legal conquest over Norman despotifin. Thefe acts declare *, That no fubject of " England shall be constrained to pay aids or " taxes even for the defence of the realm, or the " fupport of Government, but fuch as are im-" posed by his own confent, or that of his Represen-" tatives in Parliament."

* Blackftone, vol. I. p. 140.

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THE PECULIAR INHERITANCES OF ENGLISHMEN;

OR,

BRITISH CIVIL LIBERTIES.

1ft. The three effates, King, Lords, and Commons, each poffeffing diftinct privileges, and each effate fubordinate to the law, which guaranties the common intereft of the community.

"* The executive power of the laws being " lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the ad-" vantages of ftrength and difpatch that are to be " found in the most absolute Monarchy; and as " the Legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to " three diffinct powers, entirely independent of " each other; first, the King; fecondly, the " Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which is an " aristocratical affembly of perfons felected for " their piety, their birth, their wildom, their va-" lour, or their property; and thirdly, the Houfe " of Commons, freely chosen by the people from among " themselves, which makes it a kind of Demo-" cracy, as this aggregate body, actuated by dif-" ferent fprings, and attentive to different inte-" refts, composes the British Parliament, and has ", the fupreme difpofal of every thing; there can

* Blackftone, vol. I. p. 50.

" no inconvenience be attempted by either of the " three branches, but will be withftood by one " of the other two, each branch being armed " with a negative power fufficient to repel any " innovation which it fhall think inexpedient or " dangerous."

2d. Freedom of Mind on Religion. Every individual may worfhip God as the pure fincerity of his heart dictates, without any civil or religious reftraint whatever.

3d. The civil courts of justice, wherein, agreeable to the language of Magna Charta, Justice shall not be bought or fold, but right be done to every individual without diffunction.

4th. Freedom of Election, and a New Reprefentation every Three Years. N. B. The Septennial Act and the partial reprefentation of boroughs, are violent ufurpations on political liberty, and must be reformed.

5th. The Liberty of the Prefs.

6th. Trial by a Jury of Twelve Men, who are to give a general verdict on the matter of law as well as of fact.

7th. The Habeas Corpus Act.

Thefe

- Thefe invaluable privileges were created or confirmed by independent patriotic Conventions, and can never be furrendered or lost but by corrupt Parliaments. From the wifdom of feventeen hundred years has refulted thefe feveral facred inftitutions, which being founded on true equity, reafon and the laws of God, comprise and form those certain fixed principles of Government, by which a community may attain the certain enjoyment of liberty, order, and profperity; and no delegated power, even the nation itfelf, cannot abrogate them without committing a criminal act, by which true equity and reafon would be facrificed, and the laws of God be violated; for every nation in the world, in the full and free poffeffion of these feveral inflitutions, must enjoy the highest possible degree of human liberty. It is thefe which compofe the Englishman's freehold, of which the King and Peers are the truftees, and the Commons are tenants at will; to admit they have the power to alienate or waste is no defeasance of the nation's right of inheritance; the mind of man is above the reach of law; and it does not follow that power cannot be abufed. We may as well affirm, that men having the plain precepts of Scripture to refer to, shall invariably act virtuoufly; but practice will conftantly be at variance with theory, as the profession of morality in the grofs by any power is dashed with the leven of knavery.

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The unremitting duty of Englishmen is therefore to be vigilant, and with a patriotic eye watch every motion of Government. If these facred infitutions should be attempted to be perverted, a faithful spirited remonstrance should be laid before the Legislature. If they should be actually violated, and this remonstrance diffegarded, the people must have refort to political liberty.

The mutability and fallibility of man render, by a natural confequence, all human actions imperfect, whether in an individual perfon or body corporate, from which we may infer, that though it be possible the principles of a Conftitution may be perfect, the administration of them may not. The Three Eftates, the civil courts, and the various inftitutions, form a Conftitution, which, figuratively fpeaking, may be termed an adamantine edifice, which through ages will continue the fame, but in every age it will be inhabited by men various in disposition and ability, and versatile by the fafhion of the times ; yet every fucceeding age will be at no lofs to find the great outlines, the pillars and bulwarks of the manfion. And if a preceding age has ventured on useless or pernicious alterations, a fucceeding age has a complete and full power to reftore it to its primitive flate. The abufe in the national reprefentation comes under this defcription; but as virtue and vice feem to keep an equal pace, and wildom is partial in her favours,

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we cannot reckon on a greater harveft of integrity or abilities than what a former age has enjoyed : and we may truly repeat, it is poffible a Conftitution may be perfect, though the administration of it be not; confequently the Government, which is the operative power of the Conftitution, will ever be short of perfection, unless an administration shall fortunately be fo formed; that every member of it shall have united in his perfon both integrity and wildom. But it is the common misfortune of Administrations to confist of men who poffess wildom, but are deficient in patriotic integrity. Hence a Conftitution founded on political liberty, often difcovers in its operative powers the principles of an arbitrary Government. The public mind cannot be too fully impreffed with this truth, which teaches men the extreme danger of imbibing from florid harangues on the perfection of the Constitution a passive moderation, and a total inattention to the motions of Government. Thank God, a majority of the nation is not in this dream, fatal would it otherwife be; for the time would arrive when the people would awaken fettered with the chains of arbitrary power. Difinterested men, whose principles are proof against the immoderate thirft of place and power, whofe integrity regulates their ambition, will ever look with a jealous eye to the motions of Government; impreffed with the native principle of political liberty, they will ever conduct themfelves in a cool L 2 intrepid

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intrepid manner; their exertions will ever be conflitutional, and carry a weight and importance very different from the fpurious abortive fpirit of faction, which, from the nature of its predatory principles, the energy of the Executive Power of the Conflitution will ever fupprefs. But the true fpirit of liberty will be heard; the people muft renounce their birth-rights ere the Conflitution can fuffer, or the laws be materially violated.

The Republicans who affirm that we have no Conftitution, in order to accomplifh their predatory principles, may in this brief Section fee their refutation. Thefe adventurers bear a malicious envy to this ifland, which, from the eulogies beftowed on it by ancient and modern writers, we find is reprefented as the "Granary of the Wef-" tern World, the feat of Ceres; that its vallies " are like Eden; its hills like Lebanon; its " fprings as Pifgah, and its rivers like Jordan; " that it is a paradife of pleafure, and the garden " of God."

SECTION

SECTION VIII.

Remarks on the prefent State of the Elective Power of the People, and the Conflitution of Parliament.

The diffempers of monarchy were the great fubjects of apprehenfion and redrefs in the laft century; in this the diffempers of parliament.

BURKE.

IN an inquiry into the prefent flate of the reprefentation of the people, decency cannot be facrificed at the fhrine of truth, if it fhall appear that the interefts of a whole community have demanded a free discuffion; and candour will admit what impartiality naturally induces—a diffinction between the mode by which the popular reprefentation is conflituted, and the qualifications and abilities of the prefent members.

When the love of pleafure and diffipation is diffufing itfelf in an unprecedented manner through all ranks of people, and the religion of the eftablifhed church is too evidently lofing its fanctity and force on the minds of the great; men, whole paffions are not feduced by a mufical age, and whole judgments are not biaffed by the refinement of the arts, will regard the rife and fall of nations; they L_3 will

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will find that luxury gratifies the paffions at the expence of acknowledged principles; and knowing the mutability of the very best governments, with becoming zeal and refolution, will exert their most fpirited endeavours to fecure the Freedom of Election and the Independence of Parliament, which are confeffedly the bulwarks of their own. In fine, the people have been repeatedly told they have no other fecurity for their freedom. It was a known apothegm of the great Lord Treasury Burleigh, *That England could never be ruined but by a parliament. And when we are told by a great modern flatesman, " that the distempers of monarchy were "the great fubjects of redrefs and apprehension in " the laft century, but in this the diftempers of " parliament;" is it not fufficient to alarm every man? Is it not enough to roufe the nation, to find these distempers still suppurating. Without meaning to impute a shadow of apostacy to Mr. Burke, when he tells us, " + It has been the " misfortune and not the glory of this age that, " every thing must be discussed," we are drawn into a painful confession, that the Genius of Liberty has fuffered an outrage, by one of her veteran advocates fuffering his gilded day of honours to be eclipfed by the cloud of corruption, and leaving

* Blackstone, vol. i. p. 161.—Sir Matthew Hale on Parliaments, p. 49.—Montesquieu, Sp. L. 11.—6.

† Reflections on the Revolution of France, p. 16.

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the most important subject that ever impressed on his heart, or agitated his mind, to a precarious dependance on chance, or the more doubtful fecurity of fecret and corrupt influence. In an exertion of his superior abilities, a reform in parliament is of all fubjects that alone which could add additional fplendour to his talents, honour, to his principles, or dignity to his name.

When we take a retrospect of administrations, to go no further back than the commencement of this reign, and reflect on the clamour and general discontent excited by the fecret and corrupt influence of the Butean fystem, during the administration of a Grafton and a North. And when we now find an universal revival of this spirit of difcontent, we must be convinced ALL IS NOT WELL. And the reason of every man must direct him to the violation of the freedom of election as the true fource of grievance. The abuse of the reprefentation of the people has been and is the fole cause of all public discontents. And because it has not yet been remedied, the administrations of this reign have incurred the contempt of all wife men, the indignation of all honeft men, and the general execration of the great majority of people.

The art of governing a free people is the prefervation of that great chain in the order of fociety, which links, by mutual attraction and dependance, the the whole community. The balance of power and property, in the fcale of equal justice and common right, is the great interested object of the people, and the business of government. The true balance of property is the necessary equilibrium in the Conflitution, and the *status quo* of fociety: a brief investigation of this main spring in every free state, will enable us to decide more clearly the justice or injustice of our representation.

For the origin of property no certain æra can be fixed. The neceffaries of life are the cultured or manufactured products of land. Various conjectures may be adduced to fhew how and by what means particular men became possessed of landed property. Beyond a doubt, time out of mind and record, mankind have been divided into two forts of inhabitants, the landholders and the labourers ; and from the vicifitudes of human poffeffions, and the various fortunes of men, the labourers must necessarily form the multitude, and be dependant on the landholders, who are the few; and among these few there must exist relative connexions and dependancies, proportionate to their greater or lefs influence over the many. To balance thefe connexions and fubordinations in a community, which are founded in nature, is the first operative principle of government. The balance of property has an intimate connexion with the local fituation and nature of a country; it is not artifi-

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cial, but natural; not speculative, but real. Hence the Utopian hypothesises of all levellers, from Phaleas of Chalcedon, from Sir Thomas More to Thomas Paine, being founded on the erroneous ground of confidering the balance of property artificial; of owing its existence to a legislative power, and not arifing from the constituted order of nature, have proved abortive. The balance of property having its foundation in nature, all fubordinations among mankind have one mutual connexion, and are linked together in one great chain. The landholder cannot exist without the labourer, no more than the poor without the rich. Every man depends on his particular friends, connexions, or his fervants, for every thing he may be faid to enjoy. And this mutual dependance is a clear, felf-evident proof that the Great Author of Nature views mankind with an equal eye; by his immutable laws we owe our daily bread to each other. And this actual flate of mutual benefits flould ftrongly excite gratitude and fubmiffion from the governed to the governors. And on the other hand, it should be the daily study of governors to imitate the Great Author of Nature in his rich. benevolence, and in charity, promote and difpenfe the bleffings of liberty, right, and justice.

The conclusion from this reasoning shews the fcience of true government to confist in proportioning all the parts of this great chain of connexions

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nexions and fubordinations, that no one part should fo interfere with another as to produce anarchy or oppression. And from these remarks it follows, that according to the mutual dependance and reciprocity of action in the conflituent parts of our Conftitution, the Houfe of Commons, compoled of the reprefentatives of the people, should be the reprefentatives of the labourers against the landholders, or in other words, the poor and the commercial part against the rich and powerful, to constitute the balance of property in the fcale of power. Here the argument bottoms. This is the bafis on which the Conftitution is crected. And this principle is general and universal in the state. And every government operating on this first and natural ground of those connexions and fubordinations, which form the great chain of fociety, is a government of truth, of equal juffice, and of equal right.

Upon this principle we shall be able to examine truly the different acts passed at the Revolution, and those enacted since, for the freedom of election and the constitution of parliament. Of the ancient manner of holding parliaments, we find it to be the letter and spirit of the Constitution, that they should be held once a year, or oftener if need were; which is the same as they are held at this day. But the great question for the present age to decide, and which precedents of antiquity can have no avail. avail, is, whether a new Houle of Commons shall be elected every year, every three years, or every feven years? Or, whether, by the monopoly of boroughs, members shall continue to sit during their lives.

In this review of the flatutes we shall first notice those relative to the freedom of election, in the order of fuccession from the Revolution, and next, those which relate to the duration of a House of Commons.

By the Bill of Rights, 1ft Will. and Mary, it is declared in the 7th charge against James II. that he endeavoured the fubversion of the Constitution, by violating the freedom of election. And it is further recited, in vindicating and afferting their ancient rights and liberties, that they do claim and demand, and insist upon all and fingular the premises as declared to be the undoubted right of the people, the 8th of which was, that the election of members of parliament OUGHT TO BE FREE.

This indefinite and equivocal clause, that elections ought to be free, argues either a compromise on the part of the partial representation of infignificant boroughs, or an interested regard to property. But it is more rational to conclude the revolutionists had no other views than to establish their religious liberties on true protestant principles, and to limit the

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the exceffive prerogatives of the crown; they never entertained an idea of eftablifhing an equal and general reprefentation; and the Revolution in this refpect was left as incomplete as thofewhofeheads ran high with intemperate ambition could with. And this want of forefight or neglect was no doubt occafioned by the terrors of anarchy. Their minds were too much imprefied with the recent civil wars, and the diforders of the Commonwealth, to venture an extension of democratic power. They were content * to keep measures with prejudice, which they deemed necessary to the order and prefervation of their recovered Constitution.

• This conclution the fublequent flatutes of 7th and 8th Will. and Mary proves, which recites, •• That + whereas grievous complaints are made of •• violating the freedom of election, to the great •• fcandal of the kingdom; *difhonourable*, and may •• be definuctive to the conftitution of parliament;"

* Mackintofh's Vindiciæ Gallicæ, p. 298.

† 1695, a fevere bill was brought in for voiding all elections of parliament-men, where the elected had been at any expence in meat, drink, or money, to procure votes. It was very frictly penned; but time must she whether any inventions can be found out to avoid it; certainly, if it has the defired effect, it would prove one of the best laws that ever was made in England; for abuses in elections were grown to a most intolerable excess, which threatened even the ruin of the nation.

Burnet's Hiftory of his own Time, vol. IV. p. 309.

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for remedy whereof it enacts, that members, giving bribes of money or entertainments, thall be incapacitated to fit and ferve in Parliament.

The politive tenor of this act fully proves the laws at that period; established for the freedom of election were not fufficiently coercive to preferve the balance of property neceffary to the free operation of the Conftitution. The weight of the aristocratic power over-balanced the democratic; and the reprefentatives of the people have fince acted as principals, fpurned the relation which they bore as agents or deputies from a state originally organized upon delegated power; and by various fublequent measures have disposed of the elective rights of the people in fuch a manner, as even to have made their constituents the instruments of their proftituted authority; or, in the words of Mr. Burke, " * The notorious infidelity and ver-" fatility of members of parliament in their opi-" nion of men and things, by an indifcriminate " fupport of all administrations, have totally ba-" nifhed all integrity and confidence out of pub-"lic proceedings, have confounded the beft men " with the worft, and weakened and diffolved, in-" ftead of ftrengthening and compacting, the ge-" neral order of government."

* Thoughts on the Caufe of the prefent Difcontents.

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The heterogeneous idea of different interests in a community as a body, has introduced practices the most pernicious to the one common interest of the whole. This common intereft is the foul and spirit of the Constitution, and which can only be rendered general and effective by the concurrence of all the conftituent powers, in their feveral fubordinations, to this principle. But when any one man or party, delegated with those powers, confiders himfelf or themfelves allied to the community by a feparate interest, and the narrowness of their capacities, or the fordidnefs of their fouls, influences them to a mercenary conduct of making their own fortunes, or, by patronage, those of their friends, the order of fociety is violated, and the great chain of common interest becomes daily weakened by the corrofions of fecret corruptions and party interefts. Hence have arisen the mifchievous diffinctions of a Court and a Country Party, of Whig and Tory, of Ministerialists and Antiministerialists; which are the confequences of private interests opposing the real common interest of the people, and have their only true foundation in the abuse of the balance of property in the House of Commons, through the monopoly of boroughs by the nobility and hereditary members of parliament. I truft I shall prove no argument under the face of heaven can fupport fuch an unwarrantable ufurpation of political liberty, and grofs abufe of the rights of the people.

The penalty of the laft recited act merely goes to difqualify the candidate fo offending; no punifhment or penalty being inflicted on the electors taking fuch bribes. The remedy intended by this ftatute was therefore to remind the candidate of his patriotifm and his honour. But honour, though a facred tie, and the law of kings, was found to wear away in the minds of fome members; for a majority were obliged to impose another tie on their honour, with a penalty on their reputation and property, by 2 Geo. c. 24. which recites, that "Whereas it is found by experience that the laws " already in being, have not been fufficient to pre-" vent corrupt and illegal practices in the elec-"tion of members of parliament." For remedy therefore of fo great an evil, it enacts, that electors shall, if demanded, take an oath that they have not been bribed : and it is further enacted, " That if " any elector shall take money, &c. as a bribe, or " fhall agree or contract for any money, &c. to " give, or forbear to give, his vote; or if any per-" fon by himfelf, or any perfon employed by him, " doth, or shall, by any gift or reward, or by any " promife, &c. corrupt or procure any perfon or " perfons to give his vote at any fuch election, " shall for every offence forfeit 500l. to be reco-" vered as the law directs, with full cofts of fuit: " and any perfon offending in any of the cafes afore-" faid, after judgment obtained; shall for ever be " difabled to hold, exercife or enjoy any office or franchife

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" franchife to which he and they then shall, or at " any time afterwards may be entituled, as a mem-" ber of any city, borough-town corporate, or " cinque port, as if such perfon was naturally " dead."

In this ftatute the electors are made equally liable to penalties with the candidates, and the difabilities feem effectual and conclusive. But such is the mutability of human nature, and such the deficiency of human wisdom, that no statute can be virtuously framed but vice will overleap. And this last recited act being the last statute for preventing this evil, moral obligations are hereby found to be ineffectual in binding men in their public capacities, although they would blush to be fo detected in their private affairs.

Next we examine the ftatutes paffed at and fince the Revolution, relative to the holding of parliaments; the first of which is included in the Bill of Rights, I Will. and Mary, c. 2. by which it is declared to be one of the rights of the people, that there should be *frequent* parliaments.

This indefinite clause *frequent* comports with the clause before stated in the Bill of Rights, which fays, "That the election of members of parliament "ought to be free." And these are very evident and conclusive circumstances to prove, That the democratic

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democratic weight necessary in the Three Estates was left by the necessity of the times, at the Revolution, unequal and deficient, and which paved the way for all the abuses and grievances which have since arisen.

To controvert this affirmation, the fubfequent Act of the 6th William and Mary, c. 2. will be oppofed, which recites, That *frequent* and *new* Parliaments tend very much to the happy union and good agreement of the King and people; it therefore enacts and declares, That Parliaments shall be held once in three years at least, and shall have no longer continuance than three years at farthest.

But this Statute, however conclusive in itfelf, was but a mere plaister covering a gangrene; for the freedom of election was left open to every malversation of placemen and pensioners, and to the corrupt bribes of the Aristocracy; and by the Septennial Act this gangrene turned to an actual mortification. The body was confumed, and we have now nothing remaining but the skeleton of political freedom. This Act of I Geo. I. c. 38. recites, "That by an Act of 6th William and Mary, the "continuance of Parliaments was limited to three "years, and declares grievous heats, animosities, " and expences, had been incurred by that Act."

These confequences followed from the representation being partial, unequal, and monopolized. M Had

Had an equal and general reprefentation been eftablished, wherein the lower orders made choice of Deputies, and those Deputies the immediate Representatives, these maladies would have been eradicated, and the Crown equally fecured. Inftead of which the Parliament affumed a power which the Members, by virtue of their delegated capacity, could not affume, without handing down to posterity this dangerous precedent, " That a number of felfinterested men, calling themselves the representatives of the people, and constituting themselves a Parliament, by being proprietors or patrons of boroughs, and by the fecret and corrupt influence of the Executive Power, and other daring violations of the freedom of Britain, may pals an AEt for their own legislative existence for life, or for a century, and the Constitution, by fuch subversive measures, may degenerate into despotism by an Act of Parliament, and the People of England become flaves by Law.

This Statute further enacts, " That the provi-"fion in the former Act may probably at this "juncture, when a RESTLESS and POPISH fac-"tion are defigning and endeavouring to renew the "rebellion within this kingdom, be deftructive to "Government, Be it enacted therefore, That Par-"liaments shall have continuance for the space of "feven years."

The neceffity for adopting fuch a measure is not convincing and fatisfactory; and though it may be justified juftified on the ground of having a prefumptive tendency of better fecuring the prefent glorious family on the Throne, neverthelefs it proved an invafion on the Conftitution, and promoted State jobbing, which has fince arifen to an actual trade among the higher ranks; and further, it has been the immediate caufe of most of the public grievances and inglorious wars which have occurred fince that period. There cannot remain a doubt but Triennial Parliaments would have equally fecured the Crown and Conftitution. But prerogative, corrupted by Aristocracy, ever vigilant, faw the opportunity to grafp, and patriotifm, intimidated by a threatened civil war, yielded a willing prey.

The fpeech of a patriotic worthy Member, in oppofition to this bill, is deferving of notice. He obferved *, "That the right of electing reprefenta-"tives in Parliament was infeparably inherent in "the people of Great Britain, and could never be "thought to be delegated to the reprefentatives, "unlefs they made the elected the elector, and at "the fame time fuppofed it the will of the people, "that their reprefentatives fhould have it in their "power to deftroy thofe who made them, when-"ever a Miniftry fhould think it neceffary to "fcreen themfelves from their juft refentment; "that this would be to deftroy the force of all "their freedom; for if they had a right to conti-

* See Debates in Parliament, 1715.

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" nue themfelves one year, one month, or one day, " beyond their triennial term, it will unavoidably " follow, that they have it in their power to make " themfelves perpetual. He further observed, That " to fay the passing of this Bill was not to grafp " to themfelves the right of election, but only " to enlarge the time of calling new Parliaments, " was a manifeft fallacy; for whenever the three " years were expired, they could no longer be faid " to fublift by the choice of the people, but by their " own appointment. For these reasons he thought " the bill an open violation of the people's liberties; " or, to fpeak most mildly of it, a breach of the " members' truft in that part which would moft " fenfibly affect them, and of that ill tendency in " its confequences, that as nothing but the fecurity " of the Ministry could make it at that time need-" ful, so nothing but a standing force " COULD MAKE IT LASTING."

Thirty Peers entered their protefts against this Bill, affirming that new Parliaments are required by the fundamental laws of the Constitution; and that the Bill, fo far from preventing expences and corruptions, that it would rather tend to increase them, as the LONGER a Parliament is to last the more VALUABLE a station in it must become, and the greater will be the danger of corrupting its members; notwithstanding which the Bill passed, though in addition to the opposition it met in Parliament, petitions were prefented to the House from different different parts of the kingdom, wherein the people declare they looked upon it as an attempt to overturn the Conftitution.

The family of the Pretender being now extinct, and the prefent illustrious Houfe of Brunfwick reigning triumphant in the hearts and minds of the people, this Act should be repealed, as an intolerable grievance, from which arife the following queftions :---Has not the value of boroughs been fo much enhanced fince this Statute was paffed, as to render the monopoly of them a matter of infinite importance to families looking up to the Crown for promotion ? Have not the rights of election in confequence been transferred from the conftituents to the representatives, who are nominated and returned in fome boroughs without making their appearance, and the inhabitants and electors are as ignorant of their perfons and qualifications as the people of New Holland? Where then exifts the popular branch of the Legislature? If men can, independent of the fuffrages of the people, fecure to themfelves a feat in Parliament during their lives, what fecurity have the people for their liberties? as by fuch an illegal meafure men have the power of eftablishing laws, and imposing partial taxes, which may principally affect the people and not themfelves.

The inference from these questions is this, that the present Constitution of Parliament is tanta-M 3 mount mount to an hereditary Legiflature, which is the greateft of all poffible evils. Is this a fpeculative affertion, or is it a fact? What can fo incontrovertibly eftablish its being matter of fact as this queftion? Are not boroughs as naturally bequeathed to the heir as the very eftate itself, and descend from wise men to fools, and from ideots to knaves, who are all indiscriminately entrusted with the freedom of Britain, the dearest inheritance and birth-right of every Englishman?

These are truths so well known, that to have reference to matter of proof would be to infult the understanding of the meanest Commoner in England.

The first motion made to repeal the Septennial Act *, it is worthy of remark, was negatived by a majority in which were 113 placemen and other officers under the Crown. And every motion of repeal and reform fince that period has been negatived by the fame influence of the Crown. The country Gentlemen, the ftanch friends of freedom, and the only fupporters of conftitutional liberty, were unanimous for its repeal. Part of the fpeeches of two of whom I fhall recite.

The first worthy Member remarked, "Bribery at " elections, whence did it arise? Not from country " Gentlemen, for they are fure of being chosen with-

* See Debates in Parliament, 1734.

"out it. It was, Sir, the invention of wicked and " corrupt Ministers, who have from time to time. " led weak Princes into fuch destructive measures, " that they did not dare to rely upon the reprefen-" tation of the people. Long Parliaments, Sir, " first introduced bribery, because they were worth " purchasing at any rate. Country Gentlemen, " who have only their private fortunes to rely on, " and have no mercenary ends to ferve, are unable-" to oppose, especially if at any time the public " treasure shall be unfaithfully squandered away to " corrupt their boroughs. Country Gentlemen, "indeed, may make fome weak efforts; but " as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the " time of a great ftruggle is at fo great a diftance, " they at last grow faint in the difpute, give up " their country for loft, and retire in defpair. De-" fpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the " proper disposition for flavery. Ministers of State " understand this very well, and are therefore un-" willing to awake the nation out of its lethargy. " by frequent elections. They know that the fpi-" rit of liberty, like every other virtue of the " mind, is to be kept alive only by conftant ac-" tion ; that it is impossible to enflave this country " while it is perpetually on its guard. Let coun-" try Gentlemen then, by having frequent oppor-" tunities of exerting themfelves, be kept active " and warm in their contention for the public " good. This will raife that zeal and indignation " which M 4

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" which will at last get the better of those undue " influences by which the officers of the Crown, " though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have " been able to fupplant country Gentlemen of great " character and fortunes, who live in their neigh-" bourhood. I do not fay this upon idle fpecula-" tion only; I live in a county * where it is too well "known, and I will appeal to many Gentlemen " in this House, to more out of it, and who are " fo for this very reason, for the truth of my affer-" tion. Sir, it is a fore that has long been eating " into the most vital part of our Constitution; and " I hope the time will come when you will probe " it to the bottom; for if a Minister should gain " a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs; if he " should keep a register of this in his closet, and, " by fending down his Treafury mandates, fhould " procure a fpurious representation of the people, " the offspring of his corruption, who will be at " all times ready to reconcile and justify the most " contradictory measures of his administration, " and even to vote every crude indigefted dream " of their Patron into a law; if the maintenance of " his power should become the fole object of his " attention, and they fhould be guilty of the most " violent breach of Parliamentary truft, by giving " the King a diferentionary liberty of taxing the " people without limitation or control, the laft fa-" tal compliment they can pay to the Crown ; if " this should ever be the unhappy circumstance of

* Cornwall.

" this nation, the people may indeed complain; " but the door of that place where their complaints " fhould be heard will for ever be fhut against " them."

The other country Gentleman, equally diffinguished for his independence and patriotism, obferved, " The learned Gentleman (the Attorney-" General) has told us that our Conflictution has " been often varied, and that there was no time " when it was fuch as we ought or would defire " to return to. Sir, it is not to be doubted " but our Conftitution has often varied, and per-" haps there is no time when it was without a " fault ; but I will affirm that there is no time " in which we may not find fome good things in " our Conflitution. There are now, there have " been in every century, fome good laws exifting. " Let us preferve those that are good; if any of " them have been abolished, let them be restored; " and if any of the laws now in being are found to " be attended with inconveniencies, let them be " repealed. This is what is now defired, this is " what the people have reafon to expect from Par-" liament; there is nothing now defired but what " the people have a right to, frequent new Par-" liaments; and the right was established and con-" firmed even by the claim of rights, notwith-" ftanding what the learned Gentleman has faid to " the contrary,"

And further he fubjoined-" Now, Sir, to " return to the power of the Crown, which the " learned Gentleman has told us was too much " limited by the Triennial Law. I think I have " made it plain that the just power of the Crown " cannot poffibly be limited by frequent elections, " and confequently could not be too much limited " by the Triennial Law; but by long Parliaments " the Crown may be enabled to affume, and to " make use of an unjust power. By our Consti-" tution the only legal method we have of vindi-" cating our rights and privileges against the en-" croachments of ambitious Ministers is by Par-" liament; the only way we have of rectifying a " weak and wicked Administration is by Parlia-" ment ; the only effectual way we have of bringing " high and powerful criminals to condign punifh-ment is by Parliament. But if ever it should " come to be in the power of the Administration " to have a majority of this Houfe depending " upon the Crown, or to get a majority of fuch " men returned as the reprefentatives of the people, " the Parliament will then ftand as in no ftead, it " can answer none of these great purposes. The " whole nation may be convinced of the weakness " or wickedness of those in the Administration, " and yet it may be out of the nation's power, in " a legal way, to get the fools turned out or the " knaves hanged."

It would be fuperfluous to adduce the arguments advanced on the ministerial fide of the queftion, as not one objection of weight was alleged, or one rational argument advanced, otherwife than the vague apprehension of Jacobitifm.

These two speeches serve to shew the general fense entertained of this pernicious Septennial Act at the distant period of near threescore years, and whether the evils here deduced were or were not fully operating, is not a matter to engage our enquiry; fuffice for the present age to know that grievances had increased, that corruption was increasing, and that the cup of evil has now overshowed and spread over the land the *lava* of accumulated taxes. And when we consider how Paymasters, Commissions, Agents, and other fervants of the Crown, have been rewarded, we muss conclude they have rendered to Government an eternal obligation, and that these taxes are to support

" The debt immenfe of endlefs gratitude,"

" So burthenfome, ftill paying, ftill to owe."

Among the many illicit practices attending the abuse in the representation, there is one of a very specious complexion, as having a pretence to support a facred tie which every true Englishman bears in his heart—a friendship for his King. Under the pretext of being the King's friends, Members received ceived a douceur for the ulufruct of their voices, creating thereby a diffinction in the reprefentation of the people, and deftroying the confidential relation which ought to fubfift in its utmost purity between the King and his faithful people; for a King to raife bulwarks, battlements, and castles against his people is a most heterogeneous idea, and a mistaken policy in a free Government. A great and good King of a free people can have no enemies within his dominions but those of his own courtiers.

We owe this fecret and corrupt policy to the genius of Charles II. and it may fairly be faid to be practifing Machiavel's maxim in ambufh—*Divide* et impera—Divide the people and fubdue them. Intereft will attach a majority, who are taught by the influence of this maxim, that there is a tide continually flowing to Court, where those get fooneft there who fmoothly glide on the current of corruption. What fhark but will go with the ftream ?

Further, the continuance of Parliaments for feven years rendered it an object of fome importance to the private intereft of a Member; for if his election coft him at most 1500l. and he was receiving for the ufufruct of his voice the least prostituted fum, 500l. per annum, he would gain 2000l. at the expiration of the feven years he fat in Parliament, Parliament, belides the privileges of being free from arrefts and the benefit of franks; and to obtain a qualification for this little estate and finecure, the following practice has been adopted by the needy : to borrow deeds of noble Lords and Commoners ftrongly interested in the different existing Administrations, have them conveyed to themfelves on the fecurity of bonds, &c. then make oath of having a clear estate, to the amount of the fpecific qualification; and after taking their feat re-convey the fame to their patrons, and then fide on every question, and vote in every measure with the mercenary troop. This circumstance, and the monopoly of boroughs by noble Lords and Commoners, their contracts to return fuch Members whofe principles they are certain of, their rejecting others whole integrity may be hostile, their nominating and returning candidates independent of their constituents, are notorious facts, the most daring violations of the freedom of election, and grofs contempts of the law, as well as inglorious facrifices of British liberty.

That these may not appear unqualified conclufions, I shall produce the authority of a great and wife man, not less distinguished for his lucid and folid reasoning, than that his deep refearches were ever formed for the elucidation of truth. Mr. Locke tells us on this subject, "* If the Execu-

* On Gov. p. 2-222.

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" tive Power employs the force, treafure, and of-"fices of the Society to corrupt the reprefentatives, " or openly pre-engages the electors, and pre-"fcribes to their choice what manner of perfons " fhall be chofen; thus to regulate candidates " and electors, and new model the way of elec-" tion, what is it but to cut up the Government " by the roots, and poifon the very fountain of " public fecurity? For the people having referved " to themfelves the choice of their reprefentatives, " as a fence of their properties, could do it for " no other end but that they might always be " freely chofen, and fo chofe, freely act and ad-" vife."

These baneful and ruinous practices were nurtured by the Septennial Act, and cherisched by that Prince of political corruption, Sir Robert Walpole, under whose tutelage they grew and spread, and during the American war had pervaded every fecretion of the State. Lord Chesterfield, in his character of Sir Robert, fays—" That " he brought to perfection that shameful method " of governing by fecret and corrupt influence, " which at this time both disconsure and disgraces " this country, and which if not checked, and " God knows how it can now be checked, must " ruin it."

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SECTION IX.

General Propositions for accomplishing an Equal Reprefentation of the Commons of Great Britain in the High Court of Parliament.

TN laying down a conftitutional rule of action L to accomplifh this grand effential point, I anticipate the favourable condruction of every fincere impartial friend to the Conftitution. But obfervation induces me to except against all its enemies, which are those who are for reforming every thing, and those who are inimical to every idea of reform, against every clergyman who cannot, with that worthy prelate the Bishop of Llandaff, lay his hand on his breaft, and fay with him, My religion and my politics refide in my heart; and alfo against the gentlemen of the law, and those under the influence of Government, who cannot join with the venerable Lord Camden in this rule of conduct. Let the letter of conftitutional law prevail, and right be done, though purfuing the fpirit of perversion be the road to favour and fortune.

Upon the fubject of this Section, John Bull, who had paid me a polite attention fince our laft difcourfe, commenced the following dialogue.

John

John Bull. You have fully convinced me of a grand evil that is pervading the vitals of the Confitution; but to remedy which, however defirous and ferioufly neceffary, is not be attempted but in a manner fuitable to the dignity of the first kingdom in Europe, and in a way becoming a great and enlightened nation.

The Author. Impressed with fuch noble fentiments, there can be little doubt but the nation could accomplifh this effential renovation of the Conftitution without diffurbing the harmony of the fystem, or encroaching upon the acknowledged prerogatives and privileges of either of the Three Estates. The stable support of the Crown and Parliament is the united interests of the community; and the King's prerogative is beft maintained by the affections of his faithful people. There can be no hazard in his Majefty's trufting to the flanch loyalty of his fubjects, by conftituting a free and equal reprefentation; and his Majefty would arife to the true fummit of glory, to that pinnacle of immortal honour, which no Monarch fince the great Alfred ever attained, if his Majefty, by virtue of his Royal prerogative, would diffolve the prefent Parliament, expressing at the fame time his fense of their loyal attachment to his perfon and family, his affurance of their firm fupport of the conftitution and the univerfal opinion of their confpicuous talents

lents and fplendid abilities ; but that in his wifdom he had thought proper to increase the dignity of his Crown, the glory of his reign, and the common interest of the kingdom, by cementing on a permanent basis the facred relation which in all purity and confidence fhould inviolably exift between himfelf and his faithful people. To render efficient this happy compact, to conciliate all disaffection, and to preferve the letter and spirit of the Conflitution by rooting out corruption, it was his royal will and pleafure, and the anxious defire of his faithful fubjects, that before he iffued writs for a new Parliament, the Members of the late Houfe of Commons, which now stands diffolved, fhould retire to their respective counties, and he would immediately, by virtue of his prerogative, iffue mandates to the Sheriffs of the feveral counties, commanding the Mayor, Bailiffs, and Officers of every city, town, and village in the kingdom, to make returns of deputies from the inhabitants, chofen in the proportion of one deputy to every ten houfeholders paying fcot and lot. The deputies fo returned to the Sheriff should by him be fummoned to the county town, and there elect ten reprefentatives; and every county having in good peace and order returned ten reprefentatives, the reprefentatives of the nation should meet collectively in the Houfe of Commons, where, on taking their feats, an oath should be administered to every individual, binding them to purfue only those ob-N iects

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jects particularized in the oath, for which they were convened, which is for the fole and express purpole of organizing the elective power of the people, fo that a free and independent representation may be formed, agreeable to the texture and genius of our happy Conflictution, and that a Parliament might be conflicted, on the facred principles of liberty, virtue, and juffice; the laws of God, the rules of right conduct for man.

The national Convention thus legally convened, fhould be limited to fit no longer than forty days, which fhould be part of their oath; and having established the representation of the people on a univerfal, liberal, and equal mode, should submit the mode, and the future duration of a Parliament to the Houfe of Lords, which should be fummoned for the purpofe; and after their concurrence, it should receive his Majesty's royal fanction, and his Majefty should immediately, at the expiration of the forty days, which would diffolve the Convention, in the ufual way iffue his writs for electing Knights, Citizens, and Burgeffes; and the Parliament fo conflituted would to all intents and purpofes enjoy the fame privileges, and be fubject to all the statute laws relative to the fame, as if no fuch Convention had ever met, by which not an iota of the privileges of the Three Eftates of the Constitution would be affected, but, on the contrary, its true spirit be realized.

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John Bull. The measure which you have proposed meets my full approbation, but such a procedure would be unprecedented. Should not a reform originate with Parliament?

The Author. With regard to precedent, * it is a maxim of our Constitution, that the prerogative is that law in cale of the King which is law in no cafe of the fubject. The King only, by the Constitution, can convoke a Parliament or diffolve one. If at the Revolution the King could, by virtue of his prerogative, constitute the Convention into a Parliament, and that Convention affembled primarily to preferve the Constitution, on a parity of reasoning, his Majesty can assemble a Convention for the felf-fame purpole; for his prerogative +confifts in a diferentionary power of acting for the public good, where the politive laws are filent. What difinterested man in the nation would oppose his Majefty in establishing the freedom of election on a permanent bafis? What man would deem the exercife of the prerogative for the immediate benefit of the people, ‡ for which it was created, a violation of the regal power, or an infringement on the privileges of Parliament ?

* Finch, 1. 85. † Locke on Govern. p. 2-166.

‡ Plowden, p. 487.

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John

John Bull. Permit me to remind you of fome general maxims. Kings, it is faid, are feldom inclined to compaffionate their fubjects, becaufe they never intend to become men; and the nobility are apt to defpife the lower clafs of people, becaufe they never intend to become plebeians; and the rich are in general arrogant and felf-interefted; I am inclined therefore, from thefe reflections to defpair of ever witneffing this falutary renovation of the Conftitution originating from Court.

The Author. Indeed, John Bull, there is fomething profound in your remarks. Upon maturer thoughts, I am myfelf in doubt, when I confider the ftrong barrier of felf-intereft which furrounds the Court, and ftands in the way between the Crown and reform.

John Bull. I confess I was furprifed you should think that it would originate from any other quarter than Parliament, which is the door at which the people at all times should have access, to make their complaints known, and have their grievances redreffed.

The Author. I prefumed it was well known throughout the kingdom, that fo far as refpects the fubject matter, the door you fpeak of was double barred and treble locked, and private interest kept the keys. *Yohn* John Bull. It is unufual for me to relinquish an established opinion on slight grounds; you must apply sufficient evidence to enforce conviction.

The Author. All borough proprietors, great law officers, and members looking up for preferment, befides placemen, penfioners, and most of the officers of the army, will oppose this reform for an equal representation, which is the birth-right and inheritance of the people. Upon the question you would find Gentlemen of the above description maintain a great majority against it.

John Bull. Such a phalanx of interested troops opposed to the rights of the nation, confounds legal propriety, and renders hope desperate, I am convinced; but you have left me no resort, which is a matter of much concern to my interests.

The Author. That a general reform in Parliament will originate with the higher orders in the State, I have my doubts. I am afraid it is too palpable it never will; the *lex neceffitas* will therefore eventually devolve on the people, and their authority will be founded on that fundamental principle of Government, *Salus populi fuprema lex*. Of this first principle Sir William Temple observes in his Effays, "The fafety of Princes and States " lies in pursuing the true and common interest of " the nation they govern, without espousing those N 3 " of

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" of any party or faction; or if these are so formed " in a State, that they must incline to one or " other, then to chuse and favour that which is " most popular, or wherein the greatest or strongest " part of the people appear to be engaged. For as " the end of Government seems to be *falus populi*, " the fastery or welfare of the people, so the strength " of the Government is the confent of the people, " which made that maxim of *Vox Populi vox Dei*; " that is, the Governors, who are few, will ever be " forced to follow the strength of the governed, " who are many."

John Bull. Extraordinary recurrences to first principles by the people, however well grounded and fubstantiated, as the origins of every free State, and authorised by the law of Nature, of Justice, and of Right, are not to be called forth but when prompt neceffity excites to virtue, and the sword to oppose the rigid gripes of despotic power.

The Author. In admitting these primary laws as the inherent rights of a free nation, and the legal exercise of fuch general power, much depends on time and circumstances. The measure of oppresfion, and the degree of violation which the Constitution may have suffered, are not to be concluded on and taken as detailed, but must be universally felt; and the nation can never be justified in reforting to such general principles of jurisprudence, to fuch an exercise of tribunitial power, unless the affectionate appeals, the faithful remonstrances of a loyal people have been trampled on at the foot of the Throne; and the patience of freedom has grown grey in the weary folicitations to arbitrary arrogance. It is then when liberty affumes what reason dictates, virtue fanctions, and justice obtains; a wife and benevolent King will yield in the first instance, an administration spurning the narrow system of felf-interest, will coincide when Royalty is disposed to actions of glory; and by enlightened measures and patriotic acts appease the public mind, and enrich itself with popular applause.

John Bull. You have explained the dernier refort to my fatisfaction; and a queftion arifes in my mind, if the prefent Parliament was to organize and eftablish the elective power of the nation, the next Parliament following their precedent of affumed power might repeal what the last had done; and in like manner continued innovations might arife in every fubfequent Parliament.

The Author. There may be a doubt whether a Houfe of Commons is vefted with powers adequate to reform the reprefentation; but it is the greateft of all popular delufions to amufe the public mind with the continued feeble efforts for this grand effential renovation. A general, manly, and confe-N 4 quential quential mode of reform, fuitable to the dignity of the nation and the rights of the people, is against as innovation, is inveighed against as perilous, fraught with danger, too hazardous for There are three claffes of men fupporting trial. these delusive ideas, these ignoble reflections on a great enlightened people; first, the felf interested borough proprietors, placemen, and penfioners; fecondly, thefe who not comprehending the nature and active power of Government, and not regarding either its mutability or its motions, while their own affairs go on profperoufly, fupport every Adminiftration, right or wrong. The third clafs are those who well know the prefent reprefentation was formed by partial rights obtained from Norman despotism; these are the impartial and moderate men who are equally the friends of the Crown, as the Democratic part of the Conftitution, but are infected with fuch a political cowardice, that however fenfible they may be of the necessity of a general and equal reprefentation, they are abforbed by timidity, and rather than amputate the gangrened limb, they are for applying palliatives. Hence arife all the partial and illusive modes of reform. And further, what has ever over-awed a Parliament, and induced an imbecile attack on this perverfion of the Conflitution, was the importance of establishing precedents fo unlimited as an equal reprefentation demands; they feel an innate conviction,

tion, that * " it is not in Parliament alone that a " remedy for Parliamentary diforders can be com-" pleated ; hardly indeed can it begin there."

John Bull. I approve of Mr. Burke's idea; and I am convinced, if the prefent Houfe of Commons effected a partial reform, it would be a precedent equally unconflitutional as the Septennial Act. It is a fubject of fuch magnitude to posterity, that a legal Convention for the express purpose is only constitutionally competent.

The Author. It is no impeachment of the authority of the Houfe of Commons to doubt its competency; it is for the benefit of posterity it should be held fuch. The disfranchifing of charters, and the organization of the elective power of the people, are tantamount to the folemn and public confirmations of liberties, by the Charter of King John and Henry III. the Reftoration and the Revolution, which were by national conventions, and by which were conftituted the reprefentation; and it is a folecism in political argument to maintain, that redrefs of grievances can be effected by the authors of those grievances, or that corruptions can be purified by corruptors, or that reformation in any State can proceed from a body of felf-interefted and ambitious men, who are the acknow-

* Mr. Burke's Thoughts on the Difcontents, p. 100.

ledged

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ledged abettors and fupporters of the very infractions and abuses intended to be reformed. There is only one mode, in my humble opinion, by which a reform can conflitutionally originate and be fubstantiated, and two ways to accomplish that purpofe; the one, voluntary; the other by remonftrance, loyal yet firm, as founded on conflictutional principles. The first of these I have before stated, the legality of which cannot be doubted; it would be an exertion of the prerogative, founded on those facred principles which the body of the people it is held does poffess as inherent rights. If therefore the nation has the power to depart from the exprefs inflitutions of regular Government, when those inftitutions have been violated, in order to maintain its conftitutional freedom; can it be faid his Majefty has not the fame power to effect the fame purpofes? As the guardian of the Conflitution, he has an unlimited power in fecuring those liberties which the law creates; but the wifdom emanating from the fame law has happily created a limited barrier, which prevents the Crown from counteracting the power with which it is invested. And if his Majesty was determined, in his gracious benevolence, to truft to the ftanch loyalty of his affectionate people, his faithful fubjects, and promote an equal representation of the Commons of Great Britain, the prefent Parliament could not with any colour of justice oppose fuch a popular measure. With this first proposition I shall conclude.

clude, That whenever the Government is agreed on the neceffity of a reform, it never can be conftitutionally effected but by a national convention, affembled by the prerogative of his Majefty for that express purpose-Reason rules the wife, opinion the multitude. If the torrent of opinion is running inimical to conflitutional liberty, it is the duty of Government to check it. On the contrary, vice verfa, to promote with all its energy that glorious end. The general opinion now dictates the neceffity of a reform in the reprefentation; that opinion is a permanent fecurity, that if the meafure be adopted, it will be effected with peace. harmony, and order. If the prefent House of Commons were to difcover fo much patriotic virtue and felf-denial, as to effect this falutary measure, no exception would be taken, altho' the precedent be repugnant to the true spirit of the constitution.

If this voluntary mode be not embraced, a certain portion of future evils, from which we cannot fay we shall be exempt, as the very first expensive war will incur them, will occasion a reform in the representation to originate from the people.

John Bull. I fhould hope the profpect of peaceful tranquillity will induce my Sovereign to give me fuch a pledge of his facred attachment to my Conftitution, as to render fuch a recurrence to political liberty unneceffary. But upon a fubject of fuch fuch magnitude, it is advifeable to draw from every fource which offers. I fhould therefore be glad to hear what you have further to propole for the attainment of this great object, particularly as on your first propolal, we rather feed our hopes at the expence of our understandings, when we reflect that the private virtues of a Sovereign as a man do not necessfarily constitute him a Patriot King.

The Author. In whatever relates to the maintaining of your conftitutional liberty, I most chearfully comply. The measures which I have to propose will be grounded on the warrantable prefumption, that if the fenfe of the great majority of people can be conftitutionally collected, and laid at the foot of the Throne, a reform would be accomplished. Before I propole this mode a few reflections prefent themfelves. The most undoubted proof of a wife Government is the peace, order, and unanimity of the public mind. A division of fentiment, and a disjunction of the common interest, are subjects of much import in fociety; for it can never be the interest of the Crown or the people to try their ftrength. Prerogative by an over-extension may, by the very measures it takes, work its own abridgment; and the people by a miltaken notion of liberty may endeavour to remove obstacles more imaginary than in fact, and by an exertion of their latent powers deftroy the bond of union in the component parts of the Conftitution, which may fubftitute

fubstitute anarchy for order, confound diffinctions by loofening the ties of fubordination; and in attempting to be more than free, finally become enflaved. It is therefore wife, it is just, it is prudent to adopt fuch measures, that the whole community may draw together as one political body. The mode which I should recommend goes no further than to a rule of conduct fanctioned by law, whereby the people may maintain their constitutional liberty. Hence the bugbear innovation must yield to the more calm dictates of national prudence. The nation, in purfuit of this lawful object will preferve a facred reverence for the conflituent parts of the Conflitution, which are inviolable, particularly when the interests of the people are fo intimately connected with its feveral inftitutions, and above all those laws of freedom which are the folid basis of the whole. But these excellent principles of Government are reduced to mere theories, if the nation's elective power be violated. And can any thing be more repugnant to freedom and to the fpirit of our Conftitution, than to affirm, that the Constitution of Parliament is perverted, and that none but the violators are competent to reform the abuse. Surely it is a reproach of the highest nature to the good fense of the age, an age which rivals ancient Rome in the fplendor of its arts and fciences; an age in which knowledge is diffeminated through all orders of the State, when fuperfition yields to gentle toleration.

toleration; when commerce has supplanted military ferocity, and the minds of men become civilized. It is impoffible to indulge a thought fo inglorious, fo unworthy of those truly independent country Gentlemen who must be the principals in reforming this abuse. Such Gentlemen, both in and out of the House, whose constitutional integrity is proof, who have large interests at stake, and who have but one common interest with the people, by this reform will find their way to Parliament without expence, and beyond a shadow of doubt will be as anxious to ftrengthen the arm of Government in every measure relative to the interefts and honour of the kingdom as the venal tribe; a mercenary, cringing, fawning few, who never ftand upright before a great man; but from a natural bias of the heart, and curve of the mind, facrifice the public interest for their own profit; equally infincere in their attachments, they dupe their fuperiors, and exulting in their duplicity, afterwards defpife them for their credulity; and having created a division of interest between the Crown and the people, have introduced a fystem of plunder. Nothing can refift this fystem, which commencing with a treacherous facrifice of the common interest, must finally end in either flavery or anarchy, but the firm union of the independent country gentlemen and citizens, to effect an equal representation, and establish the freedom of election on a permanent and general principle. The fpirit

fpirit for a reform by natural confequence muft become general; the people will fee their intereft in it; abufes will still increase, and then they will feel the necessity of stemming that torrent which for many years has been widely spreading through the stamina of the Constitution, and loosening those ties which support the noble edifice, and which an independent Parliament only can preferve.

A reform will never be effected unlefs adopted by a cool wifdom, a' prompt judgment, and a capacious mind, operating on a fober extensive plan. Every true Englishman, impressed with the value of his free Conftitution, will make order his guide, and the public welfare his purfuit; and as I should hope there is not one fingle parish in the kingdom but what has fome friends to conftitutional liberty, and there can be none of that defcription but who are advocates for the independence of Parliament, I should propose that, to colleft the real unbiaffed fenfe of the nation on this measure, a few friends to the Constitution, independent gentlemen, and citizens in every parish of every city, town, borough corporate, and village in the kingdom, in each of their respective parifhes, without calling a meeting of the inhabitants, which might create diforder, fhould nominate one from among themfelves, who should the following day go from houfe to houfe within his parish, attended by not more than two gentlemen, and

and prefent to every householder paying fcot and lot a proposition for obtaining their right of equal reprefentation; and every householder approving the measure and the delegate should fign his name. A majority of householders thus approving fhould be deemed conclusive for a parish, and every parish of every city, town, borough corporate, and village, having in like peace and good order been thus confulted, a majority of parishes thus approving fhould be deemed conclusive for a county. The delegates of the parishes thus deputed with the collective fenfe of a county, fhould by agreement meet at an appointed place, and ballot for one among themselves to constitute a national Committee of representation, a majority of counties having in the fame orderly manner deputed their representatives, the national Committee of reprefentation fhould affemble at an appointed place, and felect from among themfelves ten perfons, according to the Conftitution, who should lay at the foot of the Throne the collected fense of the nation; and his Majefty might be addreffed in a conftitutional manner fomething to the following purport :

After expreffing in the fincerest and warmest manner their duty and allegiance to his Majesty, and their loyal attachment to his illustrious family, they should make known to his Majesty, that they are are a Committee deputed with the collective fense of his Majesty's faithful and loving subjects.

To express their deep concern in finding that all the statutes made to preferve the freedom of election, and the independence of Parliament, are rendered null and void by those circumstances, which in the natural course of things might have been expected from the partial establishment of the elective power of the people, and the opening left for the speculation of private interest.

To reprefent to his Majefty that the profperity of his Majefty's dominions wholly depends, under Divine Providence on a harmony between the Popular, Legiflative, and Executive branches of their excellent Conftitution; and they are convinced that nothing can preferve that profperity and uninterrupted harmony from the attacks of difaffection, or the underminings of vicious ambition, but an equal and free reprefentation, and fhortening the continuance of Parliaments.

To recall to his Majefty's mind the general fense of his faithful people on this fubject during the former part of his reign; that the obftacles opposed to fuch an enlightened, neceffary, and beneficial a measure were remote from his Majefty's gracious benevolence. The opposition arose from a number of felf-interested individuals, whose influence in the O Legislature

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Legiflature can promote an armament to obtain preferment, or prolong a war to make their fortunes; and thefe meafures have been fo adopted at the expence of millions of money, and to the lofs of the lives of thousands of their fellow countrymen, to the high offence against the Divine laws and the freedom of their happy Constitution, and which have grievously oppressed his Majesty's poor subjects, who are in consequence labouring under the weight of accumulated taxes, and the great advance of the necessaries of life.

To humbly teftify their affliction for these opprefive evils, and to represent to his Majesty, that this alarming aristocratic power of the Commons is the highest testimony that the Constitution of Parliament is violated by the defect in the representation of the people.

To affure his Majefty in the moft unfeigned terms their determination to fupport his Majefty in his just prerogatives with their lives and fortunes; but that they are determined to reclaim their conftitutional rights of a free and equal reprefentation; that they will maintain inviolable the Conftitution in all its branches pure and entire; and that they will unanimously fupport the dignity of his Majefty's Crown and the honour and interests of the kingdom; and when the one shall be infulted, or the other be attacked, they will produce fuch liberal liberal fupplies and extensive refources, as shall be unexampled in any former times for a defensive war.

To reprefent to his Majefty's wildom that the prefent fituation of Europe affures a tranquillity to his kingdom highly favourable to their demands, to the nation's immediate interefts, and to the glory of his Majefty's reign. They humbly therefore folicit his Majefty to exercife a prerogative fo wifely placed in his Royal hands, to diffolve the prefent reprefentation, and by virtue of the fame prerogative command a Convention fworn to the only express purpose of establishing the freedom of election and the independence of Parliament on true conflictutional principles.

To affure his Majefty that they have maturely weighed every circumftance, have analyzed the effects, and anticipate the happy confequences; that they have taken in every point of view the interefts to be affected, the difadvantages it will be attended with, and the balance of power which will be attained; that in none of those circumftances do they perceive that his Majefty's just prerogatives will be encroached on, or his dignity retrenched. On the contrary, the equilibrium neceffary for the free operation of Government will be conftitutionally poifed.

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Finally, to reprefent to his Majefty, That in this their Conflicutional claim, they are prompted by that duty which every Briton owes to the maintaining of conflictutional liberty; and in this their lawful demand, they difcharge that obligation which their anceftors entailed on them, which was, To preferve the freedom of election, and maintain the independence of Parliament; and this they are bound to do for the immediate fecurity of their Conflictution, for the benefit of their children, and to tranfmit the liberties they received from their anceftors unimpaired to pofterity.

John Bull. The particular points of the address are congenial to the fentiments of my heart; my higheft wifnes centre in the great objects of a general and equal representation, and the shorter duration of Parliaments. It is impossible his Majesty could oppose a measure required by the fundamental laws of the Constitution, and so necessary for the support of its freedom; that his Majesty could object to make his people happy and united, and by this measure conciliate all difaffection, and render himself immortal honour, would be high treason to suppose.

The Author. If the collective fense of the nation was in this manner delivered before the Throne, his Majesty and the Parliament would embrace the dignified dignified act, and in the plenitude of their wifdom hand down to posterity a Constitution, which neither ambition could pervert, or injustice annihilate.

SECT.

SECTION X.

A Constitutional Mode of Reform.

The Author.

EFORE we can enter on the particular mode) of reforming the reprefentation, private intereft, that powerful bulwark which fuftains the rotten boroughs, renders a few remarks necessary. A ftrong objection may be taken to the * mode of applying the public money to purchafe thefe boroughs; for if they were disfranchifed of their elective privileges, the proprietors might make them a better money property, by the increase of population and the revival of trade which would follow; it being a notorious fact, that the decline of numerous boroughs is owing to the monopoly of noble Lords and hereditary Members, who poffefs every inch of land, to the exclusion of trade and manufactories; in confequence, the furplus of population emigrates to villages, which multiply in every part of the kingdom, while the rotten boroughs are finking into contemptible ruin. There are fome exceptions, where a division of interefts exifts in boroughs; but in these the practice of

* Mr. Pitt's Proposition, 1783.

building

building a number of fmall cottages, in order to fecure the feat of a hereditary member, is equally a gross abuse of the Constitution and a reproach to the common fense of the people. Such reprefentatives, in both inftances, confide in the number of their houses, and not in the fair effimation of the electors. Their tenants become their vaffals, and triumph over the independent few. Hence the men of real fubftance, who are the fupport of the poor, and the trufty friends of the State, have no influence in the motions of Government; and being juggled out of their constitutional rights, become the unanimous, though filent abhorrers of that infamous fystem of corruption, which fubftitutes cunning and treachery for wildom and integrity, which involves the idea of a free Government with abfolute power, and gives a flat refutation to the theory of the Conflitution.

John Bull. If proprietors of boroughs, by their being disfranchifed, would be deprived of their annual rentals, in all fuch cafes, where private property yields to public benefit, an adequate confideration by the public fhould be given.

The Author. Most affuredly. But it appears their rentals would be benefitted by a reform; but I do not attempt to affirm it would be equal to the douceurs from Ministry; these are private confiderations tions and private interests, which, by a perfonification of the Constitution, it may be faid to know nothing of; it is totally ignorant of the poffibility of fuch practices; it prefumes it was established for univerfal benefit, for one common intereft, and not a partial monopoly. That every objection may therefore be done away which is oppofed to the disfranchifing of the elective power only of boroughs, let us for a moment confider the inroads of time and fashion, If the Constitution was origiginally free, its vital principle must have been a fpirit of universal justice, which no subsequent innovation could derive the fanction of a precedent from, if the usage was inimical to that principle. And at the prefent day, if true equity, reafon, and general liberty, which the Conftitution is founded on, renounces the ulage, that ulage is an ulurpation of the conftitutional rights of the people.

After the Norman invation had defaced the free Conftitution, eftablished by the Great Alfred, and annulled the * elective power of the people,

* This privilege has been much contefted between monarchical and popular parties. But when we confider the difference between military and commercial ages, and that the mode may vary, but the principle be the fame, the difference becomes reconciled, particularly when we are undoubtedly informed the Britons and Saxons were a free people, whofe Governments were founded on the equitable principles of election; but on this people. The contefts for the Crown by the fucceffors of William the Conqueror, afforded the people a partial refumption of their Saxon laws; and the charters of various town tithings, or boroughs, were renewed or granted to different Barons by the different Monarchs, to fupport their refpective interefts, by which a partial acquisition of elective privileges spread through some part of the kingdom, while other parts still remained destitute, and have continued so down to this prefent day; and we are still preferving the remembrance of Norman despotism, by thus continuing the chartered elective rights of particular boroughs.

It would become a matter of enquiry, why the now numerous and populous villages floud have formerly been exempt from a participation in the motions of Government by delegation, when the

this fubject monarchical writers, as Dr. Stuart well obferves *, " by founding the prerogative fo high, infer the abfurdeft con-" fequences." Mr. Hume, who refts much on the authority of Dr. Brady, an arbitrary writer, † doubts the Saxon Wittena Gemote, or Parliament, to confift of any other order than the Nobility. The Principes, Satrapæ, Optimates, Magnates, Procures, which feem to fuppofe an Ariftocracy, and to exclude the Commons. In a few pages further he obferves, Security was provided by the Saxon laws to all Members of the Wittena Gemote, both in going and returning, except they were notorious thieves and robbers, which requires no comment.

* Stuart Antiquity Eng. Conft. p. 52. + Hume, vol. I, 204 and 208.

inhabitants

inhabitants of those villages equally contribute to the public revenue as boroughs. If we were not informed that the civil diffensions and wars ocfioned the * great mass of people to refide within the protection of cities and boroughs, every one of which was furnished with castles for that purpose. But with the abolition of the feudal fystem, internal peace promoted a general confidence, population increased and spread, villages were formed, and with the introduction of commerce new towns arose on the ruins of the rotten boroughs, whose privi-

* " We know from Bede," fays a candid and manly inveftigator into the antiquities of our Government, " That there " were in England long before his time twenty-eight famous " cities, befides innumerable caftle and walled towns of note, " many of which, though now extremely decayed or quite "ruined, were then very confiderable; the greatest and richest " part of the nation living in those times, for the most part, " in cities, or great towns, for their greater benefit or fecurity, " and the greater parts of the lands of England in the Saxon " times, and long after, lay uncultivated and over-run with " forefts and bogs; fo that the inhabitants of those cities and " boroughs being then fo confiderable, for eftates in land as " well as other riches, could not be excluded from having " places both in the British and Saxon Great Councils. What " man of fenfe can believe, that the ancient and potent cities of " London, York, Canterbury, Lincoln, &c. fhould ever be " excluded from having any hand in the great confultation " about giving money and making laws, and for the public de-" fence of the kingdom in the Saxon times, any more than they " are now."

> Dr. Stuart's Antiquity of the English Constitution, p. 285. Bibliotheca Poetica, p. 270. See also p. 272.

> > leges

leges retaining a * Norman aspect, the people found it to their interests to emigrate from them, which occasioned their decay.

John Bull. It does not appear to me, that any rational argument can be advanced, that the one common intereft of the whole community fhould, however long the ufage, be garbled, cut, and divided into partial lots. If thefe partial elective privileges can be vindicated by virtue of the Conflitution, and be defended and maintained by the antiquity of the practice, at this day, it is in vain to talk of one common intereft; it is a compleat defeafance of common right.

The Author. Fortunately for Englishmen, the Conflitution acquires its data from the Great Alfred; and its principles are founded on one common right for one common interest. The Norman invasion proved a paralytic stroke on freedom, under which every nerve of liberty became torpid. In every age fince that period, various restoratives have been applied to recover it to its primitive tone; but still, as that revered patriot the great Earl of Chatham faid, "It wants a new por-"tion of health to enable it to bear its infirmities."

* One check to industry in England was the erecting of Corporations, an abuse which is not yet entirely corrected.

Hume, vol. III. p. 404.

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This expressive fentence of the noble Earl's was an evident allusion to the partial and abused representation of the people. Of the corrupt reprefentation of boroughs, at another time, he obferved, "This is what is called the rotten part "of the Constitution. It will not last the century. "If it do not drop off, it must be amputated." And I presume, by a further enquiry of the inroads of time and fashion, it will appear that the nation may with strict legal propriety adopt an universal and equal organization of delegated power.

John Bull. It will afford me pleafure to have the ufage impartially examined. Truth will diffipate prejudice, though the had the army of Xerxes against her.

The Author. It is the virtue of common intereft to have truth for its basis. Your rights cannot be maintained without her. Endeavouring to continue therefore under her auspices, I find there are upwards of * fixty boroughs that formerly fent Members to Parliament, among which are Doncaster, Whitby, Kingston upon Thames, Kidderminster, Newbury, Blandford, Chelmsford, Tunbridge, Bromsgrove, &c. &c. &c. If these populous boroughs were to refume their claims of representatation, could the Crown legally and constitutionally refuse them? In the reign of James I. Aylesbury

* Brown Willis's Notitia Parliamentaria.

and fome other boroughs claimed their conftitutional privileges. The Crown refifted these claims on the ground of their having been so long dormant, but the plea was over-ruled; and if the above dormant boroughs were to claim in like manner, the Crown could not refift with justice; for beyond a doubt every man in the kingdom who contributes his quota to the support of Government, has an equal right to elect with his neighbour.

John Bull. If the measures you have proposed for a reform should fail, every one of these dormant boroughs should immediately claim their abfolute right to representation, and contest the point with the Crown.

The Author. A very judicious idea, as the legality of it carries with it the advantage which Hamden enjoyed in the conteft with Charles I.—the conviction of the public mind in favour of common right and common juffice againft tyranny and ufurpation. Upon further enquiry we find there are alfo upwards of feventy boroughs, ftyled fuch on ancient record, but which never fent members to Parliament fince the Conqueft; although they enjoyed conflitutional privileges under the Saxons, as town tithings, among which are Leeds, Birmingham, Stratford on Avon, Walfall, Kendall, Burton upon Trent, Macclesfield, &c. And it is worthy of remark, that at this day one of thefe towns.

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towns, Birmingham for inftance, contains near 80,000 inhabitants, when the number of electors who fend to Parliament three-fourths of its members amount to but 41,000. And the face of things is fo entirely changed in the course of time, that every argument in respect to the present elective rights of partial boroughs must fall to the ground.

From Edward I. to the reign of Edward VI. all the boroughs in Lancashire were frequently excused by the Sheriff from fending Members to Parliament on account of their *poverty*; whereas that * county now ranks with the first in England for opulence and trade.

The

* Mr. Chalmers observes, in his Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great-Britain, " That it is not too much to ex-" pect, that Lancashire alone, confidering its numerous manu-" factories and extensive commerce, is now able to make " a more fleady exertion amidft modern warfare than the " whole kingdom in the time of Elizabeth. The traders of " Liverpool alone fitted out at the commencement of the late " war with France, between the 26th August, 1778, and the " 17th April, 1779, 120 privateers, armed each with ten to " thirty guns, but mostly from fourteen to twenty. From an " accurate lift, containing the name and appointment of each, " it appears that these privateers measured 30,787 tons, carry-" ing 1986 guns and 8754 men. The fleet fent against the " Armada in 1588 measured 31,685 tons, and was navigated " by 15,272 feamen. From the efforts of a fingle town, we " may infer that the private fhips of war formed a greater force " during

The Merchant Guilds, or Charters, were granted to boroughs for the express purpose of promoting commerce and protecting trade. Can it in any fhape answer these essential purposes, when noble Lords and hereditary Members monopolize every acre of land, and every houfe in their boroughs, whole trade is utterly destroyed by the decrease of population occasioned. by this monopoly? Is it confistent with justice, is it agreeable to reason, is it confonant to the texture and genius of a free State, founded on popular reprefentation, that fome boroughs, which contain not a fcore of inhabitants, fhould have influence in the motions of Government by their representatives, and other boroughs, fuch as Manchester and Birmingham, which contain 150,000 inhabitants, should have no voice in the Legislature.

John Bull. But it is faid the inhabitants of Birmingham and Manchester do not wish to fend representatives to Parliament; they defire not the trouble of election; the jarring of interests and division of parties might affect their trade.

The Author. If that be true, it is a very ftrong evidence of the entire change of cuftoms with time,

" during the war with the Colonies, than the nation with all its " unanimity and zeal was able to equip under the potent Go-" vernment of Elizabeth."

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as elective charters were originally, as I before obferved, granted for the promotion of trade. But I believe what they fear is the corruption and confufion of an election; what they defpife and dread is the general depraved flate of the elective power of the people. Otherwife, if they poffers not the ancient fpirit of their free-born anceftors, if they have funk into a lukewarm moderation, a contemptible indifference, they are worthy of flavery.

John Bull. They fay that they are well content with county Members; they have a pledge in their independence paramount to their grievances.

The Author. In every free State, the fecretions of commerce pervade the interefts of the landholders, and the produce of land and the increase of trade have but one intereft; all borough representation may therefore be done away, and a free Parliament be conflituted by independent county Members. But in that case, every inhabitant paying foot and lot, whether residing in a village, town, or city, should have a voice; and that the members might not be put to any expence, the inhabitants of every parish should elect delegates, and those delegates elect the immediate representatives; the election of the last might be compleated in a few hours.

John

John Bull. But in the name of a freeholder there is fomething fo venerable, that the prejudice naturally attached to long revered characters would not reconcile the abolition of their elective power.

The Author. Very just; I shall therefore offer you a plan for a general reprefentation, in which that respected body shall still retain its elective privileges. With the freeholders I would include the copyholders alfo, who should vote for delegates, and those delegates elect the Knights of the Shire, as I am fully perfuaded a fair and equal reprefentation of the Commons of England can never be obtained by permitting every order of the people to vote for immediate reprefentatives to Parliament. Further, it will have this defireable effect, there never can be any long contested elections, and the private fortunes of Members will never be affected by their laudable fervices for the good of their country. The prefent expence to which a Member is put, is not only an infinite difgrace to the nation, but an act of the highest injustice to the individual; and as fuch, Government is bound by every tie of honour and juffice to yield to a reform.

The freeholders and copyholders in every hundred or division of a county, I should therefore propose, shall elect delegates from among themfelves in the proportion of one delegate to every five

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five freeholders and copyholders. The delegates thus freely chosen in every hundred, &c. on the day of election should assemble at their respective county towns, and there elect the Knights of the Shire, which might be done in a few hours in every county in the kingdom.

This mode of electing Knights of the Shire would certainly accord with the original inftitution, which limited the qualifications of electors to the poffeffion of freeholds of 40s. per annum, to which at this day, according to the decrease of the denomination of money, 40l. per annum may be confidered as not more than equivalent. The delegates therefore which the small freeholders or copyholders schould elect within their respective hundreds, I should propose to be men of not less than 40l. per annum freehold or copyhold property; and this plan of electing Knights of the Shire, I trust, is eligible and constitutional.

John Bull. I would be candid in ftarting an objection if any thing weighty ftruck me, I approve therefore generally, and hope you will fuggest one as unobjectionable on the commercial part.

The Author. Your approbation is my chief aim, but in this I cannot promife the fame facility; for the variety of interests a general reform in the representation has to encounter, as well as the diversity of opinions,

nions, the rooted prejudices, and a most prevailing disposition to nurse old customs like declining age. even when evils are acknowledged to be attached to the one, and difeafe has rendered the hope of life desperate in the other. Even though Nature influences the prefervation of the aged, and reafon tells us the continuing prejudicial cuftoms is wrong, yet fuch is the force of habit, that we cherifh both with fentiments fomewhat fimilar. We remember the aged with filial gratitude, and a long continued practice infinuates a regard for the other. But the absolute necessity of a general reform renders the diffection of the victim effential to conftitutional liberty. Yet where shall we look for men to begin the amputation, where shall we find men fo disposed whole situations in life justly entitle them to the operation. It is to be hoped the good fense of this enlightened age will induce those to accomplish it whose due province it is to render to the freedom of Britain fo defireable a purpofe, I truft they will embrace this peaceful opportunity and eftablifh on a pure foundation the pyramid of liberty, as delineated by the Conftitution, and not leave the iffue to ftern neceffity or popular tumult. From a variety of plans for a reform in the reprefentation, fome truths may be gathered, and a permananent fystem be produced. In pursuit of your interest, John Bull, I am encouraged to fubmit one with all its exceptions for your approbation.

John

John Bull. I never expect to fee a perfect fystem of reprefentation; that mode, which being founded on constitutional principles, will assure the free administration of the Constitution to the people, is all that is required.

The Author. Beyond a doubt, the nearer an organization of elective power approaches to conftitutional principles, the more eligible it will be; I fhall therefore rigidly adhere to those ancient divisions and districts, the parishes, hundreds, and counties, unto which elective privileges were conflituted by the Great Alfred, for the fubordinations of magistracy, from the Throne down to the decennary, or tithing, or parish, which was a corporation of ten householders, who elected one from among themselves to represent and be answerable for them in the fuperior courts; and this principle of election ascended to the Eolderman, who was the chief magistrate of the county, and from him to the Throne itself.

The people of England, exclusive of Wales, are now computed to be about eight millions, who are reprefented in Parliament by 489 reprefentatives; Wales fends 24, and Scotland 45, which make together 558. Of this number 369 are returned by 41,000 electors, fome of whom are of the very lowest orders of people, while there are thousands thousands who contribute largely to the public revenue, and have great interests at stake, yet have no manner of choice of representatives.

John Bull. But it is faid, that although a man be elected for a paltry borough, he is declared by the Conftitution to be the reprefentative of the community at large; though he be elected by the poor of a borough, he is equally the reprefentative of the rich.

The Author. Affuredly fo, for this reafon, the terms of the Conftitution fuppole the Members independent and honeft, and the equity of law fuppofes its operation cannot deftroy its principle. But as the contrary is too often the fact, where is the man who cannot perceive the fallacy of our borough reprefentation ? What fecurity have the people against a Member who will barter for boroughs? Will any man be fo hardy as to affirm, that his conftitutional integrity will not fuffer by the infamous traffic; it is a public fale and proftitution of an Englishman's facred rights; and a man who commences borough-monger, violates every principle of human dignity and public honour, and is unworthy the name of an Englishman.

Fohn Bull. I am really ashamed to have taken up fo much of your time on a fubject, the very P 3 mention mention of which must convince every man of common-fense in England of its being an unwarrantable abuse of the rights of the people, and a dangerous innovation on the constitution.

The Author. An innovation on the Conflictution this practice most affuredly is, in the most unequivocal fense; and yet, strange to tell, the reform of this abuse is held out as innovation—Innovation is the word fet up in terrorem.

John Bull. I am fatisfied the word innovation is made the ftalking horfe of corruption. I beg you will therefore proceed in laying down a conftitutional and temperate mode of reform.

The Author. The plan which I shall offer you will be to elect a number of representatives on the commercial interest, amounting to the same of which the present Parliament is constituted. But that every householder paying scot and lot, whether residing in a city, town, or village, shall have his share in the motions of Government, by virtue of his choice of delegates, who shall elect by ballot the immediate representatives.

Before I proceed to the organization of the counties, it may be neceffary to notice the reprefentation of the eight Cinque Ports, each of which fend two Barons, or Members, to the Commons Houfe Houfe of Parliament. These privileges were granted to the Ports on account of fitting out satisfies against the coast of France, which appears at this day, when the course of time has so enlarged the views of the different nations, and aggrandized their mutual strength by such powerful navies, wholly unnecessary and void. From these Cinque Ports therefore may be taken their 16 Members, which may be transferred to the large maritime counties in the following manner:

Yorkshire is divided into three divisions, or Ridings, East, West, and North, and sends to Parliament on the landed interest two Members; but each of the Ridings containing as many acres of land as some of our largest counties. Two representatives on the landed interest may be affigned to each Riding; therefore

To Yorkshire may	v be added	_	4
Devonshire			I
Lincolnshire			I
Northumberland			I
Hampshire		·	I
Kent —			I
Effex –			1
Suffex			1
Norfolk			1
Suffolk -		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	I
Lancashire			I
Dorfetshire			I
Cornwall			I

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These additional Members to be elected in the fame manner as before stated for Knights of the Shire,

By taking the groß number of inhabitants each county at prefent contains, the number of reprefentatives to the number of inhabitants are extremely difproportionate in fome, particularly Cornwall, Wiltshire, &c. And to adopt an equal and adequate representation of the commercial intereft, each county ought to be represented according to the number of inhabitants which it contains; and to regulate this without any innovation on their present districts and divisions of hundreds and parishes, may be the most eligible, as being conflictutional. I shall therefore ftrictly regard those ancient divisions, and render the cities, towns, and villages, in some measure subfervient to them,

The number of delegates which in each parifh within a county, whether conftituting a city, town, or village, fhould be chosen, may be rated at the proportion of one delegate to every ten householders paying foot and lot. The number of taxed inhabitants within a parifh to be afcertained by the parifh books; and the number of representatives on the commercial interest which the delegates are to elect, may be calculated at a patio of five to every 100,000 inhabitants within each each county; from this ratio will arife a number, which may be termed a contingent furplus, occurring from the organization of the county of Middlefex, which I shall speak of in the order it follows with the other counties. This surplus may be added to the cities and principal towns, which will then continue to return the same number of representatives as at present, and others more only elected on this general plan, which I am defirous to render an equal and constitutional representation.

Upon the above principles of delegation, I shall organize each county, adding their prefent computed number of inhabitants, the number of reprefentatives which are now fent to Parliament, and also the hundreds and number of parishes by which each county is divided. A close regard to the minutiæ of figures is neither material or requisite. If a constitutional reform be carried into effect, a true census of inhabitants no doubt will be afcertained by accurate returns, and the number of representatives from each respective county will be rendered more strictly proportionate than a general computation can possibly regulate. BEDFORDSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 69,000—M. P. 4. The county returns two of these representatives on the landed interest, and the town of Bedford only returns the remaining two on the commercial, which at the ratio proposed are deficient to the number of people by one representative. This county is divided into nine hundreds, containing 124 parishes, and may be subdivided into three districts in the following manner:

ist District.

Reprefentatives

F

The hundreds of Wylly, Stoden, and Redbornftoke.— Every houfeholder of every parifh within this diffrict, paying fcot and lot, to vote for the election of delegates within his parifh. The number of delegates determinable by a decimation of one delegate from every ten qualified houfeholders; and the delegates of each refpective parifh, thus freely chofen to elect by ballot — at

the county town, Bedford *2

This mode of delegating the commercial interest to be general, and operate uniformly within every parish of every district within each county in the kingdom.

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Manshead, Flitt, and Clifton, — at } the town of Dunstable

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bigglefwade, Wixamtree, and Barford, at } the town of Bigglefwade

* One is added to this number from the furplus arifing from the organization of the county of Middlefex.

BERKSHIRE.-Inhabitants, 104,000.-M. P. 9. which give a furplus of two Members above the propoled ratio, allowing for two Knights of the Shire which the county returns on the landed intereft. It is divided into twenty hundreds, and may be fub-divided into the five following diftricts.

ift DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Reading, Theal, Faircrofs, and Kent-bury ______ 2t } the county town, Reading *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Ripples Moor, Bray, Bernersh, and the town of Windsor *2 Cookham, at]

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Hormer, Oke, Ganfield, Farringdon, and the town of Abingdon at | Shrievenham,

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Sonninge, Wargrove, and Charlton, at } the town of Oakingham 1

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Morton, Compton, Wanting, and the town of Wallingford ĸ Lambourn, at

* To each of these numbers one is added from the furplus.

BUCKING-

Reprefentatives

I

BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 118,000.— M. P. 14, which give a furplus of 6 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft, and is divided into eight hundreds, containing 185 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the five following diftricts.

Representatives.

ist District.

The hundred of Buckingham, the county town, Bucking-______ at ham _____*2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Ayle(bury and Afhenden, - at $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{the town of Ayle(bury} \\ - \text{the town of Ayle(bury} \end{array} \right\}$

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Difborough, at the town of High Wickham 1

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Newport and The town of Stony Strat-Cotflane, — — at ford — —

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Burnham and the town of Ameriham — at

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

CAMBRIDGE-

1

CAMBRIDGESHIRE.—Inhabitants.—145,000.— M. P. 6, which are deficient to the number of people by 3. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft, and two reprefentatives are returned by the University of Cambridge, which return may continue. It is divided into 17 hundreds, containing 163 parishes, and may be fubdivided into the five following districts.

ist District.

Representatives. town. Cam-

The hundreds of Flendish, The county town, Cam-Chefterton, and Staine, at bridge - -

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Ely, Northflow, and Papworth, at the city of Ely

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Chevely, Stapleho, Radfield, and Chilford, — — at } the town of Newmarket **1**

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Armingford, Southftow, Wetherly, Triplow, Wittlesford, — at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Wifbich and Wifbford, _____ at } the town of Wifbich _____ t

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

CHESHIRE.

CHESHIRE.—Inhabitants, 147,000.—M. P. 4, which are deficient to the number of people by 5. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed interest, and is divided into seven hundreds, containing 87 Parishes, each of which may conflitute a district.

ist District.

The hundred of Wirehall, at the city of Chefter - *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Namptwich, at the town of Namptwich

3d DISTRICT.

Thehundred of Macclesfield, at the town of Macclesfield - r

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Northwich, at the town of Congleton - 1

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Broxton, at the town of Malpas - I

6th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Bucklow, at the town of Knotsford - 1

7th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Edifbury, at the town of Frodfham - I

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

CORNWALL.

Reprefentatives.

CORNWALL.—Inhabitants, 154,000.—M.P.44, which give a furplus of 35 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft, to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into nine hundreds, containing 161 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the feven following diffricts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The hundred of East, - at the county town, Launceston *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Kerryer, ' at the town of Falmouth -

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Powden, at the town of Truro

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Trigg and Pider, _____ at } the town of Bodmin ____

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Weft, - at the town of Lefkard - I

6th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Penwith, at the town of Penfance -

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Lefnowith and Stratton, _____ at } the town of Camelford _____

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

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CUMBERLAND.—Inhabitants, 82,200.—M. P.6, which are proportionate to the number of people. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into five wards, containing 58 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the three following diffricts.

ist District.

Representatives

The wards of Cumberland and Efkdale, ______ at } the city of Carlifle ___ 2

2d DISTRICT.

The ward of Southallerdale, at the town of Whitehaven

3d DISTRICT.

The wards of Leath and North, _______ the town of Penrith _______

DERBYSHIRE,

DERBYSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 131,000.—M. 2. which are deficient to the number of people by 4. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into fix hundreds, containing 106 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the four following diftricts.

ift District.

Representatives

The hundreds of Morlestone, Appletree, and Reppington, at } the county town, Derby 3

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Scarfdale, at the town of Chefterfield .

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Winkfworth, at the town of Afhborn -

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of High Peak, at the town of Bakwell -

DEVON_

DEVONSHIRE-Inhabitants, 304,000-M.P.26, which give a furplus of q above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed interest; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 33 hundreds, containing 294 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the eleven following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Representatives

The hundreds of Wonford, Clifton and Exminiter, at } the city of Exeter

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Roborough, the town of Plymouth at

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Branton, Show-ell, and South Moulton, at } the town of Barnstable

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tiverton, Hal-berton, Haurudge, and Weft } the town of Tiverton Budley, at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Taviftock and Lifton ______ the town of Taviftock

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Fremington, Black Torrington, and Taw- } the town of Torrington at

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7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Colridge and stanborough, _____ at the town of Dartmouth _____

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Shebbear and Hartland, _____ at } the town of Biddeford _____

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Axminfter, Culliton, Ottery, Budley, and Hemyoke, _____ at } the town of Honiton _____;

10th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tingbridge, part of Hawrudge and Heytor, ______ at } the town of Ashburton __ r

11th DISTRICT.

the hundreds of Crediton Witheridge, and Winkley — at } the town of Crediton — 1

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

DORSET-

DORSETSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 146,000. M. P. 20, which give a furplus of 11 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large a maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 29 hundreds, containing 248 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the feven following diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives.

The hundreds of George, Totcomb and Woodbury, Puddleton, and Bere, — at

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Culliton, Winfrith, Rufhmore, Haflar, Rowbarrow, and Ugfcomb, ______ at _____ Melcomb Regis ____*2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Church, Benunfter, and Redhove, at } the town of Lyme Regis - r

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Cogdean, Badbury, Knowlton, and Pimperne, _____ at } the town of Pool _____ a

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Goderthorn and Bridport, Tollerford and Eggarton, _____ at } the town of Bridport ___ r

6th DISTRICT.

The hundredsof Upwim(born, Redlane, Newton, and Cranborn, _______ at } the town of Shaftesbury _____ I

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Sherborn, Buckland, Whiteway, Yetminifer, and Brownfell, —} the town of Sherborn — I

** One to each of these numbers is added from the Surplus.

DURHAM.—Inhabitants, 100,000.—M. P. 4, which are deficient to the number of people by 3. This county returns two representatives on the landed interest. It is divided into four wards, containing 84 parishes, each of which wards may constitute a District.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives The ward of Chefter, — at the city of Durham — 2

2d DISTRICT.

The ward of Eafington, - at the town of Sunderland - f

2d DISTRICT.

The ward of Darlington, - at the town of Darlington - i

4th DISTRICT.

The ward of Stockton, - at the town of Stockton - i

ESSEX.——Inhabitants, 214,000.—M. P. 8, which are deficient to the number of people by 5. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed interest, and being a large maritime county, another representative, taken from the Cinque Ports, may be added to that number. It is divided into 19 hundreds, containing 415 parishes, and may be subdivided into the eight following districts.

ist District.

Representatives

The hundreds of Chelmsford, Witham, and Dunmow, at } the county town, Chelmsford 2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Lexden and the town of Colchefter - 2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tendring Winftree, and Thurstable, at } the town of Harwich --

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Dengy and the town of Malden -

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Becontree and Havering Liberty, _____ at } the town of Rumford _____

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Ongar, Waltham, and Harlow, — at } the town of Chipping Ongar t

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Uuttlesford, Clavering, and Freihwell, at } the town of Saffron Walden

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Chafford and the town of Brentwood — a

GLOUCESTERSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 164,000.— M. P. 8, which are deficient to the number of people by 2. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into 30 hundreds, containing 280 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the fix following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of King's Barton and Dudíton, Weft Bur, St. Briavel's, Brideflow, and Dutchy, <u> at</u> the city of Gloucefter <u> a</u>

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Crawthorn and Minety, Britwells Barrows, Rapigate, Bradley, and Slaughter, <u>—</u> at

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tewkefbury, Tiblefton, Weftminfter, Bottoe, Deerhurft, _____ at } the town of Tewkefbury *2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Cheltenham, Cleeve, and Kiftgate, at } the town of Cheltenham

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Longtree, Berkley, Whifton, Bifley, and Thornbury, — at

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Grumbaldah, Puclechurch, Langley Wineshead, and Henbury, — at

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

HAMPSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 170,000.—M.P.26, which give a furplus of 16 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 37 hundreds, containing 253 parifles, and may be fubdivided into the eight following diftricts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

1 *2

The hundreds of Buddlefgate, King's Somborn, Fawley, Barton-Stacey, and Mainfborough, ______at

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Pontfdown, Bofmere, Titchfield, Bishops-Walthani, ______ at } the town of Portfmouth __ *z

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Redbridge, Manfbridge, and New Foreft, ______ at } the town of Southampton *2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of East Medham } Issee of Wight, and West Medham, — at the town of Newport

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Ringwood, Fordingbridge, and Chriftchurch, ______ at } the town of Ringwood _____ r

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Andover, Thorngate, Wherwell, Aftrow, Evingar, Kingfclear, and Overton, _____ at

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7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bafingfloke, Chutely, Holdfhot, Odiham, Crondal, Bermondfpitt, and Michael Dever, — at

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Finchdean, Eaft Meon, Meonftoke, Alton, Selborn, and Bifhop's-Sutton, ______ at

**** One is added to each of these numbers from the furplus.

HARTFORDSHIRE.—-Inhabitants, 103,000.— M. P. 6, which are deficient to the number of people by 1. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into eight hundreds, containing 121 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the five following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Ducorum, at the town of Tring - 1

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

HEREFORDSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 98,000.— M. P. 8, which give a furplus of 1 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into 11 hundreds, containing 176 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the five following diffricts.

ist District.

Representatives.

The hundreds of Grimfworth, Webtree, and Ewayflacey, at the city of Hereford — *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Wolphy and Wigmore, _____ at the town of Leominster __ 19

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Greytree and Wormlow, _____ at the town of Rofs _____r

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Radlow and Broxafh ______ at the town of Ledbury ____

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Stretford and Huntington, _____ at the town of Weobly _____ r

* One is added to this number from the furplus,

HUNTING-

HUNTINGDONSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 57,000.— M. P. 4, which are deficient to the number of people by 1. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into four hundreds, containing 78 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the two following diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Norman Crofs and Huntingstone, at } the county town, Huntingdon 2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tofeland and Leighton fore, ______ at } the town of St. Neot's _____ r

KENT.

KENT.—Inhabitants, 257,000.—M. P. 26, which give a furplus of 11 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 62 hundreds, containing 408 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the eleven following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Representatives

The hundreds of Bridge and Petham, Weftgate, Down Chamford, Kinghamford, Stowting, Bircholtfranchife,

2d DISTRICT.

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Maidstone, Larkfield, Eyhorn, Twiford, Rotham, Marden, Cranbrook, Barkley, and Rolvenden, ______ at

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bewiburough, Folkestone, Loningborough, Heane, and Streats, at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Eaftrey, Cornilo, Wingham, and Prefton, _____ at } the town of Sandwich ____ z

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6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of New Church, Langport, Allowfbridge, Ham, Worth, Oxney, Tenthe town of New Romney terden, and Blackborn, at

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Blengate, Ifle of Thanet, Ringflow, and the town of Margate at Whitstable,

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Feversham, Bocton, Felborough, Chart and Longbridge, and Tenthe town of Feversham - 1 ham,

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Dartford and Wilmington, Axftane, Godf- the town of Dartford heath, Somerden, and Wefterham, at at]

10th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Blackheath, Bromley, Beckenham, Rookef- the town of Greenwich I ley, and Lefnefs at

11th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tunbridge, Watlingston, Brencley and Horfmunden, Weft and East the town of Tunbridge -Barnfield and Selbrittenden, at

*** One is added to each of these numbers from the surplus.

LANCASHIRE.

LANCASHIRE.——Inhabitants, 260,000.— M. P. 14, which are deficient to the number of people by 1. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into fix hundreds, containing 61 parifhes; each of thefe hundreds may conflitute a diftrict.

ist District.

Representatives

The hundred of Fournefs or Loynfdale ______ at } the county town, Lancaster z

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of West Derby at the town of Liverpool - 3

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Salford - at the town of Manchefter 3

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Mounderness at the town of Preston ---- z

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Layland - at the town of Wigan - 2

6th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Blackburn — at the town of Blackburn 2

LEICESTERSHIRE.

LEICESTERSHIRE.——Inhabitants, 116,000.— M. P. 4, which are deficient to the number of people by 4. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into fix hundreds, containing 192 parifhes; each of thefe hundreds may conftitute a diffrict.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives The hundred of East Goscote, at the county town, Leicester *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Weft Gofcote, at the town of Loughborough 1

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Gartrey - at the town of Harborough I

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Framland, - at the town of Milton Mowbray 1

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Goodlaxton, at the town of Lutterworth 1

6th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Sparkingho, at the town of Hinckley - r

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

LINCOLN-

LINCOLNSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 252,000.— M. P. 12, which are deficient to the number of people by 3. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 30 hundreds, containing 630 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the fix following diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Lawris, Lincoln Liberty, Wraggot, and Gartrey ______ at } the city of Lincoln _____ 3

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Neffe, Ellow Kirton, Aveland, Beltiflow, and Afwardburn, — at

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Grantham, Wiverbridge, Loveden, Flaxwell, Boothby, and Lango, at }

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Skirbeck, Horncaftle, Bullingbrook, Candlefhow, Hill, and Calceworth ______at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bradley, Ludbrough, Louthcafk, Walfhcroft, and Yarburough, at

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Corringham, Manlake, Aflacote, and Well, at

MIDDLESEX.----Inhabitants, 1,350,000.-M. P. 8. The fmallnefs of this county, and the immense number of people it contains, would feem to obviate this mode for an equal reprefentation, as there is a deficiency in the prefent return from this county of no lefs than 59 reprefentatives. The county returns two representatives on the landed interest, and is divided into feven hundreds, containing 200 parishes, and may be fub-divided into the eleven following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

The city of London, from the earlieft periods of hiftory, has been diftinguished by privi-leges peculiar to itself, and on the mode proposed must ftand an exception to the propoled ratio; for agreeably to that it fhould return forty representatives, which is a proportion, it will readily be allowed, as much too great as the prefent num- > the city of London ber are too few, when its population and high importance in the State are duly confidered. To reconcile this objection, eight reprefentatives may be affigned to the city of London, to be elected in the ufual manner as the livery are in general, a class removed from the lower or ders of people."

2d Di-

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2d DISTRICT.

The parifies within the liberties of Westminster to elect on the general mode propofed, by delegates returned from each parifh, which will have this good effect, there the city of Westminster electioneering, or an eternal fcrutiny, and the inhabitants will always have it in their power to elect independent and able men at

Reprefentatives

2d DISTRICT.

The Kenfington division of the hundred of Offulfton - at the town of Brentford

4th DISTRICT.

The Holborn division of the hundred of Offulfton -at the town of Hampflead -2

5th DISTRICT.

The Finibury division of the hundred of Offulfton — at the town of Highgate

6th DISTRICT.

The Tower division of the hundred of Offulfton — at the town of Hackney — z

7th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Edmonton, at the town of Enfield 2

Sth DISTRICT.

The hundred of Iftleworth, at the town of Hounflow - 2

oth DISTRICT.

The hundred of Spelthorne, at the town of Staines -

10th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Goare, at the town of Stanmore

11th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Elthorne — at the town of Uxbridge — 2

F. 243 1

MONMOUTHSHIRE .- Inhabitants, 42,000. M. P. 4, which are proportionate to the number of people. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into fix hundreds, containing 127 Parishes, and may be subdivided into the two following diffricts. and and the second

ift District.

Reprefentatives

on a strand

The hundred of Skinfrith, Ragland, Trelech, and Calde- } the county town, Monmouth *2 at l cot.

1.11.2 Mar . . . od DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bergavenny, Wenlooge, and Ufk _____ at } the town of Abergavenny

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

. 7

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NORFOLK.—Inhabitants, 285,000.—M. P. 12, which are deficient to the number of people by 4. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 31 hundreds, containing 660 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the eleven following diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Taverham, Blowfield, and Humbleyard, at the city of Norwich - *4

2d DISTRICT.

* E

The hundreds of Grimfhoe, Shropeham, and Gilecrofs, the town of Thetford - 2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of East Flegg, West Flegg, and Walsham, at } the town of Yarmouth - 2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Freebridge and Clackclofe — at } the town of Lynn Regis — 1

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Greenhoe, Wayland, and Laundich, at the town of Swaffham - 1

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Foreho, Milford, and Eynsford — at } the town of Wymondham 1

7th D1-

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7th DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

ť.

The hundreds of North Er-pington, Holt, and North at

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Disse, Earls-ham, and Depwade, at } the town of Disse

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Gallow, Smethdon, and Brother Crofs, the town of Fakenham — I at |

10th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Loddon, Cla-vering, and Henfted at } the town of Loddon τ

11th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tunfted, Hap-

X Two are added to this number from the furplus.

NORTH-

[246.]

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 158,000. M: P. 9, which are deficient to the number of people by 1. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into twenty hundreds, containing 326 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the fix following diftricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Representatives.

The hundreds of Nafaburgh, Willibrook, Polbrook, Corby, and Navisford — at

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Spelho, New Bott Legrove, and Wimer-	the county	town,	North-7	•
fley at]			ر ہ	-

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Higham, Ferris, Huxlow, and Rothwell, at

4th DISTRICT.

the town of Daventry - I den, and Norton, - at the town of Daventry

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Towcester, Clely, and Sutton — at the town of Towcester — r

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Hamfordfnew, Orlingbury, and Guilefburough ______at

Northum-

NORTHUMBERLAND.—Inhabitants, 142,000.— M. P. 8, which are deficient to the number of people by 1. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into feven wards, containing 460 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the five following diftricts.

, ist District.

Reprefentatives. - at the county town, Newcaftle *4

The ward of Caftle - at

2d DISTRICT.

The wards of Islandshire, Glendale, and Bamburg, at the town of Berwick - 2

3d DISTRICT.

The ward of Coquetdale, - at the town of Alnwick ----- 1

4th DISTRICT.

The ward of Morpeth, ____ at the town of Morpeth ____ I

5th DISTRICT.

The ward of Tindall _____ at the town of Hexham ____ I

* Two are added to this number from the furplus.

NOTTING-

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Nortinghamshire.—Inhabitants, 168,000.— M. P. S, which are proportionate to the number of people. This county returns two representatives on the landed interest. It is divided into fix wapointakes, containing 168 parilhes, and may be fubdivided into the five following diffricts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The wapontakes of Thurgafton } the county town, Nottingand Rufcliff _____ at } ham _____ }2

2d DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Newark and Bingham, _____ at } the town of Newark ____ *2

3d DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Broxftow, at the town of Mansheld - 1

4th DISTRICT.

The Hatfield division of Baffetlaw wapontake _____ at } the town of Workfop _____ z

The North and South Clay division of Baffetlaw wapontake ______ at

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

I DESCRIPTION OF A DESC

OXFORDSHIRE. Inhabitants, 128,000. M. P. 9, which are proportionate to the number of people. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft, and two reprefentatives are returned from the University of Oxford, which return may still continue. It is divided into 14 hundreds, containing 280 parishes, and may be subdivided into the five following districts.

ist District.

Representatives.

The hundred of Bullington and Wotton, _____at } the city of Oxford _____ *2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Banbury, Bloxham, and Ploughley, at } the town of Banbury — r

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Binfield, Langtree, Ewelin, and Dorchefter ______ at } the town of Henley _____ r

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tame, Lewknor, and Pirton, _____ at } the town of Tame _____ t

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Bampton and Chadlington _____ at } the town of Witney _____ t

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

RUTLAND-

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RUTLANDSHIRE.——Inhabitants, 20,000. M. P. 2, which are returned by the landed intereft only. This county being fo very fmall, one reprefentative may be taken from the landed intereft, and be affigned to the commercial, to be elected by delegates from every parifh within the county, at the county town, Okeham.

SHROPSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 145,000.—M.P.12, which give a furplus of 3 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into 15 hundreds, containing 170 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the feven following diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives

SOMERSETHIRE. Inhabitants, 302,000. M. P. 18, which give a furplus of 1 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 43 hundreds, containing 385 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the nine following diffricts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Hare Cliff, with Bedminfter, Portbury, and Chew _____ at } the city of Briftol _____

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds	of Bathforum,		1 I'
Keynfham,	Wellow, and	the city of Bath	24
Chewton	at		.5,

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Wellsforum, Winterstoke, Bemftone, and the city of Wells _____ Glaston Hydes ____ at

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Taunton Dean, Andersfield, Kiníbury Weft, Melverton, North Currey, Abdick, and Bulfdon, _____ at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of North Petherton, Connington, Huntípill, with Puriton and Whitley, at

6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Frome, Whitftone, Brewton, Norton, the town of Frome Ferrars, and Kilmerfdon, at

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Caerhampton, Wilmington, and Freemannors, ______ at } the town of Minehead _____

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Tintinhull, Somerton, Martock, South Petherton, Kingfbury, and Crewkhorn ______ at

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Horethorn, Cattefafh, Stone and Yeovil, Berwick, Cocker, and Hunfbero, ______ at } the town of Milbornport - r

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

STAFFORDSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 196,000. M. P. 10, which are deficient to the number of people by 2. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed interest. It is divided into five hundreds, containing 130 parishes, each of which hundreds may constitute a district.

Ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives The hundred of Offlow, — at the city of Litchfield — 2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Cudlestone, at the county town, Stafford 2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Seifdon, - at the town of Wolverhampton 2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Totmanslow, at the town of Uttoxeter - 2

5th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Pyrehill - at { the town of Newcaftle un- }2

SUFFOLK.—Inhabitants, 202,000.—M. P. 16, which give a furplus of 4. This county returns two representatives on the landed interest; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 22 hundreds, containing 575 parishes, and may be subdivided into the nine following districts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Carlesford, Colneis, Sampford, and the Liberties of Ipfwich, — at the town of Ipfwich — 2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Thingow, } the town of St. Edmonds-Thedwastre, and Lackford, at } bury

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Baberge and Rifbridge ______ at the town of Sudbury _____ t

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Stowey and Blackbourn, <u>at</u> the town of Stowmarket <u>r</u>

The hundred of Loofe, Wilford, and Thredling, — at the town of Woodbridge c 6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Hartefmere and Hoxon _____ at the town of Eye _____ I

7th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Cosford, Bofmore, and Cleydon, — at] the town of Hadleigh — i 8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Plumfgate, and Blithing _____ at the town of Aldborough ____ t

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Wangford and Lothingland — at the town of Beckles — t

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

SURREY.—Inhabitants, 225,000.—M. P. 14; which give a furplus of one above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into 14 hundreds, containing 140 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the fix following diffricts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The hundred of Brixton, at the borough of Scuthwark *4

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Woking, Chertfey, and Farnham, at the county town, Guildford 2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Kingfton and Emly, _____ at } the town of Kingfton __ 2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Croydon and Copthorne _____ at the town of Croydon __ 2

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Ryegate, Dorking, and Tanridge, — at the town of Ryegate

6th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Godalming and Blackheath — at the town of Godalming — I

* Two are added to this number from the furplus,

SUSSEX.

SUSSEX.—Inhabitants, 298,000.—M. P. 20, which give a furplus of 3 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft; to which number, being a large maritime county, may be added another, taken from the Cinque Ports. It is divided into 65 hundreds, containing 312 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the 12 following diftricts.

ift DISTRICT,

Reprefentatives

Th	e hundred	is of Bole	ham,	e 1	
1	Weft Bourn	1 and Singl	eton,	the city of Chichester	
1	Manhood,	Aldweek,	and	sthe city of Chichener	4
	Dumford		at		

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Barcomb, Dorfett, Loxfield, Rotherfield, and Loxfield Baker, at

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Whaleftone, Prefton, Youfinere, Fifhers, Gater, Burbech, and Prefton, _______at the town of Brighton _____2

4th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Guefling, Baldfloe, Bexhill, Nenfield, the town of Haftings ---- I Battell, and Netherfield, at

5th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Goldfpur, Staple, Goftröw, Henhurft, the town of Rye ______ and Shoyfwell, ______ at]

6th

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6th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Grinstead, Buttinghill, Rushmonden, and Hartfield, _____ at

7th District.

The hundreds of East Eastwrith, Shinglecrofs, and Rotherbridge ______ at } the town of Horsham _____ t

8th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of East Bourne, Longbridge, Dill, and Pefey Liberty and Foxearle, at

9th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Avisford, Poling, and Brightford, — at } the town of Arundel — r

10th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Stenning, West Grinstead, Windham, the town of Stenning — 1 and Tipnoake, — at

11th DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Eafbourne and Weft Eaftwrith, — at } the town of Midhurft — r

12th District.

The hundreds of Willingdon, Alcifton, Totnore, Shiplake, and Hauxborough — at

WARWICK:

S

WARWICKSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 198,000.— M. P. 6, which are deficient to the number of people by 6. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into five hundreds, containing 158 parishes, and may be fubdivided into the four following districts.

ift District.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Knightlow, and Coventry county at the city of Coventry _____3

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Kineton - at the town of Warwick - 2

3d DISTRICT.

The hundred of Hemlingford, at the town of Birmingham 3

4th DISTRICT.

The hundred of Barlichway, { at the town of Stratford on Avon _____ }z

WESTMORE-

WESTMORELAND.—Inhabitants, 44,000. M. P. 4, which are proportionate to the number of people. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into four wards, containing 26 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the two following Diffricts.

ist District.

Reprefentatives The eaft and weft wards — at the county town Appleby *2

2d DISTRICT.

The wards of Kendal and Lonfdale ______at } the town of Kendal _____

* One is added to this number from the furplus.

WILTS HIRE.

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WILTSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 175,000.—M.P. 34, which give a furplus of 23 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed interest. It is divided into 29 hundreds, containing 304 parishes, and may be subdivided into the feven following districts.

ist District.

Representatives The hundreds of Underditch, Downton, Cawden and Cad-the city of Salifoury worth, Chalke, and Dauworth 2d DISTRICT. The hundreds of Swanborough, Melkfham, Bradford, Whor- the town of Devizes at welfdon, 2d DISTRICT. The hundreds of Selkley, Ramf-) bury, Kingfbridge, and Kin- } the town of Marlborough at 1 wafton, 4th DISTRICT. The hundreds of Malmefbury, The town of Malmefbury — I 5th DISTRICT. The hundreds of Chippenham, Pottern Canigs, and Calne, the town of Chippenham 1 at 6th DISTRICT. The hundreds of Amefbury, Elftube and Everley, Branch { the town of Amefbury I and Dole au 7th DISTRICT. The hundreds of Warminfter, Weftbury, Hatefbury, Da- the town of Warminfter -I merham, and Mere, at | * One is added to this number from the Surplus.

WORCESTERSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 132,000.— M. P. 9, which give a furplus of 1 above the ratio. This county returns two reprefentatives on the landed intereft. It is divided into five hundreds, containing 152 parifhes, and may be fubdivided into the three following diffricts.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

The hundreds of Worcefter and Upton $\underbrace{}_{at}$ the city of Worcefter $\underbrace{}_{at}$ 2

2d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Blaken, Ofwaldeflaw, and Perfhore, at the town of Evenham

3d DISTRICT.

The hundreds of Halfshire and Doddigtree - at the town of Kidderminster 2

YORKSHIRE

YORKSHIRE.—Inhabitants, 614,000.—M.P.30. This extensive county returns two representatives on the landed interest; to which number may be added four more, taken from the Cinque Ports, which will give two representatives for each of the three ridings by which the county is divided. It is also divided into 24 wapontakes, containing 563 parishes, and may be subdivided into the nineteen following districts.

ift DISTRICT.

Reprefentatives

The wapontakes of Bulmer, Oufe and Darwent, and An- } the city of York	4
fty Liberty, at]	,

2d DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Skirack, — at the town of Leeds — 2

3d DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Harthill, Buckrafe, and Hawdenthire, at

4th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Morley, - at the town of Hallifax - 2

5th DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Holdernefs, Dickering, and Kingfton county _____ at } the town of Hull _____ 2

6th DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Strafford and Tickhill — at the town of Sheffield — 2

7th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Agbridge, at the town of Wakefield - 2

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8th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Barston, - at the town of Pontefract - 2

oth DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Gilling Weft and Hangweft - at the town of Richmond -2

10th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Hallikeld and Hang Eaft _____ at the town of Rippon ____ 2

11th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Claro, - at the town of Knarefborough 1

12th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Staincrofs, at the town of Barnfley - 1

13th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Ofgodcrofs, at the town of Doncafter - I

14th DISTRICT.

The wapontakes of Staincliff and New Crofs _____ at the town of Settle _____ B

15th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Pickering, at the town of Scarborough z

16th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Burdforth, at the town of Thirfk - 1

17th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Rydall - at the town of New Malton 1

18th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Lambargh the town of Guisborough - 1

19th DISTRICT.

The wapontake of Gilling east and Allertonshire — at the town of Northallerton

The

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The Principality of Wales, confifting of twelve counties, fends to Parliament twenty-four Reprefentatives; twelve of whom are returned on the landed intereft, and twelve by the commercial; which as a province of the State, and of the leaft importance in the fcale of commerce, its products arifing chiefly from pafturage, may be confidered as equivalent to the number of inhabitants, which are computed at about 320,000. The only arrangement in this principality which may be propofed would be to elect the reprefentatives on the fame general mode of delegation as that offered for the Commons of England, and that two reprefentatives be returned from each county to join the Convention propofed for a Parliamentary reform.

Before a mode of reform be offered for a more equal reprefentation in Scotland, it may be ufeful to ftate the prefent mode by which the reprefentatives of the Scottifh Burghs are elected, which we learn by an addrefs from a committee of citizens at Edinburgh to the Burgeffes and Heritors *. " Now we appeal to you, Gentlemen, how far " you enjoy the invaluable privilege of election, " which as Britifh fubjects is your birth-right. " Do you elect your reprefentatives in Parliament ? " No—The Town Councils are the *fole* electors. If Do you elect the Town Councils ? No—The

P. 13 and 14.

" Parliament

" Town Councils elect themfelves. Thus the " Burgeffes of Scotland have not the most distant " connexion with the legiflative body of the realm. " They have not the most indirect representation " to Parliament. The Councils are the abfolute " electors both of themfelves and of our reprefen-" tatives in Parliament. Can we then, Gentlemen, " be faid to enjoy freedom or the rights of Bri-" tilh fubjects ? Surely not. We leave it to your-" felves, Gentlemen, to judge whether or not this " be our present fituation. Are our representa-" tives in Parliament poffeffed of the qualities, or " actuated by the principles of true patriots? Are " they men of capacity and probity? Are they ac-" quainted with the flate of our commerce and " manufactures, and attentive to our interest in " Parliament ? No; intent only on procuring " places and penfions for themfelves and adhe-" rents, they will perhaps never think of the pub-" lic welfare."

If this be the true ftate of the reprefentation of Scotland, for the honour of their nation, refpect for themfelves, and the fair fame of pofterity, the people fhould never reft till they had obtained a reform, otherwife those qualifications which the courtly intrigue of these last thirty years has been fixing on them by a few *bowing*, time-ferving, cringing, infidious, mercenary, perfevering courtiers, will be confidered as hereditary.

However

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However repugnant to conftitutional liberty the present state of the Scottish Burghs may be, arbitrary in their police, and engrofied by an Ariftocracy, it has not a neceffary relation to the difcuffion which I have prefcribed myfelf. Their internal police, however partially grievous, does not affect the whole kingdom, for political liberty certainly does not depend upon the particular privileges or fetts of this or that Burgh, or any particular cities or towns; on the contrary, they depend on the free enjoyment of this principle by the body of people. It is an universal power fpreading over the whole State; it pervades the clay-built hut as well as the ftately manfion; it is a vital principle that should be cherished in the bofom of the pooreft commoner, and by the body of people should be ever maintained pure for its own fake, and for ever be kept facred for the bleffings of liberty, which it difpenfes to all. That fo general a power fhould be prefcribed to a local fituation, to one part of the State, and not to the other, and confound the diffinction between univerfal freedom and partial flavery, involves an idea which equity and common fenfe revolts at, and is wholly inimical to the principles of the British Conftitution. Upon the leading ones of which, that there is no right without a remedy, and that no individual can be bound but by laws to which he shall have given his confent through the

the medium of his representatives. There may be added therefore to the ten representatives returned from each county in England two reprefentatives from each county in Scotland, composing a convention fworn to the express and only purpose of establifhing an equal and adequate reprefentation of the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament. It may appear unneceffary to repeat, that a reform in Parliament can never be conflictutionally effected but upon the principles of political liberty before fully stated. The spirit of the laws of England would be deeply wounded, their texture violated, and the genius of the Conflitution utterly deftroyed, if in the prefent Parliament the idea of a fupreme and an arbitrary power were confounded. If it can disfranchife one borough, why not all? If it can enact its own existence from three to feven years, why not for a century, or decree itfelf perpetual. Political liberty is expressly against fuch an usurpation; no ftatute can deprive the people of those rights which are in themfelves unalienable. The right of chufing reprefentatives to legiflate, and the limitation of their existence in that capacity, is an undoubted right of the nation, it is the focial right of every man, which no politive law can wreft from him, which our anceftors could not difpose of to the prejudice of their posterity; and if any usurped power should have violated this facred privilege, or if it should have been furrendered

dered by a corrupt Parliament, it can at any future time be lawfully refumed.

By the Act of Union, the number of representatives from Scotland to the British House of Commons was fettled to be 45-thirty of which are returned on the landed interest, and 15 on the commercial. The reafon for affigning double the number of representatives to the landed interest was of the fame impolicy which has influenced a number of Aristocratic acts fince the Revolution. The queftion of importance between the landed and commercial interest we can be at no loss to decide, when we confider the growing affluence of Scotland wholly arifes from its manufactures and commerce; and from this fource alone depends the appreciation of land and the confequence of the landholders. As commerce therefore has become the first moving principle in public affairs, and of the higheft importance to the State, the mode of reform which may be proposed for Scotland is the following.

That each fhire return one reprefentative on the commercial intereft, except the finall fhires of Cromartie, Clackmannan, and Kinrofs; and that each reprefentative be elected at the principal town within the fhire, and be termed member of that town, but to be chofen by the delegates returned by by the ceffed householders of every parish within the county, as proposed for England.

The delegates of the fhire of Cromartie may be added to thole of Nairnshire; the delegates of Clackmannan to thole of Sterlingshire, and the delegates of Kinrols to thole of Fifeshire. By uniting these small shires, there will remain an additional representative to be elected at Edinburgh, Glafgow, and Aberdeen; so that from these capital places may be returned 2 Members each to Parliament. This mode will give 33 representatives on the commercial interss, and leave 12 for the landed interss, as proposed for England; and these representatives may be returned in the lowing manner.

The Delegates from the following Shires :

Reprefentatives

1011111	2	Representatives
Edinburgh Haddington Berwick	_	
Roxborough Selkirk		
Peebles	to elect at city of Edi	nburgh 4
Dumfries Linlithgow		
Fife		
Clackmannan Kinrofs)	
Lanerk] .	
Wigton Air	to also at Clafrom	
Kirkcudbright Bute	to elect at Glafgow	2
Renfrew	J	
Aberdeen Kincardine)	
Bamff	to elect at Aberdeen	2
Elgin Perth	J	
Argyle		
Forfar Stirling	to elect at Perth	
Dumbarton	5	
Invernefs Nairne]	
Cromarie		
Caithnefs Sutherland	to elect at Inverness	2
Rofs		
Orkney	Ĺ	12

That the delegates of the people should be put to no expence in their journies and wafte of time to elect the representatives of the nation. Every fhire in England, Wales, and Scotland, fhould, by a county rate, fupport the expence of elections, as well as the annual flipends which should be allowed to the national reprefentatives during the continuance of a Parliament. On this last subject much has been faid, and many are divided in opinion; but to me this observation appears unanswerable-The very texture of the Constitution is conftructed on principles productive of a happy medium between the rigid principles of abfolute Monarchy and the lax principles of Democracy. The fame arguments therefore, taken in a conftitutional point of view, will hold good against annual Parliaments as septennial; the first having a tendency to create anarchy, the other leading to arbitrary power; and as thefe arguments are clearly deducible from every conftituent part of the Constitution, no doubt can arife that the industry and wildom of our anceftors was even directed to the grand object of tempering the two extremes of abfolute Monarchy and pure Democracy. The proper medium is therefore

TRIENNIAL PARLIAMENTS.

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THE CONCLUSION.

AFTER contemplating the Theory of our Conflitution, and minutely furveying every part of a beautiful fyftem, erected by the wifdom of ages, to counterpoile the inequality of men, to protect the virtuous from the vicious, the humble peafant from the pampered Peer, we must unite in the fentiments of eminent men of other nations, who adoring the Genius of Liberty which influenced the mind of Britannia, and adopted her the parent of Freedom, have confessed that the has given to the world an emulative and grand fyftem of political economy; a fyftem which is glorioufly intended to maintain the dignity of human nature, a fyftem, the genius of which it is to be hoped all nations may in time adopt.

But what must be the feelings, what must be the deep concern of the prefent age, to find this beautiful fabric has diverged by *practice* from that independence in its conftituent parts which is its vital principle, and decayed in its ftamina by a fundamental grievance in the reprefentation of the people? people ? The violation of the freedom of election, and the independence of Parliament, being univerfally acknowledged, fhould be with unanimity immediately remedied. Let not an enlightened people fofter on pofterity an evil, which increafing, may afford them no atonement but in the general execration of this, as a time-ferving, corrupt, and degenerate age.

A partial reform of the rotten boroughs, and the neglect of a general organization of the elective power of the people, will be attended with the fame effects. The first may give a colourable independence, but it will never produce that effential principle neceffary to preferve the freedom of the Constitution, to maintain the independence of the people from the abufe of power, and to check that tide of luxury which is fapping the vitals of the State, and which will be the most formidable enemy the freedom of Britain ever had to encounter. Her arms deceive the eye, captivate the fenfes, indulge the paffions, fubdue reafon, and triumph over reflection, enervate and weaken the powers of the Conftitution, and fink a nation into vice and infamy. It was this which was both the caufe of the fplendor and decadency of the Roman Empire. It was this which rendered the Romans incapable of maintaining their liberties; and as every effect proceeds from a caufe. T nations.

nations, like men, rife, flourish, and decay; and doubtful would be the affertion, if a man shall fay, we shall avoid a similar fate.

The true fpirit of liberty is the real fpirit of the Conftitution; and every man whole bolom glows with this noble flame, difdains the fpirit of faction; his heart exults in proud allegiance to that Supreme Power which guaranties his perfonal fecurity and private property. No greater wound can his feelings receive, than when ftern neceffity calls him forth to refift the abufe of a power created for his happinefs. His loyalty to his Sovereign, his attachment to the laws, and reverence for order, conspire to render him passive and forbearing; and in the hope of a change of men, of measures, and of time, he often fuffers anticipation of better days to fuperfede the energy of present vindication. But there is a time when even hope no longer can find a point to reft her fostering wing; those times have frequently occurred in the Hiftory of JOHN BULL; but the unity of his powers, and the energy of his fpirit, have ever regained the equilibrium; and he has taught the arbitrary Monarch, and the ambitious Aristocrat, that their only fecurity and interest is in the due exercife of their privileges, prefcribed by the laws; and that he himfelf, by knowing how to yield a grateful fubmiffion to a wife Government,

vernment, has convinced all the world that he is capable of fecuring and enjoying the higheft poffible degree of human Liberty and focial Freedom.

FINIS.





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